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Preface
This thesis was intended to be a comprehensive account of a strictly defined topic.
"The Paris Club: the Neglected Key Player in Sovereign Debt Workouts" was the title I
originally proposed, in the spring of 2008. But the real world abruptly intruded. A few
months after I finished a detailed proposal, the worst global financial crisis since the
Great Depression broke out. Working as an economist in the monetary and economic
policy departments at De Nederlandsche Bank, I could not resist spending my research
time on more topical policy issues. The result is a thesis that consists of a collection of
four empirical studies related to three distinct policy issues. Each of these issues calls
for a better understanding of changes in flows of finance in times of crisis.
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1Introduction
Since the onset of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, countries have witnessed
periods of significant declines, massive outflows, or even complete drying up of va-
rious flows of finance. What has been different this time, is that the retrenchment in
flows of finance is experienced by developed countries, and on a scale comparable
only to the period of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Given the consequences to
the real economy, much of economic and monetary policy discussions since the global
financial crisis concern the drivers of various flows of finance.
The contributions in this thesis are united by this theme, and aim to improve our
understanding of factors influencing flows of finance. In particular, the four chapters
focus on three types of finance: i) international private capital flows covering a coun-
try’s financing needs, ii) trade finance in support of international trade, and iii) bank
lending to firms. Concerns over these flows of finance came up over the course and
aftermath of the global financial crisis, in the context of three diverse policy issues.
The first policy issue concerns the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
in strengthening the international financial system. The global financial crisis marked
the revival of the IMF, with credit outstanding to its members rising from an all time
low in 2007 to an all time high in 2011 (Figure I). It also fuelled the debate on whether
the IMF should focus more on crisis prevention or resolution. One aspect of this broad
policy issue is the effectiveness of IMF interventions in countries that experience a fi-
nancial crisis – an issue that received renewed attention during the European sovereign
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Figure I. International Monetary Fund Credit Outstanding to Member States, 1984-2014
Euro Billions
Source: International Monetary Fund.
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debt crisis and subsequent participation in IMF adjustment programs of Greece (2010),
Ireland (2010), and Portugal (2011). Do IMF programs help crisis-hit countries to at-
tract private capital flows or do IMF interventions merely signal that a country is in
trouble? Chapter 1 sheds new light on this more traditional research question.
The second policy issue came up during the 2008-09 global trade collapse. In
the four-month period from October 2008 to January 2009, the volume of world trade
dropped by 17% (Figure II) – the steepest fall of world trade in recorded history (Bald-
win, 2009). Policy makers around the world raised the question whether a drying up
of trade finance contributed to the decline in trade flows, and whether governments
and central banks should intervene to support trade finance. Motivated by this policy
discussion, Chapters 2 and 3 study private trade credit insurance – a specific form of
Introduction 3
Figure II. World Trade Volume, 1992-2014
Index: October 2008=100
Source: CPB World Trade Monitor.
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trade finance used by firms to cover the risk of non-payment on short-term trade trans-
actions. Chapter 2 examines the influence of claims shocks on the quantity and price
of private export credit insurance provided by a global insurer. Subsequently, Chapter
3 estimates the private export credit insurance effect on trade.
The third and final policy issue is about bank lending to firms; an issue that is still
at the top of the policy agenda in many European countries, including The Netherlands.
Since 2009, bank lending to firms across Europe declined significantly (Figure III). A
key question is to what extent supply and demand factors contribute to this decline.
In the context of this policy debate, Chapter 4 studies the influence of bank lending
standards on the supply of bank lending to firms in The Netherlands.
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Figure III. Bank Lending to Non-Financial Corporations, 2004-2014
Annual growth rate
Source: ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse.
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Do IMF programs stimulate private capital flows to crisis-hit
countries?
Chapter 1 relates to the first policy issue on the role of the IMF in strengthening the
international financial system, and examines whether countries that experience a finan-
cial crisis can attract private capital inflows by participating in an economic adjustment
program by the IMF. This so-called "catalytic effect" of IMF programs is important to
cover part of a country’s financing gap: the difference between the country’s finan-
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cing needs (maturing debts and ongoing deficits) and private capital inflows. When
the IMF fails to catalyse private capital inflows, a financing gap remains, and a break-
down of the IMF program becomes more likely.
The catalytic role of the IMF has received much research attention. Theoreti-
cal contributions have shown that there are two reasons why an IMF program could
catalyse private capital inflows. First, the policy conditions attached to an IMF pro-
gram could signal to private creditors a country’s willingness to reform and stave off
default (Marchesi and Thomas, 1999; Tirole, 2002). Second, the liquidity provision
by the IMF alleviates the country’s costs of implementing adjustment policies, thereby
lowering the likelihood of default (Morris and Shin, 2006; Corsetti, Guimarães and
Roubini, 2006). Yet, existing empirical studies either reject the idea of IMF programs
stimulating private capital flows (Özler, 1993; Bird and Rowlands, 2002, 2008, 2009;
Jensen, 2004; Edwards, 2006) or find only a positive effect on bond issuances and
spreads within a limited group of countries with an "intermediate" level of external
debt or reserves (Mody and Saravia, 2006; Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody, 2006).
Chapter 1 re-examines the catalytic effect of IMF programs on private capital
flows by distinguishing between IMF programs in defaulting and non-defaulting coun-
tries. So far, the empirical literature has largely ignored the fundamental difference be-
tween countries that keep servicing their debt and countries that default on their debt,
while from a theoretical point of view an IMF program is unlikely to catalyse private
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capital flows when a country defaults. A standard country-level data set and instru-
mental variable approach is used to account for the nonrandom selection of countries
that participate in an IMF program; i.e. countries sign an IMF program when they face
a financial crisis, and accordingly are less likely to attract private capital flows. To con-
trol for this sample selection, variables that measure a country’s political or economic
proximity to the United States – IMF’s major shareholder – are used as instruments
for IMF program participation (Barro and Lee, 2005). Notably, our ex post selection
of IMF programs in non-defaulting countries – countries that did not restructure their
debt in the same year the IMF program is signed – does not introduce a sample selec-
tion bias, since debt restructuring agreements are often the deliberate outcome of the
financing packages supporting IMF programs.
Applying the instrumental variable model, we find that IMF programs catalyse
private capital flows to countries that do not restructure their commercial or official
debt. This finding sheds new light on the empirical rejection of Fund catalysis of
private capital flows in previous studies. Moreover, since this result appears to hold
almost irrespective of a country’s level of debt or reserves, it suggests that the scope for
IMF catalysis is broader than found in previous studies that focus on bond issuances
and spreads. Finally, regarding the mechanism underlying IMF catalysis, the evidence
suggests that the signalling role is more important than the size of IMF lending. This
chapter is published in The World Economy (van der Veer and de Jong, 2013).
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Do shocks to private export credit insurance impact on trade?
Chapters 2 and 3 concern the role of trade finance in world trade, and focus on private
trade credit insurance which covers risk of non-payment in domestic and international
trade. Recent studies have shown that shocks to the supply of bank-intermediated trade
finance affect international trade (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Niepmann and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr, 2013). While banks are the primary suppliers of trade finance, a focus
on banks exclusively could give an incomplete picture of trade finance constraints in
times of crisis, such as during the 2008-09 global trade collapse. Indeed, private trade
credit insurers – covering EUR1.97 trillion of domestic and international trade in 2013
(ICISA, 2014) – are economically relevant players in the market for trade finance too.
Due to lack of data, however, very little is known about the influence of shocks on the
availability of private trade credit insurance and the impact on trade.
A few studies have examined the trade-promoting role of public export credit
agencies (Egger and Url, 2006; Moser, Nestmann and Wedow, 2008; Felbermayr and
Yalcin, 2013), but private export credit insurance differs in important ways from public
guarantees. A key difference is that private export credit insurance mostly covers short-
term credits with a tenure of 60 to 120 days, while public guarantees generally cover
projects with a duration between 2 and 5 years. Within the European Union, public ex-
port credit agencies have since 1998 even been restricted from providing guarantees on
export credits with a maturity of less than two years. As a result, private insurers dom-
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inate the market for short-term trade credit insurance in Europe. Another difference
relates to country coverage. Private insurers traditionally cover risks on trade between
firms in OECD countries, whereas governments mainly cover risks on exports to high
risk countries. In short, private export credit insurance is also, and in particular, im-
portant in facilitating short-term trade flows between firms in developed countries.
This thesis provides the first two studies on private trade credit insurance. Both
studies use the same unique bilateral country-level data set covering worldwide insur-
ance underwriting by a global trade credit insurer; one of the "Big Three" private trade
credit insurers (Euler Hermes, Atradius, and Coface) which together cover 86 percent
of the world market. The data set includes yearly observations on the value of bilateral
exports covered with export credit insurance, premium income received, and claims
paid, covering 25 exporting countries and 183 destination countries in the period from
1992 to 2006.
Chapter 2 estimates the effect of claims incurred by the global trade credit insurer
on its quantity and price of export credit insurance. The claims effects are identified
within a pair of countries over time. To absorb the influence on insurance underwriting
of factors other than claims, a fixed effects model is estimated (see i.e. Khwaja and
Mian, 2008). Country-pair fixed effects control for bilateral heterogeneity, and time-
varying country fixed effects account for all country-specific insurance supply-and-
demand shocks in both exporting and destination countries.
Outline 9
The findings show that a doubling of claims (as experienced by private trade
credit insurers in 2008) results, on average, in a decline in the share of bilateral ex-
ports insured by about 11% and rise in premium level by about 4%. The price effect
disappears in the year following the claims increase, while the quantity effect per-
sists somewhat longer and dies away in the second year following the rise in claims.
Moreover, these benchmark claims effects increase when the insurer makes a loss and
further rise with the size of the loss – up to three times the size of the benchmark ef-
fects. Importantly, since the demand for export credit insurance relative to the total
value of exports tends to increase in adverse economic circumstances (when claims
increase), the estimated decline in the share of bilateral exports insured is likely to
be supply-driven. Finally, the chapter concludes with an examination of international
transmission effects in case of extreme losses. The evidence indicates that the global
trade credit insurer transmits extreme loss shocks across countries by reducing its sup-
ply of export credit insurance.
The insurance literature provides two possible explanations for the link between
claims and the quantity and price of insurance. Capital shock theories show how loss
shocks can deplete an insurer’s capital base, thereby constraining the capacity to pro-
vide insurance until capital is restored via retained earnings from higher premium rates
(Winter, 1994; Cummins and Danzon, 1997). Alternatively, rising expectations about
future claims could also cause insurance supply to constrict and premiums to rise (Lai
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et al., 2000). The benchmark results do not distinguish between these two explana-
tions. The evidence on the international transmission of extreme loss shocks, however,
suggests a role for capital constraints. This chapter is published as DNB Working
Paper (van der Veer, 2014a).
Subsequently, Chapter 3 estimates the effect of private export credit insurance
on trade. The bilateral country-level data on the value of exports covered with private
export credit insurance is included in a standard fixed effects gravity model of trade
that is consistent with a theoretical gravity equation (Anderson and Van Wincoop,
2003; Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). The model estimates the elasticity of total bilateral
exports with respect to bilateral exports covered with export credit insurance by the
global trade credit insurer. Importantly, time-varying country fixed effects control for
any time-variant country-specific factors, including changes in the supply of export
credit insurance by other insurers.
Different variants of this trade model consistently show a positive effect of pri-
vate export credit insurance on exports. Moreover, the results suggest that there is a
trade multiplier of private export credit insurance; every euro of insured exports gen-
erates more than one euro in total exports. For a variety of samples, the results show
a trade multiplier of private export credit insurance in the range of 1.3, which implies
that every euro of privately insured exports generates about 1.3 euro of total exports.
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A number of hypotheses from the existing literature could explain the trade mul-
tiplier of private export credit insurance. First, the trade multiplier supports the idea
that the reduction in risk due to a trade credit insurance policy increases exports to
markets where a firm would not sell otherwise (Funatsu, 1986). Second, export credit
insurance gives importers access to supplier credit, which reduces their transaction and
financing costs (Ferris, 1981) and could stimulate their import demand. This channel
would further support the trade multiplier if other suppliers use private insurance cover
as a signal on the creditworthiness of an importer, improving the importer’s overall ac-
cess to supplier credit (Becue, 2008). Although private insurance cover is not public
information, Becue, an industry insider, argues that information on a change in a pri-
vate insurer’s credit policy on an importer tends to travel fast among all suppliers of the
importing firm. Finally, if insuring accounts receivable gives exporters better access to
external finance (Becue, 2008; Jones, 2010), this could increase their export level and
generate additional exports on top of insured exports. This chapter is published in the
Journal of Risk and Insurance (van der Veer, 2014b).
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Do bank lending standards influence the supply of bank lending to
firms?
Chapter 4 contributes to the current policy discussion on the factors driving sluggish
bank lending growth in Europe, and studies the influence of bank lending standards on
the supply of bank lending to firms. Bank lending standards are the internal guidelines
or criteria of a bank which reflect the bank’s loan policy, and consist of various com-
ponents such as interest rates, collateral requirements, non-interest rate charges, and
covenants. Since it is difficult to collect quantitative information on (all of) these com-
ponents, central banks often use information from bank lending surveys to understand
changes in credit conditions and gain better insight into future economic developments.
A number of authors have studied the information content of these bank lending
surveys, examining the temporary or one-off effects of changes in bank lending stan-
dards. For example, reported changes in bank lending standards have been shown to
be good predictors of aggregate bank lending and real GDP growth in the euro area
(De Bondt et al., 2010; Cappiello et al. 2010; Ciccarelli et al., 2010) and the United
States (Lown and Morgan, 2006; Ciccarelli et al., 2010; Bassett et al., 2012). More-
over, there is evidence that reported changes in bank-specific lending standards are
associated with one-off effects on bank lending in Italy (Del Giovane et al., 2011),
Germany (Blaes, 2011) and Denmark (Kuchler, 2012). So far, however, there has been
little attempt to identify whether the level of bank lending standards influences bank
Outline 13
lending. Yet, after a prolonged period of tightening of bank lending standards (such as
during the 2007-09 global financial crisis) it seems natural to assume that bank lending
standards are tight, limiting bank lending for a given level of loan demand.
Chapter 4 examines the link between the level of bank lending standards and
the supply of business lending in The Netherlands in the period from 2003 to 2013,
using confidential bank-level data from the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey. This
quarterly survey asks senior loan officers about bank-specific changes in i) standards
on the approval of business loans, and ii) credit demand. Using the survey answers, an
intuitive bank-specific measure for the (cumulated) level of bank lending standards is
proposed in which a reported tightening is only offset by a reported easing of standards,
and vice versa. This novel variable for the level of bank lending standards is introduced
in a standard bank-level panel data model of business lending with bank-specific and
time fixed effects (Del Giovane et al., 2011). The model identifies the level effect of
bank lending standards on business lending within bank variation over time. Notably,
response bias – a concern that comes up when using bank survey data – is unlikely
to be an issue. The distribution of reported tightenings and easings in the sample
seems plausible. Moreover, any common bias among banks would be picked up by
the time fixed effects, and any bias against reporting a change in lending standards
works against finding a statistically significant level effect of bank lending standards
on business lending.
14 Introduction
The results show a robust "level effect"; a one point increase in the level of
a bank’s lending standards – i.e. a bank reports a tightening – reduces the bank’s
quarterly growth rate of business lending in the range of .5 percentage points; or about
2 percentage points in annualized terms. This level effect persists until bank lending
standards are eased, comes on top of a one-off effect of a change in standards, and
results from the influence on business lending of non-price bank lending standards such
as collateral requirements, non-interest rate charges, and covenants. Importantly, the
level effect should be interpreted as a supply effect as the model captures the influence
of both macroeconomic and bank-specific changes in the demand for business loans.
The finding of a level effect of bank lending standards helps to explain periods
of both high and low bank lending growth. Two counterfactual analyses for business
lending in The Netherlands are performed to illustrate the economic relevance of the
level effect at the macro-level. The first scenario suggests that due to loose bank lend-
ing standards, business lending growth was about 4 percentage points higher in the
years prior to the 2007-09 financial crisis. The second scenario, in turn, indicates that
the current annual growth rate of business lending in The Netherlands is about 3 per-
centage points lower due to tighter bank lending standards since the crisis. This chapter
is published as DNB Working Paper (van der Veer and Hoeberichts, 2013).
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the main findings, policy implications,
and suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 1
IMF-Supported Programs: Stimulating
Capital to Non-Defaulting Countries
1.1 Introduction
The International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) has an important role in triggering
private capital flows to countries that participate in an adjustment program. Fund-
supported programs are intended to pave the way toward a return to balance of pay-
ments viability and sustainable growth. In order to accomplish these goals, a coun-
try’s financing gap needs to be covered. Private capital inflows are important in this
regard. IMF loans tend to fall short of a country’s financing needs, and the inter-
national community usually avoids a full bailout by official rescue loans in order to
limit moral hazard. When the IMF fails to catalyse private capital flows, a financing
gap remains, and a breakdown of the Fund program becomes more likely.
1 This chapter is published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. in The World Economy. The reference
to the article is: van der Veer, K.J.M. and E. de Jong, 2013. IMF-Supported Programs: Stimulating
Capital to Non-defaulting Countries, The World Economy 36(4), 373-395. We are grateful to Martin
Admiraal and Henk van Kerkhoff for collecting the data and to Marco Hoeberichts for excellent re-
search advice. We thank Marloes Foudraine, Poonam Gupta, Pierre Lafourcade, Ashoka Mody, Marc
Roovers, seminar participants at the 2010 EEA Annual Congress, De Nederlandsche Bank, and an
anonymous referee for useful comments and discussions. The views expressed in this chapter are
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions with which they are
affiliated.
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Is the IMF successful in "catalysing" private capital flows to developing coun-
tries? Surveying the literature, Cottarelli and Giannini (2006) conclude that ‘its (cat-
alytic official finance) potential as a crisis management tool, in particular, appears at
best limited.’ Similarly, Bird (2007) observes that ‘the evidence certainly implies that
it is misplaced to rely on the Fund catalysing private capital markets to lend.’ Indeed,
it is often argued that Fund programs signal payment difficulties, increasing spreads
and triggering private capital outflows (Özler, 1993; Bird and Rowlands, 2002, 2008,
2009; Jensen, 2004; Edwards, 2006).
Our findings shed new light on this empirical rejection of Fund catalysis of
private capital flows. In line with theory, we show that IMF programs do stimulate
private capital flows to countries that do not restructure their debt. Thus, our main
contribution is to show empirically the importance of focusing on non-defaulting
countries when examining the catalytic effect of IMF programs.
A number of recent studies examine the theoretical insight by Morris and Shin
(2006) and Corsetti, Guimarães and Roubini (2006) that Fund catalysis is most likely
to work when a country’s fundamentals are poor, but not hopelessly so. For exam-
ple, Mody and Saravia (2006) and Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody (2006) show that
IMF programs lower bond spreads and increase bond issuance, but only in countries
within a limited "intermediate" range of external debt or reserves. Bird and Row-
lands (2008), however, find that the effect of IMF programs on private capital flows
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is either negative or statistically insignificant when accounting for varying initial eco-
nomic conditions of countries.
We build on these analyses but show that Fund catalysis applies to private cap-
ital flows as well. Moreover, we find evidence supportive of a broader scope for
Fund catalysis than suggested in previous empirical studies. That is, our finding is
not limited to nor driven by countries with an "intermediate" level of debt, reserves
or short-term debt; IMF programs seem to catalyse private capital flows when coun-
tries do not restructure their debt, almost regardless of a country’s level of debt or
reserves.
Notably, we do not interpret this evidence of a broader scope for Fund catalysis
as being inconsistent with the theory of catalytic finance that predicts Fund cataly-
sis to fail in countries with very good economic fundamentals (see i.e. Morris and
Shin, 2006).2 Instead, we argue that debt or reserve levels are insufficient measures
to differentiate between countries with various economic fundamentals. For exam-
ple, a debt restructuring is a clear measure of very weak country fundamentals, but
countries with diverging levels of debt or reserves restructure their debt. Likewise, it
can be questioned whether a low level of debt or high level of reserves implies that
a country has very good economic fundamentals. If anything, our result of a broader
2 The reasoning is that in countries with very good economic fundamentals, the IMF provision of
liquidity could lower the reform effort.
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scope for Fund catalysis suggest that, in practice, countries with very good economic
fundamentals do not seem to participate in IMF programs.3
But how can the IMF catalyse private capital? The IMF describes the mecha-
nism as follows:
"In most cases, IMF loans provide only a small portion of what a country
needs to finance its balance of payments. But, because IMF lending signals
that a country’s economic policies are on the right track, it reassures investors
and the official community and helps generate additional financing. Thus, IMF
financing can act as a catalyst for attracting funds from other sources."4
This "signalling role" of the IMF features in the theoretical models by Marchesi
and Thomas (1999) and Tirole (2002), who see IMF policy conditionality as a way to
signal a country’s adjustment effort to stave off default. Other models highlight the
liquidity provision by the IMF as an explanation for catalysis (Morris and Shin, 2006;
Corsetti, Guimarães and Roubini, 2006). Liquidity support lowers the likelihood of
default by enlarging the range of economic fundamentals at which private creditors
roll-over their credit to the country.
We remain agnostic on these theories. Our results indicate Fund catalysis of
private capital flows in the first program year, which mirrors the predictions of models
highlighting the role of liquidity provision in preventing default. Since IMF lending
is conditional on policy adjustment, however, our finding can also be due to the Fund
program signalling a country’s reform effort.
3 In a similar vein, Cottarelli and Giannini (2006) note that the argument of a negative signal of IMF
programs seems not much convincing, as typically, markets know already that a country is in trouble
when it reaches the point of starting program discussions with the IMF.
4 See "What is the IMF?" at www.imf.org.
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We apply an instrumental variable approach à la Barro and Lee (2005) to ac-
count for the endogeneity of IMF programs. Our model confirms that failure to con-
trol for the non-random selection of IMF programs would introduce a bias against
Fund catalysis of capital flows. Contrary to previous studies, we distinguish between
Fund programs in defaulting and non-defaulting countries. This way, we single out
IMF intervention in countries that restructure their debt in the same year the IMF
program is signed, for which we – in line with theory – do not expect a catalytic ef-
fect on capital flows. Importantly, since debt restructuring agreements are often the
deliberate outcome of the financing packages supporting IMF programs, the ex post
selection of IMF programs in countries that did not restructure their debt does not
introduce a sample selection bias.
In what follows, we discuss the theoretical literature that focuses on the condi-
tions for Fund catalysis (Section 2) and review the latest empirical findings (Section
3). We describe our methodology and data in Section 4, and discuss the issue of sam-
ple selection bias. Section 5 presents our benchmark results. In Section 6 we test the
sensitivity of our benchmark results, apply an alternative estimation technique, and
show how our findings relate to existing evidence on Fund catalysis in countries with
"intermediate" fundamentals. Section 7 concludes.
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1.2 Catalysis and default: theoretical considerations
We draw on recent theoretical studies to identify how the IMF could trigger private
capital flows, and under what conditions this catalytic role of the IMF may be suc-
cessful. While the models focus on either IMF lending or program conditionality as
the driver of Fund catalysis, they are all build on the interaction between the debtor
country, private creditors and the IMF. The decision of each player is endogenous to
the actions of the other. Private creditors will resume lending if they believe the IMF
can induce the debtor country to adopt policies conducive to repayment of private
debt. Recognizing its pivotal role, the IMF will intervene. The debtor country, in
turn, realizes that the private creditors and the IMF will only act accordingly if costly
adjustment policies are undertaken.
Effective catalysis of Fund programs, then, hinges on IMF lending being a
complement (not a substitute) to private lending and on the ability of the IMF to
induce the debtor country to implement the necessary adjustment policies. Crucially,
IMF intervention must not weaken a government’s incentive to implement desirable
but costly policies. The literature suggests that the extent to which such debtor moral
hazard can be avoided depends on the country’s economic fundamentals.
First, consider the catalytic role of IMF lending. Morris and Shin (2006) and
Corsetti, Guimara˘es and Roubini (2006) argue that even in the absence of explicit
conditionality, IMF lending can trigger private lending by alleviating the country’s
costs of implementing adjustment policies. Yet, the IMF can only effectively coun-
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teract the risk of insolvency and restore confidence when the country’s economic
fundamentals are poor, but not hopelessly so. When fundamentals are very weak,
an IMF program is unable to compensate for the economic difficulties faced by the
country, at least not in the short term. Similarly, Penalver (2004) relates the success
of Fund catalysis to the ability to avoid default. The IMF lends funds below the pre-
vailing market interest rate and it is this subsidy that induces the borrowing country
to exert adjustment effort to avoid default. By preventing default, future marginal
rates of return on investments are kept high, encouraging private capital flows.
Aside from the Fund’s liquidity provision, the IMF may also catalyse private
capital flows by signalling that a country’s economic policies are on the right track.
Marchesi and Thomas (1999) argue that by signing a Fund program, countries can
signal their willingness and ability to reform and use new money for investment and
debt repayments. As such, Fund policy conditionality can work as a "screening de-
vice", enabling private creditors to discriminate between debtor countries that are
willing and unwilling to adjust policies. Likewise, Tirole (2002) argues that the IMF
can monitor a country’s policies and thus serve as a "delegated monitor" for private
creditors. The Fund’s role is to substitute for the missing contracts between the sov-
ereign and individual foreign investors and thereby help the country to attract private
capital.
Like the catalytic role of IMF lending, Mody and Saravia (2006) observe that
catalysis via the signalling role of the Fund also depends on the country’s economic
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fundamentals. Country commitment through the Fund is likely to be effective when
countries are vulnerable but have not yet crossed thresholds that imply inability to
service external debts even with Fund assistance. Consequently, an IMF program is
unlikely to catalyse new capital when solvency is at stake.
1.3 Recent empirical studies
This section briefly reviews the recent empirical literature on the catalytic effect of
IMF programs. These studies are different from the earlier attempts to identify Fund
catalysis in that they allow for the impact of Fund programs to differ across country
fundamentals and/or control for the nonrandom selection of countries with an IMF
program.5
Mody and Saravia (2006) take into account country conditions when examin-
ing the catalytic effect. Their results imply that IMF programs reduce bond spreads
when a country’s reserves cover between 4 and 12 months of imports or the debt-to-
GNP ratio is between 36% and 54%. Also, they find that Fund presence raises the
frequency of bond issuance in a comparable "intermediate" range of debt or reserves.
Thus, Mody and Saravia demonstrate that Fund catalysis can be effective, but that the
catalytic effect is limited to countries within an intermediate range of fundamentals.
Studies estimating the impact of Fund programs on private capital flows have
traditionally generated evidence against Fund catalysis (see Cottarelli and Gianini,
5 See Cottarelli and Giannini (2006) for a survey of the earlier studies on catalytic official finance.
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2006). Edwards (2006), however, noticed a flaw within this literature, namely that it
overlooks the nonrandom nature of IMF programs. Countries sign an IMF program
when they face a financial crisis, and accordingly are less likely to attract private cap-
ital flows. Failure to control for this sample selection when estimating the impact of
Fund programs leads to a bias against Fund catalysis. Edwards controls for sample
selection, but reaffirms that Fund programs lead to private capital outflows. Surpris-
ingly, he finds that correction for sample selection makes no difference to his results.
A possible reason, however, is his focus on portfolio equity flows. Most low and
middle-income countries have zero inflow of equity investment, possibly precluding
identification of sample selectivity.
Bird and Rowlands (2002, 2008, 2009), in particular, cast doubt on the catalytic
effect of IMF programs. In their 2008 contribution, they estimate total private capi-
tal flows, account for sample selectivity and examine how the economic conditions
of countries affect catalysis, but find no grounds for catalytic conversion. They show
that the catalytic effect does vary with the initial conditions of a country, but find
either statistically insignificant or negative Fund catalysis. Likewise, Jensen (2004)
reports a negative effect of Fund programs on foreign direct investment, without al-
lowing for the effect to vary across countries’ economic fundamentals.
Our main concern with these studies, however, is the way they differentiate
between countries with various economic fundamentals. The practice is to categorize
countries according to their level of external debt or reserves, assuming that a certain
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level of debt or reserves implies the same state of economic fundamentals across
countries. This assumption, however, can be refuted. For example, a sovereign debt
restructuring is a clear measure of very weak country fundamentals. Yet, the levels
of external debt or reserves in countries that restructure their debt diverge greatly.6
Consequently, the rejection of Fund catalysis in previous studies could be due to an
insufficient divide between countries that keep servicing their debt and countries that
default on their debt. Recall that from a theoretical point of view, one would not
expect defaulting countries to derive much benefit from the catalytic role of IMF
programs.7 Aside from theory, it also seems somewhat unfair to include the cases of
IMF involvement in countries that restructure their debt when evaluating the catalytic
role of the IMF, since this is generally not the aim of IMF programs in these cases.8
In this article, we improve on the way country fundamentals are accounted
for when evaluating Fund catalysis. We examine the reaction of private creditors
to Fund intervention in countries that do not restructure their commercial or official
debt, which we believe is the proper way to evaluate the catalytic role of the IMF.
6 A simple check of the raw data reveals that a third of the countries that restructure their debt have
a level of external debt to GDP below the mean value of the countries that do not restructure their
debt. Likewise, more than a third of the restructuring countries have a level of reserves higher than
the mean level of the non-restructuring group.
7 Arteta and Hale (2008) even show that when countries restructure their debt, they experience a
decline in bond and bank lending that persists for over two years.
8 Diaz-Cassou, Erce-Dominguez and Vazquez-Zamora (2008) provide a detailed case-study analy-
ses of the various roles the IMF played in recent sovereign debt restructurings. They find that the
IMF can i) influence countries’ decision to restructure when the debt burden is deemed unsustain-
able, ii) provide liquidity to substitute for a loss of access to international financial markets, iii) set a
medium-term domestic adjustment path through conditionality, iv) provide independent information,
and v) provide incentives to creditors and debtors involved in the restructuring process.
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Consequently, we focus on the IMF’s traditional role of addressing short-term bal-
ance of payment crises.
1.4 Methodology and data
We aim to examine whether IMF programs trigger private lending. We focus on
Stand-by Arrangements (SBAs) and Extended Fund Facilities (EFFs); the traditional
Fund programs to address balance of payments crises in middle-income countries.
SBAs are designed to help countries address short-term balance of payments prob-
lems, while EFFs assist countries in overcoming balance of payments problems that
stem largely from structural problems and require a longer adjustment period.
Our data set includes total private capital flows to all middle-income countries
in the period from 1984 to 2004. Due to missing observations our final sample in-
cludes 49 countries (see Appendix Table A1.1 for the countries in our sample). We
measure the effect on private capital flows one year after the IMF program is signed.
Focusing on the first program year allows us to ignore the issue of program imple-
mentation, which becomes important when estimating the impact of Fund programs
over a longer horizon (Edwards, 2005). Contrary to previous studies, we distinguish
between Fund programs in countries that do, and do not, restructure their debt in the
same year the IMF program is signed. This way, we single out the effect of IMF in-
tervention in defaulting countries for which we, in line with theory, do not expect
Fund catalysis.
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We apply an instrumental variable approach to account for the endogeneity of
IMF programs and follow the strategy proposed by Barro and Lee (2005) (see also
Eichengreen, Gupta and Mody, 2008). They argue that the IMF is a political orga-
nization, where the decision to approve a Fund program is influenced by the Fund’s
major shareholders, in particular the United States. As such, program participation is
determined by a country’s economic situation and its political or economic proxim-
ity to the United States. The authors come up with various measures to capture the
link between a country and the United States and use these variables as instruments
for IMF programs.
Accordingly, we estimate a "first stage" probit model for the chance of signing
an IMF program:
Bit = αi + γt + Zitδ + ε1it (1.1)
where ‘B’ is a binary variable with value one when a country signed an IMF
program but did not restructure its debt in the same year, α and γ are country and
year fixed effects, and ‘Z’ is a vector of variables predicting participation in a Fund
program. Aside from country characteristics, ‘Z’ includes variables reflecting a coun-
try’s economic and political proximity to the United States.
From the probit estimation we generate predicted values of Fund program par-
ticipation and use these predicted values (or propensity scores) as an instrument for
program participation in the "second stage" regression for private capital flows:
Yit = αi + γt +Xitβ + ε2it (1.2)
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where ‘Y’ are total private capital flows in percent of GDP, α and γ are coun-
try and year fixed effects, and ‘X’ is a vector of variables explaining capital flows
– including the propensity score – and ε2 is a second error term. All explanatory
variables are lagged one year to avert simultaneity issues.
1.4.1 Variables and data sources
We measure total private capital flows as the aggregate of bond and bank loans, eq-
uity investment, short-term flows and foreign direct investment, all taken from the
World Bank’s Global Development Finance. The World Bank’s data on capital flows
records gross flows (except for foreign direct investment).9 Focusing on gross capital
flows assures that a positive change is driven by increased inflows instead of reduced
outflows. If IMF programs are catalytic, they should be expected to increase gross
capital flows (Bordo, Mody and Oomes, 2004).
The second stage equation includes "pull" and "push" factors of private cap-
ital flows. The pull factors are a common set of economic variables measuring a
country’s solvency and liquidity position: real GDP growth, trade to GDP, debt ser-
vicing to exports, external debt, reserves in months of imports, short-term debt to re-
serves, (change in) domestic credit to GDP. These conventional measures come from
9 Note that the World Bank’s data on capital flows lists what are essentially gross flows as "net".
They are "net" in the sense that they are net of amortizations on account of principal repayment. Only
foreign direct investment (FDI) is given as a net flow; it is measured as the balance of in- and outflows
of the reporting country. Since FDI is an important source of capital for middle income countries we
prefer to include FDI in our measure of capital flows. Our main result is robust to the exclusion of
FDI from our measure of capital flows.
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the IMF’s International Financial Statistics or World Economic Outlook; except for
trade, external debt and debt service for which we used World Bank resources (see
Appendix Table A1.2 for the data sources). Aside from these more conventional
measures we include a measure of exchange rate volatility, calculated as the annual
variance to the mean of a country’s monthly U.S. dollar exchange rate. The volatil-
ity of a country’s exchange rate is an indicator of financial instability and exchange
rate risk (Jeanneau and Micu, 2002). Finally, we include year fixed effects to capture
global "push" factors of private capital flows.10
The first stage equation examines the probability for a non-defaulting country
to participate in a Fund program. We define a country that participates in an IMF
program as "defaulting" if it restructures its commercial or official debt in the same
year the IMF program is signed. The data on commercial debt restructuring agree-
ments are available from the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (2002, and
subsequent issues). The Paris Club website reports data on restructuring agreements
of official bilateral debt. The IMF calls on the Paris Club creditors when the suc-
cess of a rescue package is linked to the ability of a debtor to restructure its existing
claims (IMF, 2001). As such, a Paris Club agreement is a signal of very weak country
fundamentals.11
10 Some authors propose using United States interest rates as a global "push" factor for private capital
flows to developing countries (Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1993), although other studies failed to
confirm this relationship (World Bank, 1997). We did not find US interest rates to affect a country’s
capital flows.
11 Arteta and Hale (2008) find that official debt restructuring leads to a larger decline in credit than
commercial agreements. As a possible explanation, they argue that commercial agreements contain no
new information since official creditors usually negotiate with sovereigns before commercial creditors.
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Table 1.1: International Monetary Fund Programs in Middle-Income Countries,
1984-2004
Standby Arrangements Extended Fund Facilities
Debt Restructuring Debt Restructuring
All None Commercial Official Both All None Commercial Official Both
1984 9 5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
1985 10 3 0 3 4 1 0 0 0 1
1986 7 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1987 4 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
1988 8 4 0 3 1 1 1 0 0 0
1989 5 0 0 4 1 3 1 0 2 0
1990 9 3 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 0
1991 16 7 0 8 1 2 1 0 1 0
1992 12 8 0 3 1 3 2 0 1 0
1993 9 8 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 0
1994 12 6 1 3 2 4 2 0 2 0
1995 19 16 0 2 1 2 0 0 1 1
1996 10 10 0 0 0 6 4 0 1 1
1997 8 8 0 0 0 3 2 1 0 0
1998 6 5 0 1 0 4 1 2 0 1
1999 7 4 2 1 0 4 3 0 1 0
2000 8 5 1 1 1 2 0 0 2 0
2001 7 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2002 9 8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2003 9 9 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
2004 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 190 125 7 41 17 38 19 3 12 4
Table 1.1 shows the number of IMF programs approved and commercial and
official debt restructurings concluded in middle income countries in the period from
1984 to 2004. Standby Arrangements – the short-term stabilization program – make
up the bulk of the IMF programs (83%). A little over a third (37%) of all countries
that signed a Fund program also restructured their commercial and/or official debt in
the same year. Thus, about two-third of all IMF programs were signed in what we
define as non-defaulting countries.
30 Chapter 1. IMF-Supported Programs: Stimulating Capital to Non-Defaulting Countries
Previous research has identified various determinants of Fund program partici-
pation.12 Our benchmark model is similar to the model used by Eichengreen, Gupta
and Mody (2008). To capture a country’s economic and political proximity to the
United States, we include a variable measuring U.S. aid as a percentage of total for-
eign aid received by a country. The data on foreign aid are from the OECD DAC
database. We also examine alternative political-economy variables, such as the frac-
tion of votes that each country cast in the United Nations General Assembly along
with the United States (Barro and Lee, 2005) and U.S. bank exposure (Oatley and
Yackee, 2004).
In addition to U.S. aid receipts, we include other country-specific variables.
These macroeconomic controls are similar to the variables used in the capital flows
equation. Yet, instead of our measure of exchange rate volatility, we follow Eichen-
green, Gupta and Mody (2008) and added dummy variables for pegged rates and
regimes of limited flexibility using the Reinhart-Rogoff classification of exchange
rate regimes (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).13 The summary statistics for all variables
are in Table 1.2.
12 See Steinwand and Stone (2008) for a useful overview.
13 Also, in the capital flows equation we replaced the variable "change in debt/GDP" for the level of
external debt, which turned out to be a better determinant of capital flows. The results do not change
when debt/GDP and the change in debt/GDP are included in the model.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Regression
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Total Private Capital Flows/GDP 5.3 7.4 −18.1 52.6
Real GDP Growth 4.1 4.1 −13.4 22.0
Trade/GDP 83.5 42.0 16.3 220.9
Debt Servicing/Exports 18.5 13.8 0.3 117.9
Total External Debt (US Billions) 24.8 47.7 0.0 247.6
Reserves/Imports (Months) 4.0 3.6 0 27.1
Short-Term Debt/Reserves 7.9 76.6 0 1483.2
Domestic Credit/GDP 44.0 46.4 −71.5 494.4
Exchange Rate Volatility 2.2 21.6 0 468.3
Exchange Rate Regime 0.3 0.5 0 1
IMF Program 0.1 0.3 0 1
Precautionary Program 0.0 0.2 0 1
IMF Loan (Percent of Quota) 18.3 66.3 0 751.7
US Aid/Total Aid 18.7 19.6 0.1 84
UN Voting in Line With the US 0.2 0.1 0 0.4
US Bank Exposure (US Billions) 3.3 8.1 0 77.2
Note: The sample consists of the 633 observations for the period 1984 to 2004 that are used in the regressions
in Tables 1.4-1.6.
1.4.2 Sample selection bias
A question comes up immediately: does the ex post selection of IMF programs in
countries that did not restructure their debt in the same year as the IMF program was
signed, cause a sample selection bias? Perhaps countries restructure in the year the
IMF program is signed precisely because Fund catalysis failed? We make several
points regarding the selection process.
First, the endogeneity critique relates to the exclusion – only from our group of
non-defaulting IMF program countries – of countries that restructure their debt in the
same year the Fund program is signed. We include in our non-defaulting group all
cases in which a program country restructured in the years prior or after signing the
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IMF program. In the sensitivity analysis below, we show that the results are robust
when accounting for the influence of these debt restructurings.
Second, more often than not, the agreement of a debt restructuring – in the same
year an IMF program is signed – is an intended outcome of Fund program design.
Consider the restructuring of official debt as measured by a Paris Club agreement.
The IMF (2001) notes that:
"In the exceptional cases in which financing packages require the partici-
pation of Paris Club creditors, there is normally advance consultation between
Fund staff and these creditors, including during the negotiation of a program."
Likewise, commercial debt restructurings (in the same year the IMF program is
signed) are often also "predetermined", instead of the (negative) outcome of a random
catalytic process. This is most likely for the majority of cases in our sample in which
both a commercial and official debt restructuring are agreed in the year the Fund
program is signed (see Table 1.1). In these cases, the Paris Club creditors oblige the
debtor country to arrange an agreement on comparable terms with private creditors,
in accordance with the Paris Club’s "comparability of treatment" clause:
"The debtor country undertakes to seek from non-multilateral creditors, in
particular other official bilateral creditor countries that are not members of the
Paris Club and private creditors (mainly banks, bondholders and suppliers), a
treatment on comparable terms to those granted in the Agreed Minutes." (see
www.clubdeparis.org)
Finally, a closer look at the timing of the commercial debt restructurings that
are not accompanied by a Paris Club agreement (i.e. ten cases in our sample; see
Table 1.1), reveals that all but one are agreed either before or no longer than two
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months after the Fund program was signed.14 It seems unlikely that a lack of positive
Fund catalysis in the few months after signing the Fund program triggered these
restructuring agreements.
In short, debt restructuring agreements that are concluded in the same year
as an IMF program is signed, are not likely to be the result of failing Fund cataly-
sis. Instead, these agreements are often the deliberate outcome of the design of the
financing packages supporting IMF programs.
1.5 Benchmark results
1.5.1 Predicting IMF program participation in non-defaulting
countries
Table 1.3 presents the results for the first stage regression estimating the likelihood of
an IMF program. The share of U.S. aid is our key instrumental variable. Estimated
without other conditioning variables, we find a positive and statistically significant
influence of U.S. aid on program participation (Table 1.3, Column 1). Columns 2
and 3 show, however, that U.S. aid is positively and significantly related to Standby
Arrangements (SBAs) but not to Extended Fund Facilities (EFFs). This result is
consistent with the finding by Stone (2008) that U.S. influence operates to constrain
conditionality. Since the level of conditionality of EFFs is higher than for SBAs, we
14 In the case of Uruguay in 1999, the commercial debt restructuring was agreed on six months after
the IMF program was signed.
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are not surprised to find a significant influence of U.S. aid on SBAs only.15 Neverthe-
less, as the significant correlation between U.S. aid and Fund program participation
is crucial to our instrumental variable approach, we prefer to limit our analysis to
SBAs. We show below that our second stage results regarding Fund catalysis are
robust to including EFFs in the first stage regression.
The results of our benchmark model for program participation are presented
in Table 1.3 Column 4. Importantly, U.S. aid remains positive and statistically dif-
ferent from zero, even when additional country-specific variables are included in the
model.16 The signs of the conditioning variables are plausible and generally consis-
tent with other studies. Non-defaulting countries are more likely to participate in a
SBA when they have a higher level of debt service, a rising level of external debt or
a pegged exchange rate. The latter finding is supportive of the idea that flexible ex-
change rates allow countries to better accommodate external shocks (Edwards and
Levy Yeyati, 2005). We also find a positive but marginally significant effect of a
change in domestic credit. A possible explanation could be that a domestic credit-
boom increases the chance of a sudden stop in capital flows (Eichengreen, Gupta and
Mody 2008), increasing the likelihood of Fund intervention. Finally, non-defaulting
countries are less likely to sign a SBA the better their access to capital markets (as
15 Standby Arrangements test an average of five categories per month, whereas Extended Fund Fa-
cilities test an average of seven categories (Stone, 2008).
16 While these additional variables do not provide identification in the second stage, because they
do not plausibly satisfy the exclusion criterion for an instrumental variable, they reassure us that any
significance imputed to the political-economic determinants are not really attributable to these other
characteristics (see Eichengreen, Gupta and Mody (2008) for similar reasoning).
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Table 1.3: Determinants of IMF Programs Without a Debt Restructuring (First Stage
Model)
Dependent Variable: SBA SBA EFF SBA SBA SBA
or EFF or EFF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US Aid/Total Aid 0.009∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Real GDP Growth −0.004 −0.057∗∗ 0.001
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
Trade/GDP −0.007 −0.008 −0.014∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Debt Servicing/Exports 0.022∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Change in Debt/GDP 0.023∗∗∗ 0.011 0.021∗∗
(0.009) (0.001) (0.010)
Reserves/Imports −0.015 −0.057 −0.021
(0.071) (0.066) (0.086)
Short-Term Debt/Reserves −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Domestic Credit/GDP −0.001 −0.002 −0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Change Dom. Credit/GDP 0.008∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Exchange Rate Regime: 0.786∗∗ 0.772∗∗ 0.691∗
Pegged (0.393) (0.382) (0.424)
Exchange Rate Regime: 0.215 −0.216 0.294
Limited Flexibility (0.380) (0.370) (0.350)
UN Voting 3.823
(2.441)
US Bank Exposure 0.003
(0.019)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Psuedo R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.35 0.33 0.33
Number of Observations 772 693 95 684 684 514
SBA: Standby Arrangement. EFF: Extended Fund Facility. All explanatory variables are lagged one year.
Robust standard errors (clustered by country) presented in parentheses. Significance levels: ***: 1%, **: 5%,
*: 10%.
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measured by the short-term debt to reserves ratio).17 Economic growth, trade, re-
serves, and domestic credit, are also negatively related to SBAs, but these effects are
not significantly different from zero.
Previous studies often find lower economic growth to be a good predictor of
IMF program participation. To see whether our insignificant estimate for economic
growth is due to the focus on SBAs, we include EFFs. The results in Table 1.3
Column 5 now show a negative and statistically significant effect of economic growth
on program participation. As noted above, we show below that including EFFs in the
first stage regression does not alter our main finding.
Finally, we examine alternative measures to capture a country’s link with the
United States. The results in the final column of Table 1.3 show both U.N. voting
in line with the United States and U.S. bank exposure to enter the regression posi-
tively, but neither is statistically significant. The estimate of U.S. aid, however, is
unchanged and remains statistically distinguishable from zero at all reasonable sig-
nificance levels. Therefore, we use the specification of the fourth column of Table
1.3 for instrumenting IMF programs in the second stage regression of capital flows.
1.5.2 The catalytic effect of IMF programs in non-defaulting
countries
Figure 1.1 shows the pattern of capital flows to countries that participate in an IMF
program. The raw data seem consistent with the idea that Fund intervention catalyses
17 This result is due to our focus on non-defaulting countries, and dissapears when we include SBAs
in countries that restructure their debt.
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Figure 1.1: Private Capital Flows to International Monetary Fund (IMF) Program
Countries, 1984-2004
Percent of GDP
Note: median capital flows, countries with an IMF program at t-1 or t+1 are excluded.
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IMF programs without a debt restructuring
private lending to non-defaulting countries. After experiencing a decline, capital
flows to countries that sign an IMF program but do not restructure their debt, recover
in the first year of the IMF program. This recovery of capital flows is much less clear
when all countries with an IMF program – including countries that restructure their
debt – are considered.
The question is whether this result still holds when we condition on other vari-
ables explaining capital flows and account for the endogeneity of IMF programs. The
results for our benchmark model of capital flows are presented in Table 1.4, Column
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1. Before we discuss the catalytic effect of IMF programs in non-defaulting coun-
tries, we briefly discuss the other determinants of capital flows.
The benchmark results show that economic growth is associated with higher
capital inflows. Also, we find evidence that a higher level of external debt and ex-
change rate volatility are strongly related with lower capital inflows. Thus, the model
seems to indicate that financially instable countries or countries with a higher risk of
facing external payments problems receive less private capital.
Turning to the estimate of greatest interest; Fund programs seem to catalyse
private capital inflows to non-defaulting countries. The instrumental variable esti-
mate for IMF programs without a debt restructuring is positive and statistically dis-
tinguishable from zero (Table 1.4, Column 1). The point estimate of 8.884 implies
that, on average, an increase in the probability of program participation by 0.129 (one
standard deviation) increases private capital inflows by 1.1%.
This result holds when we slightly change the control group by including a
dummy variable for IMF programs with a debt restructuring in the second stage equa-
tion for private capital flows (Table 1.4, Column 2). The coefficient of IMF programs
in countries that restructure their debt is negative and statistically insignificant. When
we also instrument for IMF programs with a debt restructuring (using the same co-
variates as in the probit model for IMF programs without a debt restructuring) the
estimate turns positive but remains statistically insignificant (Table 1.4, Column 3).18
18 We do not read too much into this instrumental variable estimate for the effect of IMF programs
in countries that restructure their debt, as the estimate for U.S. aid in the first stage program partici-
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Table 1.4: Catalytic Effect of IMF Programs Without a Debt Restructuring (DR)
(Second Stage Model)
Dependent Variable: Total Private Capital Flows/GDP
(1) Benchmark Model
(2) Include Variable For IMF Programs (IMF) With a Debt Restructuring
(3) Include Variable For IMF Programs With a Debt Restructuring, Instrumented (Instr.)
(4) Drop All Observations With a Debt Restructuring
(5) IMF Programs Not Instrumented
(6) Include All IMF Programs in Dependent Variable of Program Participation Model
(7) Include All IMF Programs in Dependent Variable of Program Participation Model; No Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IMF, No DR, Instrumented 8.884∗∗ 8.825∗∗ 8.883∗∗ 10.129∗∗
(4.346) (4.371) (4.331) (4.189)
IMF, With DR −0.131
(0.818)
IMF, With DR, Instr. 3.464
(2.122)
IMF, No DR 1.884
(1.478)
All IMF Programs, Instr. 6.334 −9.883
(4.172) (7.404)
Real GDP Growth 0.159∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.098
(0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.085) (0.073) (0.073) (0.079)
Trade/GDP −0.015 −0.014 −0.014 −0.002 −0.019 −0.015 0.019
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Debt Servicing/Exports 0.056 0.056 0.051 0.048 0.058 0.044 0.019
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.042) (0.036) (0.039) (0.044)
Total External Debt −0.092∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.024∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014)
Reserves/Imports (Months) −0.134 −0.134 −0.119 −0.100 −0.142 −0.116 0.207
(0.210) (0.210) (0.212) (0.233) (0.211) (0.219) (0.219)
Exchange Rate Volatility −0.025∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Short-Term Debt/Reserves 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 −0.000 −0.001 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Domestic Credit/GDP 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.005 0.020 0.021 0.021
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Change Dom. Credit/GDP 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003 −0.002 −0.000 −0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.05
Number of Observations 633 633 633 545 633 633 633
All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) presented in parentheses.
Significance levels: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%.
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More importantly, our key finding of a positive and statistically significant effect of
IMF programs without a debt restructuring on private capital flows is unchanged.
Continuing, an alternative strategy would be to simply drop all observations with a
debt restructuring from the sample. This approach generates a positive IMF program
effect that is slightly larger than the benchmark result (Table 1.4, Column 4). The
fifth column of Table 1.4 presents the results when endogeneity bias is not accounted
for. The estimated IMF program effect is again positive but statistically insignificant,
highlighting the importance of dealing with endogeneity.
Finally, to show more clearly what innovation drives our finding of positive
Fund catalysis, we estimate the model including all IMF programs in the first stage
equation. When all IMF programs are considered in the dependent variable of the
program participation model – thus including the ones with a debt restructuring – the
estimate remains positive but is now statistically insignificant (Table 1.4, Column 6).
This underlines the importance to analyse IMF programs without a debt restructuring
separately. Moreover, the final column of Table 1.4 shows the results when including
all IMF programs but excluding the year fixed effects. Bird and Rowlands (2008,
2009) use this type of setup and find a negative and statistically insignificant effect of
IMF programs on total private capital flows in their full sample.19 Indeed, the estimate
for IMF programs now turns negative. This final result shows that our finding of
pation model (the key variable to provide identification in the second stage capital flows model) is not
statistically significant. Results not reported, but available from the authors upon request.
19 Bird and Rowlands (2008) also find a negative and statistically significant effect of IMF programs
on total private capital flows in medium and highly indebted middle-income countries.
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positive Fund catalysis is not likely to be due to differences compared to previous
studies, other than the inclusion of year fixed effects and, importantly, our focus on
Fund programs in countries that do not restructure their debt.
1.6 Sensitivity analysis
We start our sensitivity analysis with some robustness checks based on changes to
the first stage program participation model, and continue with a number of changes
in the second stage regression for capital flows. Subsequently, we estimate a dy-
namic model, and examine the influence of the size of IMF lending, precautionary
IMF programs, past debt restructurings, exchange rate regime, and sample period.
We also examine whether our finding differs in democratic versus autocratic coun-
tries, and show results using a treatment effects model that accounts for unobserved
heterogeneity in program participation. For brevity, we only report the estimates for
our main variable of interest.20
First, we check the sensitivity of our main result to changes in the dependent
variable of the first stage regression of program participation. Recall, that the first
stage dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a country signed an
IMF program and did not restructure its commercial or official debt in the same year.
We examine whether it matters to use both commercial and official debt restructur-
ings when distinguishing between defaulting and non-defaulting program countries.
20 All other estimates are available from the authors upon request.
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In the first and second row of Table 1.5, we changed the dependent variable by includ-
ing – in the group of non-defaulting IMF program countries – countries with respec-
tively an official or commercial debt restructuring. The catalytic effect is robust to
both alternative approaches, but the estimate is less significant when program coun-
tries with an official debt restructuring are included in the group of non-defaulting
countries. This suggests that it is particularly important to single out the (negative)
effect on capital flows in countries that restructure their official debt in the same year
they sign an IMF program. Subsequently, the third row of Table 1.5 shows that our
basic result remains resilient when we include Extended Fund Facilities without a
debt restructuring in the group of non-defaulting program countries.
Next, we conduct a battery of robustness checks based on reasonable changes
to the second stage regression of capital flows. First, we estimate a dynamic ver-
sion of the model by including the lagged dependent variable in the regression of
capital flows. This way, we account for the fact that capital flows are often corre-
lated over time. The lagged dependent variable enters the regression positively and
is statistically significant, but our main result is unchanged (Table 1.5, Row 4).
We continue by examining whether the catalytic effect is related to the size of
the IMF loan. We measure the size of the IMF loan as a percentage of a country’s
quota within the IMF, but find no significant impact on capital flows. The fifth row
in Table 1.5 shows that our main result is unchanged. These results suggest that
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Table 1.5: Sensitivity Analysis of the Catalytic Effect of IMF Programs Without a
Debt Restructuring
Dependent Variable: Total Private Capital Flows/GDP
Fixed Effects: Year and Country
IMF Program Without a Debt Restructuring, Instrumentedt−1 Coefficient S.E. Obs.
Benchmark Model 8.884∗∗ (4.346) 633
Changes to First Stage program Participation Model
Non-Defaulting Group Includes program Countries...
1. With Official Debt Restructuring 7.868∗ (4.696) 633
2. With Commercial Debt Restructuring 8.252∗∗ (3.921) 633
3. With Extended Fund Facility 7.137∗ (3.870) 633
Changes to Second Stage Capital Flows Model
4. Add Lag Dependent Variablet−1 8.385∗∗ (4.006) 633
5. Add Size of IMF Loant−1 9.141∗∗ (4.374) 633
6. Add Precautionary programst−1 7.322∗ (3.898) 633
7. Add Past Debt Restructuringst−2,t−3 8.981∗∗ (4.303) 633
8. Add Exchange Rate Regimet−1 9.106∗∗ (4.478) 633
9. Add Controls 4 to 8 7.595∗∗ (3.785) 633
10. Add Controls 4 to 8, 1990-2004 8.664∗∗ (4.085) 495
11. Democracies Only 10.433∗∗ (4.626) 428
12. Autocracies Only 21.666∗ (12.279) 205
Alternative Estimation Technique
13. Treatment Effects Modela 6.358∗∗ (3.258) 633
14. Treatment Effects Modelb, Add Controls 4 to 8 5.851∗∗ (2.872) 633
15. Treatment Effects Modelc, Add Controls 4 to 8, 1990-2004 7.372∗∗ (3.253) 495
Robust standard errors (clustered by country) presented in parentheses. Significance levels: ***: 1%,
**: 5%, *: 10%. Regressors included but not reported: Real GDP Growtht−1, Trade/GDPt−1, Debt
Servicing/Exportst−1, Total External Debtt−1, Reserves/Imports (Months)t−1, Exchange Rate Volatilityt−1,
Short-Term Debt/Reservest−1, Domestic Credit/GDPt−1, Change Domestic Credit/GDPt−1.
aLambda = -2.858 (1.687); Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 2.63 Prob > chi2 = 0.1051.
bLambda = -2.922 (1.498); Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 3.56 Prob > chi2 = 0.0591.
cLambda = -3.549 (1.586); Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 4.32 Prob > chi2 = 0.0377.
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countries can use a Fund program to signal adjustment effort and the intention to
repay debts. The size of the IMF loan does not seem to matter for Fund catalysis.
A related test is to see whether our finding is driven by precautionary pro-
grams. When an IMF program is precautionary, the country agrees to meet specific
conditions for use of IMF resources, but communicates its intention not to make pur-
chases. Previous studies find that the catalytic effect of IMF programs appears salient
in the context of precautionary programs (Mody and Saravia, 2006). Table 1.5 Row
6 shows that our finding is robust to the inclusion of a dummy for precautionary
programs, although the size and the statistical significance of the catalytic effect are
slightly lower.
Continuing, we examine whether past debt restructurings are responsible for
our finding of positive Fund catalysis in non-defaulting program countries. Table
1.5, Row 7, shows that our result is robust when including a dummy variable for
debt restructurings concluded one or two years prior to the IMF program. In passing,
we note that we find a negative and statistically significant (at the 10 percent level)
effect on capital flows two years after a debt restructuring, in line with the findings
by Arteta and Hale (2008).
Subsequently, we check the sensitivity of our results by accounting for type of
exchange rate regime (Table 1.5, Row 8), estimating a full model including all the
controls examined above (Table 1.5, Row 9), and shortening the sample to the period
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from 1990 to 2004 (Table 1.5, Row 10). Again, none of these changes destroy our
findings.
Finally, we examine if our finding of positive Fund catalysis in non-defaulting
countries is due to the subsample of democracies. In a recent study, Bauer, Cruz and
Graham (2012) argue that democracies have greater opportunities to implement the
policy reforms that are key to catalysing private investments. They test the hypoth-
esis that the catalytic effect of IMF programs is greater in democratic as opposed to
autocratic countries and find positive Fund catalysis of foreign direct investment in
democracies, and a negative effect of IMF programs in autocracies. Following their
approach, we use Cheibub et al.’s (2009) measure of regime type to split the sam-
ple between democracies and autocracies. The results in Table 1.5, Rows 11 and 12,
show that our finding is not caused by the subsample of democratic countries. The
catalytic effect in non-defaulting countries is statistically stronger for the subsample
of democracies, but the size is more than twice as large in autocracies.
Overall, we conclude that our result is relatively robust to reasonable changes
in the first and second stage regression. IMF programs seem to stimulate private
capital flows to non-defaulting countries in the first program year.
1.6.1 Alternative estimation strategy
Bird and Rowlands (2009) show that the results of estimating the catalytic effect can
be sensitive to the estimation procedure used to correct for selection bias. Following
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their approach, we test whether our result holds when we account for unobserved dif-
ferences between program and non-program countries. Our benchmark instrumental
variable model adjusts for the non-random selection of IMF programs in terms of ob-
served differences between program and non-program countries.21 Alternatively, the
treatment effects model explicitly addresses bias caused by correlation of program
participation with omitted (unobserved) variables. In this approach, the results of the
first stage regression are used to construct a selection bias control factor – lambda –
reflecting unobserved variables correlated with Fund program participation. Lambda
is then added to the capital flows model in addition to a dummy variable for program
participation (instrumented). Notice that this also changes the interpretation of the
coefficient for program participation compared to the instrumental variable model.
We apply the treatment effects model to our benchmark specification, the spec-
ification including other controls, and for the period from 1990 to 2004. We find
lambda to be negative and statistically significant (except for the first specification;
see Table 1.5 notes a to c), indicating that unobserved variables correlated with Fund
program participation reduce capital inflows. More important, Table 1.5, rows 13 to
15, show that our main result is robust to this alternative identification strategy. In
line with Bird and Rowlands (2009), we do find the estimates to be sensitive to the
estimation technique – the treatment effects model indicates a much larger catalytic
21 Notice that if the observables are correlated with the unobservables, the benchmark model might
(partially) "balance out" the unobservables as well.
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effect – but all results provide evidence of Fund catalysis in IMF program countries
that do not restructure their debt.
1.6.2 The scope for Fund catalysis
We conclude by examining how our findings relate to previous empirical studies indi-
cating that Fund catalysis is only effective when a country’s economic fundamentals
are in an "intermediate" range (see Mody and Saravia, 2006; Eichengreen, Kletzer
and Mody, 2006). These authors categorize countries into those with good, inter-
mediate or bad fundamentals according to their level of external debt, reserves or
short-term debt, and find IMF programs to reduce bond spreads and raise bond is-
suance in a limited intermediate range of economic fundamentals.
To put our results into perspective, we examine whether our finding of Fund
catalysis of total private capital flows is due to the subsample of countries with an
intermediate level of external debt, reserves or short-term debt, as defined in Bordo,
Mody and Oomes (2004). The raw data indicate that countries in the intermediate
category for external debt, reserves or short-term debt, account for respectively 30,
26 and 14 percent of the 125 observations with a Standby Arrangement and no debt
restructuring (our first stage dependent variable). Thus, our sample of IMF programs
in non-defaulting countries is not concentrated particularly in countries with an in-
termediate level of debt or reserves.
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Table 1.6: The Scope of Fund Catalysis in Non-Defaulting Countries
Dependent Variable: Total Private Capital Flows/GDP
Fixed Effects: Year and Country
IMF Program Without a Debt Restructuring, Instrumentedt−1 Coefficient S.E. Obs.
Drop Observations With "Intermediate" Fundamentals
1 Debt/GDP 40-60% 12.952∗∗ (5.714) 474
2 Reserves/Imports (Months) 1.25-3 7.620∗ (4.408) 422
3 Short-Term Debt/Reserves 200-400% 8.159∗ (4.418) 606
Drop Observations With "Good" Fundamentals
4 Debt/GDP<40% 15.375∗∗∗ (4.896) 398
5 Reserves/Imports (Months) >3 11.107∗ (6.695) 296
6 Short-Term Debt/Reserves <125%a 14.541∗ (8.077) 160
Drop Observations With "Bad" Fundamentals
7 Debt/GDP >60% −0.297 (3.096) 394
8 Reserves/Imports (Months) <1.25 9.171∗∗ (4.457) 548
9 Short-Term Debt/Reserves >400% 9.738∗∗ (4.530) 581
Robust standard errors (clustered by country) presented in parentheses. Significance levels: ***: 1%,
**: 5%, *: 10%. Regressors included but not reported: Real GDP Growtht−1, Trade/GDPt−1, Debt
Servicing/Exportst−1, Total External Debtt−1, Reserves/Imports (Months)t−1, Exchange Rate Volatilityt−1,
Short-Term Debt/Reservest−1, Domestic Credit/GDPt−1, Change Domestic Credit/GDPt−1.
aIn order to limit the loss of observations, the threshold of 125% is somewhat lower than defined by Bordo,
Mody and Oomes (2004).
More importantly, Table 1.6 shows that our main result is not caused by the
subsample of countries with an intermediate range of debt or reserves. The effect of
IMF programs on capital flows is positive and statistically significant even when we
drop all observations in the intermediate range (Table 1.6, Rows 1 to 3). Likewise, our
result is also fairly robust to dropping all observations with good fundamentals (Table
1.6, Rows 4 to 6). Finally, when we remove all observations with bad fundamentals,
the results are more ambiguous (Table 1.6, Rows 7 to 9). The positive effect of Fund
programs disappears when we exclude countries with a level of debt above 60%. Yet,
the estimate for Fund programs remains positive and statistically significant when
observations with low reserves or a high level of short term debt are dropped.
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We conclude that our results are not due to some subset of our sample. IMF
programs seem to catalyse private capital flows to countries that do not restructure
their debt, almost irrespective of a country’s level of debt or reserves. Thus, the scope
for Fund catalysis seems to be broader than suggested in previous empirical studies.
1.7 Conclusion
By distinguishing between defaulting and non-defaulting countries, we improve on
the way country fundamentals are accounted for when measuring the impact of IMF
programs on private capital flows. Previous studies either reject the idea of Fund
catalysis or find only a narrow window of effectiveness when focusing on bond is-
suances or spreads. Our results indicate that, in general, IMF programs catalyse
private capital flows to countries that do not restructure their commercial or official
debt.
These findings are consistent with the idea that Fund catalysis is effective when
a country’s solvency is not at stake. To better understand the factors driving catal-
ysis, we also examine whether the size or use of IMF credit matters. Although the
signalling and lending function of IMF programs are difficult to analyse separately,
the evidence points out that countries can use IMF programs to signal their commit-
ment to reform and willingness to repay debts to private creditors.
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Chapter 2
Loss Shocks and the Quantity and Price of
Private Export Credit Insurance: Evidence
From a Global Insurer
2.1 Introduction
For decades, developments in the market for trade credit insurance remained largely
unnoticed to policy makers and the wider public. For example, the structural change
within the European Union (EU) – where public export credit agencies were re-
stricted and the market for private short-term trade credit insurance developed into a
multi-billion business – took place silently since the late 1990s.23 As a result of this
change, export credit insurance covering the risk of non-payment on short-term trade
transactions within the EU is now generally provided by private insurers (Morel,
2011). Worldwide, private trade credit insurers – "niche" players within the broader
market for trade finance – covered EUR1.97 trillion of international and domestic
trade in 2013 (ICISA, 2014).
22 This chapter is published as DNB Working Paper (van der Veer, 2014b). I thank Jan Willem van
den End, Marco Hoeberichts, Neeltje van Horen, Eelke de Jong, Andrew Rose, Job Swank, Marco
Verwoerd and seminar participants at De Nederlandsche Bank for comments. Henk van Kerkhoff
provided excellent data assistance. I bear full responsibility for any remaining errors. The views
expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of De Nederlandsche Bank.
23 Since 1998, EU legislation restricted public export credit agencies from providing guarantees cov-
ering export credit risks with a maturity of less than two years to the "marketable risk countries", i.e.
the countries within the European Union and most other OECD countries (see European Commission,
1997). Private insurers usually cover credits with a tenure of 60 to 120 days (Swiss Re, 2006).
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Developments in trade credit insurance did make it to the global policy agenda
during the 2008-09 global trade collapse. In 2008, private trade credit insurers faced a
rapidly deteriorating risk environment and a doubling of their claims (Figure 2.1). As
Figure 2.1: Claims, Quantity and Price of Private Trade Credit Insurance,
2001-2013*
Percent; Index 2008=100
*Figures include domestic and export credit insurance.
Source: International Credit Insurance & Surety Association (ICISA) Yearbook 2014-2015. Figures on the value of
insured trade are only available from 2005 onwards.
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a reaction, they cut back on their insurance supply and raised premium rates. On the
demand side, there were opposing influences. The decline in global demand reduced
world trade and thereby the need for export credit insurance, while at the same time,
there was high demand from exporters for credit insurance protection (Morel, 2011).
These circumstances fuelled the debate on a possible gap in the supply of short-term
export credit insurance which led to the G-20 call on public export credit agencies to
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fill the perceived gap.24 Yet, the extent of the "hard market" – an insurance market
characterised by a limited availability of insurance and higher premium rates – in
short-term export credit insurance was difficult to assess. Real time figures on the
quantity and premium level of private export credit insurance are publicly unavailable
and research on the conduct of private trade credit insurers did not exist.25
This chapter is the first to study the effect of claims incurred by a global trade
credit insurer on its quantity and price of export credit insurance. Using a unique
bilateral country-level data set on the global insurance underwriting by one of the
"Big Three" trade credit insurers, I show that a temporary increase in claims results
in a decline in quantity and rise in premium level of export credit insurance. Holding
other things constant, on average, a doubling of claims results in a decline in the
share of bilateral exports insured of about 11% and rise in premium level of about
4%. The price effect disappears in the year following the claims increase, while the
quantity effect persists somewhat longer and dies away in the second year following
the rise in claims.
24 Subsequently, fourteen governments within the EU set up various state aid schemes to support the
market for short-term export credit insurance (see for an overview van der Veer, 2011).
25 The Bern Union (BU) provides the most extensive publicly available data on short-term trade credit
insurance. A few limitations of these country-level data, however, make it difficult to assess develop-
ments in the market for private short-term export credit insurance. First, the data combine short-term
export credit insurance provided by private insurers and public export credit agencies (ECAs). This is
likely to mask changes in private insurance cover, especially during a crisis when ECAs aim to sup-
port the market. Second, the BU collects data by destination country only; thus, no inference can be
made on home country developments in insurance coverage. Last but not least, the BU quarterly fig-
ures report "credit limits", which refer to the amount of total potential exposure by insurers and do not
measure the amount of actual export credit insured.
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These benchmark findings are consistent with the features of the global private
trade credit insurance market. In general, this market is characterised as an oligopoly
where the Big Three global insurers (Euler Hermes, Atradius, and Coface cover 86
percent of the world market) offer relatively homogeneous insurance policies, com-
pete heavily on price, and can (very) easily adjust their exposure (see e.g. Becue, De
Smet and Volcke, 2012; Becue, 2013). Indeed, the short-term nature of trade credits
covered, in combination with the unique ability to dynamically adjust their potential
exposure on existing insurance policies (Swiss Re, 2006), allows private trade credit
insurers to reduce their exposure quickly and significantly in case of a loss shock.
Subsequently, I find that the benchmark claims effects increase when the in-
surer is making a loss and further rise with the size of the loss. A doubling of the
claims in the subsample of losses is associated with a decline in the share of exports
insured of 20% and rise in premium level of 8%; about double the size of the bench-
mark effects. These claims effects rise even further – to about triple the size of the
benchmark effects – when the subsample of losses is limited to only include losses
above the median loss amount. Finally, and analogous to international shock trans-
mission by global banks (see i.e. Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; De Haas and Horen,
2012), I find evidence indicating that the global trade credit insurer transmits extreme
loss shocks – the 97.5th percentile losses – across countries via a reduction in its sup-
ply of export credit insurance. Overall, these results support the idea that loss shocks
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can temporarily reduce the availability and increase the price of private short-term
export credit insurance, consistent with a hard market.26
The insurance literature provides two possible explanations for the link be-
tween claims and the quantity and price of insurance. Capital shock theories formal-
ize the idea that a loss shock negatively affects an insurer’s capital, and temporarily
constrains the capacity to write coverage until higher premium rates allow capital
to be built up again from retained earnings (Winter, 1994; Cummins and Danzon,
1997). Alternatively, Lai et al. (2000) show that an adverse change in expectations
about future losses could also cause a hard market. Based on the benchmark results, I
cannot assess whether it is changing expectations about future claims or actual losses
depleting the trade credit insurer’s capital that cause insurance supply to constrict
and premiums to rise. The evidence on the international transmission of extreme loss
shocks, however, suggests a role for capital constraints.
I use a fixed effects (FEs) approach to examine the claims effect on the quantity
and price of private export credit insurance, and separately estimate a quantity and
price equation. The data set includes yearly observations on exports covered with
export credit insurance, premium income received, and claims paid, covering 25 ex-
porting and 183 importing countries from 1992 to 2006. These bilateral panel data
allow me to identify the claims effect on the insurer’s share of bilateral exports in-
sured and premium level of export credit insurance within a pair of countries over
26 Note that I cannot prove the existence of a hard market in private export credit insurance in case
of a loss shock, since the data cover information on one global trade credit insurer only.
56 Chapter 2. Loss Shocks and the Quantity and Price of Private Export Credit Insurance
time (i.e. I include country-pair FEs), while ruling out the influence on insurance
underwriting of factors other than claims by including time-varying exporter and im-
porter FEs. Basically, the time-varying FEs sweep out all country-specific insurance
supply-and-demand shocks in both exporting and destination countries. Notably,
since the demand for export credit insurance relative to the total value of bilateral ex-
ports tends to increase in adverse economic circumstances (when claims increase),
the estimated decline in the share of exports insured in case of a loss shock is likely
to be supply-driven.
This study builds on and aims to contribute to the literature on insurance un-
derwriting (see for an overview Weiss, 2007; Harrington, Niehaus and Yu, 2013).
The focus on private trade credit insurance is novel. An advantage of examining this
line of insurance is that, in addition to claims and premium income, I can also ex-
ploit information on the quantity of insurance cover. This overcomes a key issue
encountered in the existing empirical literature on insurance underwriting, where the
insurance package – the price and quantity of coverage – is generally not observed
(see i.e. Weiss, 2007).27 The private export credit insurance data allows me to exam-
ine the direct link between claims and both the quantity and price of insurance. That
is, I estimate the elasticity between the claims ratio (claims over premium income)
and the share of exports insured (insured exports over total exports) on the one hand,
and the elasticity between the "claims level" (claims over insured exports) and the
27 In general, the empirical literature that studies factors influencing insurance underwriting uses the
ratio of premiums over claims (inverse loss ratio) to proxy for the price of insurance. The quantity of
insurer output is proxied by the present value of losses incurred (see i.e. Froot and O’Connell, 1999).
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premium level (premiums over insured exports) on the other. Doing so, I show that
claims influence both the quantity and price of insurance. Moreover, the results sug-
gest that, within the market for private trade credit insurance, the negative quantity
effect of a loss shock generally dominates the positive price effect in terms of size
and duration.
Finally, this chapter relates to the literature that studies the magnifying role of
trade finance constraints to the 2008-09 global trade collapse. In a key contribution,
Amiti and Weinstein (2011) show that banks transmit financial shocks to exporters
via a reduction in trade finance. More recently, Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr
(2013) find that shocks to the supply of letters of credit – a bank-intermediated in-
strument to reduce risk in international trade – affect exports. While the data on
private export credit insurance do not cover the period of the global trade collapse,
I find that loss shocks (like the doubling of the industry’s claims ratio in 2008) af-
fect the supply of insured exports at all times.28 Although far from being conclusive,
these results hint that a reduction in the availability of private export credit insurance
was part of the trade finance constraints during the global trade collapse.
In what follows, I briefly review the literature that explains the economics of
insurance markets following a loss shock, and describe how underwriting measures
28 Notably, the results in Chapter 3 suggest that the trade effect of changes in the supply of insured
exports is larger than the value of exports insured. In that chapter, which is based on the same dataset
used in this chapter, I estimate a gravity model to test whether private export credit insurance stim-
ulates trade and consistently find a positive and statistically significant effect. Moreover, the results
suggest that there is a trade multiplier of private export credit insurance; every euro of insured exports
seems to generate more than EUR 1 (about 30 euro cents more) in total exports.
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by trade credit insurers in case of a loss shock relate to the general features of the
global trade credit insurance market (Section 2). In Section 3, I discuss the empirical
strategy and data. The benchmark results on the average effect of claims on the quan-
tity and price of private export credit insurance are discussed in Section 4, followed
by sensitivity analysis in Section 5. Section 6 examines the quantity and price ef-
fect of losses, and international transmission effects of extreme loss shocks. Section
7 concludes.
2.2 Loss shocks and insurance underwriting: theoretical
considerations
I examine the link between claims incurred by a private trade credit insurer and the
quantity and price of its supply of export credit insurance. To understand potential
mechanisms at work, in this section I first shortly review the literature that explains
the economics of insurance markets following a loss shock. Subsequently, I describe
some general features of the global trade credit insurance market – in particular the
unique ability of private trade credit insurers to dynamically adjust their exposure on
existing insurance policies – and how these relate to the underwriting measures taken
by trade credit insurers in case of a loss shock.
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2.2.1 Loss shock theories
Several studies within the insurance literature examine the tendency of the quantity of
insurance supplied to decline and insurance prices to rise following adverse shocks.
So far, this pattern is shown to apply in the market for liability insurance (Gron, 1994;
Winter, 1994; Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Lai et al., 2000) and catastrophe reinsur-
ance (Froot and O’Connell, 1999), and perhaps also occurs in the market for private
trade credit insurance. The notion that insurance markets can go through periods of
limited capacity and higher premium rates – a "hard market" – following a loss shock
is theoretically well established. Yet, different theories for the underlying mechanism
exist. Cummins and Lewis (2003) postulate that most of the literature assumes that
hard markets in response to loss shocks are driven by ‘some combination of’ three
factors: capital market imperfections, probability updating, and correlated losses.
First, Winter (1994) formalizes the idea that an increase in claims – a loss
shock – negatively affects an insurer’s capital, and temporarily constrains the capac-
ity to write coverage until higher premium rates allow capital to be built up again
from retained earnings. In Winter’s model, it is assumed that insurers cannot simply
raise new capital following a loss shock because external capital is more costly than
internal capital (i.e. capital market imperfections). Alternatively, the market value
of equity might decline after new capital is raised if it is expected that this new cap-
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ital is also used to cover unsettled claims on prior policies, on which no additional
premiums can be collected.29
Alternatively, an unexpected loss shock might also increase the insurer’s and
potential policy holders’ expectation of future losses (i.e. probability updating; Froot
and O’Connell, 1999). As a result, Lai et al. (2000) show that insurance supply
is restricted while insurance demand increases. While both these changes lead to
premium increases, the effect on the quantity of insurance is ambiguous. Froot and
O’Connell (1999) find absolute declines in the quantity of reinsurance following a
loss shock, showing that supply rather than demand shocks are more important for
understanding the effect of losses on prices and quantities in their catastrophe rein-
surance pricing study. Notably, a situation of restricted supply and increased demand
seems to have been characteristic of the private trade credit insurance market during
the 2008-09 global trade collapse (see the Introduction).
Finally, and closely related to probability updating, the extent to which losses
are positively correlated exacerbate any changes in the quantity and price of insur-
ance resulting from a loss shock (Froot and O’Connell, 1999; Lai et al., 2000). Pos-
itive correlations among losses are likely to be an important driver of developments
in private trade credit insurance markets. Claims tend to rise during business cycle
29 Cummins and Danzon (1997) provide a more general theory, connecting loss shocks, capitaliza-
tion and premiums by allowing for insurer insolvency and sensitivity of policyholders to the financial
quality of the insurer. Their model is more general in the sense that it can also explain a price decrease
following a loss shock. Such a decline in price follows if policyholders are sensitive to the finan-
cial quality of the insurer and thus lower their demand when an insurer´s chance of going bankrupt
increases.
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downturns (Swiss Re, 2006), which are generally transmitted across, or simultanu-
ously hit, countries and industries.
2.2.2 Underwriting measures by trade credit insurers in case of a
loss shock
The big three global trade credit insurers (Euler Hermes, Atradius, and Coface) have
risk portfolios covering several millions of firms, broadly diversified across countries
and sectors. In case of a deteriorating risk environment they can take a number of
underwriting measures to keep aggregate risk in line with their equity capital and risk
tolerance. These measures are targeted at the buyers with whom the policy holders
trade (buyer underwriting) and the terms and conditions of the insurance policies
(policy underwriting). The contingency actions aim to limit the rise of the claims
ratio during normal business cycle downturns as well as major credit events (e.g.
a large scale default) or a widespread credit crisis. Depending on the shock, the
scope of measures can vary from tailor-made adjustments in insurance cover at the
individual firm level, to fast and more rigorous cover and policy adjustments across
countries and sectors.
The trade credit insurers’ key risk management tool is their ability to dynami-
cally manage their maximum potential exposure – the "credit limits" – on individual
buyers. Private trade credit insurers generally offer whole turnover insurance poli-
cies, covering all of a firm’s trade receivables, including the good risks.30 The trade
30 Whole turnover policies do not cover intercompany sales, exports to governments, and can exclude
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credit insurer, however, retains the right to reduce or cancel a granted limit on any
particular buyer at any given time. When a buyer is facing financial difficulties –
perceived e.g. by late payments, which the policy holder is obliged to notify to the
insurer (Becue, 2013) – a trade credit insurer can immediately reduce the policy
holder’s credit limit on the buyer to the amount of the outstanding invoices. This
way, new orders are no longer covered by the insurance policy.
In combination with the short-term nature of trade credits covered, the ability
to set and manage credit limits gives trade credit insurers ‘a degree of control over
risk exposures that distinghuishes credit insurance from other kinds of insurance and
from many other credit instruments (Swiss Re, 2006).’ Essentially, dynamic limit
management is at the core of contingency measures by trade credit insurers targeted
at buyer underwriting. The buyer underwriting measures generally involve: identi-
fication and reduction of weak country and sector exposures, exit of bad risks and
reduction of weak risks at the individual firm level based on internal buyer ratings,
structured review of high exposures, adjustment of the buyer acceptance rate, and
improvement of the recovery success rate in key markets.
A second set of measures to limit the rise of the claims ratio is aimed at policy
underwriting. These measures involve price increases to reflect hightened risks, can-
cellation and/or restructuring of loss making policies, strict selection of new clients,
and stricter policy conditions when existing contracts are renewed. Aside from pre-
(risky) companies the insurer is not willing to cover.
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mium rate adjustments, trade credit insurers can change a number of other non-price
conditions attached to insurance policies, such as the percentage of self-retention,
claims deductibles, and aggregate first losses.
Importantly, whereas trade credit insurers can immediately reduce their expo-
sure via credit limit adjustments, the premium rate and other non-price conditions
cannot be adjusted in the policy period. Notably, the majority of trade credit insur-
ance policies are renewed on an annual basis (Jones, 2010). Also, even though trade
credit insurers can differentiate between the terms and conditions attached to their
insurance policies, they offer relatively homogeneous policies, as e.g. described in a
white paper by Becue, De Smet and Volcke (2012, p. 72):
"Credit insurance has shown the features of a commodity for many years.
The differences between the credit insurers have been reduced in such a way
that the products are experienced as identical. The commodification only em-
phasises the price. The credit insurers therefore urgently need to come up with
differentiation strategies."
As a result, the scope for a unilateral rise in premium rates to increase an in-
surer’s overall premium income is limited. Indeed, the world trade credit insurance
market is generally characterised as an oligopoly with strong price competition (Be-
cue, 2013). Notably, in the two-year period from 2005 to 2007 the average premium
rate in the global trade credit insurance market declined by 29 percent (see Figure
2.1).
Finally, trade credit insurers smooth the impact of a loss shock by transferring
risk through the use of reinsurance, and by the release of reserves. Reinsurance works
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as a substitute for capital and is heavily used by trade credit insurers. According to
Swiss Re (2006), the global insurers cede about half of their business to reinsurers.
Losses are also partly absorbed by a release of the equalisation reserve, which is build
up in years when an insurer makes a profit.31 Accounting for reinsurance capacity, the
(net) exposure of the global insurers in 2013 was about 200 times the value of their
shareholders equity.32 The relatively small capital base underlines the importance of
dynamic limit management to quickly reduce exposure and thereby limit the rise of
the claims ratio in adverse circumstances.
Overall, the characteristics of the private trade credit insurance market are
vividly described in Becue, De Smet and Volcke (2012, p. 54-55):
"The credit insurance market is characterised by an oligopoly. A few large
players cover 85% of the market. They know each other and watch each other
like hawks. Strong competition leads to razor sharp prices. That is good in
itself but it also removes the important margins. The sector cannot build up
sufficient reserves. At the slightest setback the credit insurers get frightened.
[. . . ] When the situation is bad, credit limits are withdrawn so that less cover is
given. This makes it possible to survive, however at the expense of the client."
Given the general features of the private trade credit insurance market – in par-
ticular the unique ability of trade credit insurers to dynamically adjust their potential
exposure on existing insurance policies – one would, on average, expect larger quan-
tity than price adjustments in private trade credit insurance in case of a loss shock.
31 The European Commission has defined four methodes of calculating the equalisation reserve in a
particalur year (see EU Directive 87/343/EEG of 22 June 1987).
32 See Moody’s 2013 Credit Opinion reports on Euler Hermes, Atradius and Coface, available at
www.moodys.com. The net total exposure to shareholders’ equity of Euler Hermes, Atradius, and
Coface in 2013 respectively, was 231x, 209x, and 191x. In 2008, the net total exposure to sharehold-
ers’ equity of the global insurers was around 300x. Shareholders’ equity of Euler Hermes, Atradius,
and Coface in 2013, valued EUR2.46, EUR1.29, and EUR1.78 billion respectively.
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2.3 Empirical strategy and data
I aim to identify whether an increase in claims paid by a private trade credit insurer
leads to a decline in the quantity and rise in the price of its supply of export credit
insurance. To absorb the influence on insurance underwriting of factors other than
claims, I rely on a fixed effects approach (see i.e. Khwaja and Mian, 2008). Subse-
quently, I employ the following two specifications:
Quantity equation
ln(ShareExpInsuredijt) = α0+α1Dij+α2Dit+α3Djt+β1 ln(ClaimsRatioijt)+εijt
(2.1)
Price equation
ln(PremiumLevelijt) = α4+α5Dij+α6Dit+α7Djt+β2 ln(ClaimsLevelijt)+γijt
(2.2)
where i denotes the exporting country, j denotes the importing country, t denotes
time in years, ln(.) denotes the natural logarithm operator, and the variables are
defined as:
• ShareExpInsured is calculated as insured exports over FOB exports
from i to j, and is referred to as the share of exports insured,
• ClaimsRatio is calculated as claims divided by premiums on insured exports
from i to j,
• PremiumLevel is calculated as premiums divided by insured exports from i to j,
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• ClaimsLevel is calculated as claims divided by insured exports from i to j,
• D are country-pair (ij), exporter-year (it), and importer-year (jt) dummy variables,
• ε and γ are omitted influences on the share of exports insured and the premium
level respectively, assumed to be well behaved.
The parameters of interest are β1 and β2. These represent the effect of claims
on the quantity and price of private export credit insurance, and are identified within
country-pair variation over time. I estimate the equations with OLS, using a robust
covariance estimator (clustered by country-pair dyads) to handle heteroskedasticity.
Importantly, the identification strategy hinges on the inclusion of comprehen-
sive sets of fixed effects. For instance, I include a set of country-pair fixed effects
(i.e. a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive set of {Dij} intercepts) to absorb all
time-invariant characteristics that are common to a pair of countries and influence the
share of exports insured (such as distance). I also add comprehensive sets of time-
varying exporter and importer fixed effects (i.e. sets of {Dit} and {Djt}) to sweep
out all country-specific insurance supply-and-demand shocks in both exporting and
destination countries. Notably, these time-varying country fixed effects account for
the influence of the business cycle on insurance underwriting in both exporting and
importing countries. This assures that the claims ratio or claims level, which tends to
rise (fall) during business cycle downturns (upturns), does not pick up business cy-
cle fluctuations. In this regard, it is also important to note that the dependent variable
in the quantity equation measures the share of exports insured. Whereas a business
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cycle downturn in a destination country can be expected to simultaneously lead to a
rise in claims and an absolute decline in the need for export credit insurance due to
lower import demand from the destination country, this does not influence the share
of exports insured since both the numerator (insured exports) and denominator (total
exports) decline.
Moreover, the time-varying fixed effects take account of any time-variant country-
specific factors that influence insurance underwriting, a number of which have been
identified in the literature. For example, the fixed effects capture the influence of
efficiency gains on the supply of insurance (Cummins and Outreville, 1987), inter-
est rate shocks (Doherty and Garven, 1995), changes in the financial quality of the
insurer (Cummins and Danzon, 1997), general macroeconomic shocks (Guo, Fung
and Huang, 2009), and regulatory changes (Berry-Stolze and Born, 2012). More-
over, the time-varying exporter fixed effects capture changes in the insurer’s market
share in the various exporting countries over time. Finally, the time-varying importer
fixed effects account for changes in the capacity of reinsurance available on destina-
tion countries, an important determinant of primary market insurance capacity and
efficiency (Cummins and Weiss, 2000; Weiss and Chung, 2004). As described in
Section 2.2.2., risk transfer via the purchase of reinsurance is a key risk management
tool for private trade credit insurers.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for the Variables in the Benchmark Sample
Mean Median Sd Min Max
Insured Exports (Millions) 211 38 518 0.05 6220
Exports (Millions) 4870 1200 12100 0.98 179000
Share of Exports Insured: Insured Exports/Exports (%) 8.4 5.3 9.9 0.002 98.0
Claims (Millions) 0.409 0.062 1.1 0.001 19.1
Premiums (Millions) 0.523 0.126 1.2 0.001 17.6
Claims Ratio: Claims/Premiums (%) 352 55 1760 0.06 48127
Premium Level: Premiums/Insured Exports (%) 0.43 0.29 0.44 0.01 10.01
Claims Level: Claims/Insured Exports (%) 1.32 0.16 6.27 0.0003 99.75
Unit of analysis: exporting country-importing country-year (ijt). The benchmark sample includes 4759 obser-
vations.
The sources of the data are described in Appendix Table A2.1. A correlation
matrix for the variables used in the regression analysis is presented in Table A2.2 The
countries are listed in Table A2.3.
2.3.1 Data on a global trade credit insurer
The data set is unique and includes exports covered with export credit insurance, pre-
mium income received, and claims paid by one of the "Big Three" global trade credit
insurers which have a combined share of 86 percent of the world market (ICISA,
2014): Euler Hermes (34 percent), Atradius (31 percent) and Coface (21 percent).33
The raw data consists of an unbalanced panel with bilateral information on 25 export-
ing countries and 183 importing countries covering the period from 1992 to 2006.
The sample used in the regression analysis has a maximum of 4759 annual observa-
tions. Summary statistics for the variables are presented in Table 2.1.
33 Further company details are confidential.
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The quantity equation relates changes in the share of bilateral exports insured
to changes in the insurer’s claims ratio. I use the term "insured exports" to refer to
exports that are covered with export credit insurance by the global trade credit insurer.
The annual value of insured exports between a pair of countries varies considerably,
ranging between EUR 50 thousand and EUR 6.2 billion, with an average of EUR
211 million. In turn, the "share of exports insured" refers to the share of exports
between a pair of countries that is covered with export credit insurance by the global
trade credit insurer. This annual share of exports insured ranges between (but is not
equal to) zero and 98 percent, with a median (mean) value of 5.3 (8.4) percent. In the
regression analysis I also show results when accounting for the potential influence of
outliers by winsorizing the data.
The claims (or loss) ratio is measured as the ratio of claims over premium in-
come.34 It is an inverse profitability measure and an important performance indicator
for trade credit insurers. The sum of the claims ratio and the expense ratio – total in-
surance expenses divided by total insurance revenues – is the combined ratio.35 When
this combined ratio exceeds 100%, the insurer makes a loss on its insurance activ-
ity.36 Since the expense ratio is relatively constant over time, claims ratio shocks are
the main driver of the overall financial results of a trade credit insurer. Importantly,
with expense ratios historically ranging between 20-40%, global trade credit insur-
34 I use the gross claims ratio which measures claims and premiums including the part that is ceded
to reinsurers.
35 Total insurance revenues is the sum of premium and information income (i.e. credit checking fees).
36 Whether the insurer makes an overall loss also depends on the investment result.
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ers make a loss when the claims ratio exceeds 60-80%.37 The average (unweighted)
claims ratio in the sample equals 352%, which reflects the skewed distribution of
claims ratios.38 In the regression analysis, I correct for this skewness by taking logs.
Notably, the sample does not seem to be biased towards observations with a high
claims ratio. The median claims ratio is 55%, almost equal to the industry’s average
claims ratio (on insured domestic and international trade) of 53% in the period from
2001 to 2013 (see Figure 2.1). Below I also examine whether the claims effect on the
share of exports insured differs when the insurer makes a loss; i.e. when the claims
ratio exceeds 80%.
The price equation relates changes in the premium level to changes in the
claims level. The premium level is measured as premium per euro of insured exports,
and has a median (mean) value of .29% (.43%); in line with the average 2005-2013
premium level in the global trade credit insurance market of .32% (ICISA, 2014).39
The variable for claims in the price equation is normalized by insured exports instead
of premium income. I refer to this ratio as the "claims level". The median (mean)
value of the premium level is .16% (1.32%); again close to the average industry’s
claims level of .17% in the period from 2005-2013 (ICISA, 2014).
37 In 2012, Euler Hermes, Atradius and Coface, respectively had a net expense ratio of 23, 28 and 26
percent (see Moody’s 2013, Euler Hermes, Coface and Atradius: Peer Comparison).
38 Notice that the maximum (aggregate annual) claims ratio on insured exports between a pair of
countries is 48127 percent(!). In this particular case, total insured exports had a value of EUR 3.2
million, premium income was EUR 5.5 thousand, and claims paid summed up to EUR 2.7 million.
39 Figures on the value of exports insured, needed to calculate the premium level, are not available
before 2005 (see ICISA, 2014).
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Table 2.2: Effect of Claims on Quantity and Price of Private Export Credit Insurance
Dependent Variable: Log Share of Exports Insuredijt Log Premium Levelijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Claims Ratioijt −.11∗∗∗
(.01)
−.09∗∗∗
(.01)
−.07∗∗∗
(.02)
Log Claims Ratioij,t−1 −.03∗∗
(.01)
−.02
(.01)
Log Claims Ratioij,t−2 −.00
(.01)
Log Claims Levelijt .04∗∗∗
(.01)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
.03∗∗∗
(.01)
Log Claims Levelij,t−1 .01∗
(.01)
.00
(.01)
Log Claims Levelij,t−2 −.00
(.01)
R2 .96 .97 .98 .94 .96 .97
RMSE .39 .29 .24 .24 .18 .15
Observations 4759 3487 2677 4759 3487 2677
Data set includes annual observations covering 23 exporting and 122 importing countries, 1992 -
2006. The Share of Exports Insured is calculated as Insured Exportsijt/Exportsijt, Premium Level
as Premiumsijt/Insured Exportsijt, Claims Ratio as Claimsijt/Premiumsijt, and the Claims Level as
Claimsijt/Insured Exportsijt. All regressions include country-pair (ij), time-varying exporting country (it),
and time-varying importing country (jt) fixed effects. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in
parentheses. Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
2.4 Benchmark results
This section presents the benchmark results for the average effect of claims on the
quantity and price of private export credit insurance. First, I estimate the default
quantity and price specifications including only contemporaneous claims, and then
add lags of claims to examine the duration of the claims effect. The results are
presented in Table 2.2.
Turning to the quantity regressions first, the estimate for the coefficient of the
claims ratio is negative and statistically distinguishable from zero at all reasonable
significance levels (Table 2.2, Column 1). Higher claims ratios seem to be related
to a lower share of exports insured. To get a sense of magnitudes, suppose that the
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claims ratio doubles. Since both the share of exports insured and the claims ratio
are denoted in logarithms, the estimated coefficient of .11 can be interpreted as an
elasticity. Thus, a doubling of the claims ratio on insured exports from country i
to country j would lead to an average decline in the share of exports insured from
country i to country j of 11%. The results in the second and third column of Table
2.2 indicate that, on average, the negative claims effect on the share of exports insured
lasts about a year. The coefficient of the first lag of the claims ratio suggests that this
share is about 3% lower one year after a doubling of the claims ratio. The average
claims effect dies away after one year.
Importantly, the estimated decline in the share of exports insured results while
controlling for country-specific demand shocks. Thus, the decrease in the share of
exports insured appears to be due to a decline in the supply of private export credit
insurance. The main concern regarding this interpretation is the relative demand for
insurance on exports from country i to j. If exporters prefer to cover a lower share
of exports with private export credit insurance following a rise in claims, this could
also explain the decline in the share of exports insured. As discussed in Section 2,
however, the relative demand for insurance tends to rise following an unexpected
loss shock due to probability updating of future losses. This makes it unlikely that
lower demand explains the quantity decrease. Overall then, these results suggest that
the estimated decline in the quantity of private export credit insurance following an
increase in the claims ratio is supply-driven.
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Table 2.2 also reports the results from equation (2), where the premium level is
the dependent variable and claims are normalized by the quantity of insured exports.
The estimate for the claims level is positive and statistically distinguishable from zero
at all reasonable significance levels (Table 2.2, Column 4). The size of the coefficient
implies that a doubling of the claims level increases the premium level with about
4%. Thus, the claims effect on the price of insurance is less than half as large as
the effect on the quantity of insurance. A possible explanation for the relatively
small elasticity between claims and the premium level is that insurers can change a
number of other non-price conditions attached to insurance policies. For example,
policy holders have a self-retention – a portion of the insurance exposure that the
policy holder covers – which can be adjusted in terms of cover percentage, claims
deductibles, and aggregate first losses. Contrary to the claims effect on the quantity
of export credit insurance, the average claims effect on the premium level seems to
disappear in the first year after the increase in claims (Table 2.2, Columns 5 and 6).
The coefficient of the first lag of the claims level is only marginally significant (at the
10 percent level) and small, with a point estimate of .01.
Succinctly, an increase in claims seems to lead to an economically and sta-
tistically significant decline in the supply and increase in the price of export credit
insurance by this global trade credit insurer, holding other things constant. A dou-
bling of the claims ratio (or claims level) results, on average, in a decline in the share
of exports insured of about 11% and a rise in price of export credit insurance of about
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4%. The price effect seems to disappear in the year following the claims increase,
while the quantity effect persists somewhat longer and dies away in the second year
following the rise in claims.
In the remainder of this article, I further test the robustness of these benchmark
results to sample changes and omitted variable bias, and examine whether larger
claims have proportionately bigger effects than small claims. In particular, I inves-
tigate whether the marginal quantity and price effects differ when claims turn into
actual losses.
2.5 Sensitivity analysis
2.5.1 Sample changes
I start the sensitivity analysis with a number of robustness checks estimating the
benchmark quantity and price specifications on various subsamples. The purpose of
this examination of reasonable changes to the sample is to show that the results are
not due to small parts of the sample. The results are presented in Table 2.3, Rows
1 to 14. Each of the rows in the table corresponds to a different sensitivity check,
while the columns show the results of the claims effect in the quantity and price
specification.
Since I am interested in exporter effects, I start by dropping groups of im-
porter countries. First, I delete all observations for industrial importers, and then
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Table 2.3: Sensitivity of Effect of Claims on Quantity and Price of Private Export
Credit Insurance
Dependent Variable: Log Share of Log Premium
Exports Insured Level
(1) (2)
Log Claims Ratio Log Claims Level Obs.
Benchmark Results −.11∗∗∗
(.01)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
4759
Sample Changes
1. Drop Industrial Importers −.10∗∗∗
(.02)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
2370
2. Drop Latin America, Caribbean Importers −.11∗∗∗
(.01)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
3951
3. Drop Middle Eastern Importers −.11∗∗∗
(.01)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
4226
4. Drop Asian Importers −.10∗∗∗
(.01)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
4375
5. Drop African Importers −.11∗∗∗
(.01)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
4275
6. Drop (Formerly) Centrally Managed Importers −.11∗∗∗
(.01)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
3961
7. Drop Poor Importers (Real GDP p/c <1000) −.11∗∗∗
(.01)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
4730
8. Drop Small Importers (Population <1 Million) −.11∗∗∗
(.01)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
4178
9. Drop Non-European Exporters −.10∗∗∗
(.01)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
4191
10. Drop Non-European Exporters & Importers −.11∗∗∗
(.02)
.03∗∗∗
(.01)
2336
11. Drop Early Data (Year<1998) −.10∗∗∗
(.01)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
3901
12. Drop if Claims Ratio (Level) >Median −.07∗∗∗
(.02)
.03∗∗
(.01)
2379
13. Winsorize data at 1% and 99% −.10∗∗∗
(.01)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
4759
14. Winsorize data at 5% and 95% −.09∗∗∗
(.01)
.04∗∗∗
(.01)
4759
Estimation Changes
15. Add Financing Costs & Contract Enforcement −.11∗∗∗
(.01)
.03∗∗∗
(.01)
3370
16. Add Cross-Border Bank Lending −.10∗∗∗
(.02)
.05∗∗∗
(.01)
3382
Data set includes annual observations covering 23 exporting and 122 importing countries, 1992 -
2006. The Share of Exports Insured is calculated as Insured Exportsijt/Exportsijt, Premium Level
as Premiumsijt/Insured Exportsijt, Claims Ratio as Claimsijt/Premiumsijt, and the Claims Level as
Claimsijt/Insured Exportsijt. All regressions include country-pair (ij), time-varying exporting country (it),
and time-varying importing country (jt) fixed effects. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in
parentheses. Significance: ***1%, **5%.
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successively drop observations for developing countries from Latin America or the
Caribbean, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and for (formerly) centrally managed
economies.40 These robustness checks leave the basic claims effect on the quan-
tity and price of export credit insurance largely unchanged. The same goes when
dropping poor importers (those with real GDP per capita of less than EUR 1000 per
annum) or small importers (defined as a country with fewer than one million people).
Next, I test the robustness of the results by dropping exporter observations. In
particular, these checks examine whether the results hold when focusing on insured
exports from and to Europe. Although other markets are growing in importance, the
majority of exports covered with private export credit insurance are still destined to
Europe (Morel, 2011). First, I drop non-European exporters from the sample. The
results in Row 9 of Table 2.3 show that this robustness check does not undermine the
findings. Second, I drop all non-European exporters and importers, thus focusing on
insured exports flows within Europe. Again, the results remain resilient (Table 2.3,
Row 10).
Further, I check whether the benchmark results hold when dropping the ob-
servations before 1998. In that year, the European Union restricted public export
credit agencies from providing guarantees on short-term export credits to the coun-
tries within the European Union and most other OECD countries, leaving these so-
called "marketable risk countries" to the private trade credit insurers (see European
40 The various groups of countries are as classified by the IMF’s International Financial Statistics’
country codes.
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Commission, 1997). Once more, the results are basically unchanged (Table 2.3, Row
11).
Continuing, I examine if the quantity and price effects are due to observations
where the claims ratio or claims level is relatively high. I do so by dropping all
observations above the median value of the claims ratio or level. Again, I find a sta-
tistically significant effect of claims on the quantity and premium level of insured
exports (Table 2.3, Row 12). The size of the quantity effect, however, is now con-
siderably smaller; .07 instead of .11. This suggests that the impact of claims on the
quantity of insured exports might be nonlinear. I further go into this issue in Section
6.1 below, where I examine the claims effects when the insurer makes a loss.
Finally, I account for the influence of potential outliers by winsorizing all vari-
ables. First, I winsorize the data at the 1% and 99% level; i.e. I replace any data
value below the 1th percentile by the 1th percentile and any value above the 99th per-
centile of the sample data by the 99th percentile. I also check whether the results are
robust to winsorizing the data at the 5% and 95% level. The results are presented in
Rows 13 and 14 of Table 2.3. Again, the results are largely unchanged. Only the size
of the negative claims effect on the quantity of export credit insurance is marginally
smaller with a size of .09 instead of .11.
Overall, I conclude that the finding of a statistically significant claims effect on
the quantity and price of private export credit insurance is not due to some subset of
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the sample and is robust to reasonable sample changes. A rise in claims seems to
reduce the quantity and increase the price of private export credit insurance.
2.5.2 Estimation changes
Following the sample changes, I now examine the sensitivity to changes in the quan-
tity and price equations. These checks test for omitted variable bias. Given the
inclusion of a rich set of dummy variables controlling for time-varying exporter and
importer as well as time-invariant country-pair characteristics, any potential omitted
variable bias would stem from time-varying country-pair characteristics. I control for
such candidates suggested in the recent trade finance literature.
First, recent theories of trade finance (Antràs and Foley, 2011; Schmidt-Eisenlohr,
2013) show that cash-in-advance transactions – instead of open account transactions
which could be covered with export credit insurance – are expected if financing costs
and contract enforcement are high in the exporting country relative to the importing
country. In order to account for this possible source of omitted variable bias, I con-
struct two dummy variables. The first dummy measures the relative financing costs
within a country-pair and is equal to one if financing costs in the exporting coun-
try are higher than in the importing country. I follow Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013), and
proxy financing costs by the net interest margin from Beck et al. 2009.41 The sec-
ond dummy measures relative enforcement (proxied by the "Law and Order" country
41 The net interest margin is the ratio between the accounting value of the net interest revenues of
banks and their total earning assets.
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rates of the International Country Risk Guide) within a country-pair and is equal to
one if enforcement in the exporting country is higher than in the importing coun-
try. Notably, both dummy variables are time-varying within country-pairs (only) in
part of this subsample; the financing costs variable is time-varying in 230 out the 662
country-pairs, while the relative inforcement dummy varies over time in 102 country-
pairs. In line with theory, I find a negative coefficient of both dummies but the effects
are not statistically significant.42 Importantly, the results in Row 15 of Table 2.3 show
that the main findings are robust to introducing relative financing costs and contract
enforcement.
Next, recent studies show that shocks to the supply of bank-intermediated
trade finance affect exports (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Niepmann and Schmidt-
Eisenlohr, 2013). This could be a source of omitted variable bias if these shocks in-
fluence insured exports differently than total bilateral exports. Since the time-varying
country fixed effects capture (domestic) country-specific shocks to bank lending, I
test the robustness of the results to changes in cross-border bank lending. As Mora
and Powers (2011) note, trade finance is dependent on both domestic and cross-
border funding. I add to the quantity and price equations a variable measuring inter-
national claims (in log), using the bilateral data on international bank lending from
the Bank for International Settlements’ Consolidated International Banking Statis-
tics. These international banking claims capture the sum of cross-border lending and
42 Results not reported. In passing, I note that the coefficient of the variable for relative contract
enforcement is statistically significant - and with a size of -.34 also economically relevant - when
excluding the time-varying country fixed effects.
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local claims extended in foreign currency, and include trade finance claims such as
those related to letters of credit. I do not find a statistically significant influence of
this measure of cross-border bank lending in either the quantity or price equation.
More important, the results in Row 16 of Table 2.3 again show that the claims effect
on the quantity and price of export credit insurance is resilient.
2.6 Losses, extreme losses and international transmission
effects
So far, the focus has been on the average effect of claims on the quantity and price of
private export credit insurance. In this section, I estimate the claims effect when the
insurer is making a loss, and examine if the claims effect increases with the size of
the loss. Finally, I examine if the private trade credit insurer transmits extreme loss
shocks across countries.
2.6.1 The claims effect when the insurer makes a loss
The benchmark results show the average effect of an increase in claims on the quan-
tity and price of private export credit insurance. This average effect is based on the
full sample of observations, including both (aggregate annual bilateral) observations
where the insurer made a profit and where the insurer incurred a loss; i.e. when the
value of claims exceeds 80% of premium income (see Section 2.1). One could argue,
however, that the insurer might react differently when it is making a loss.
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Table 2.4: Effect of Losses on Quantity and Price of Private Export Credit Insurance
Dependent Variable: Log Share of Exports Insuredijt Log Premium Levelijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Claims Ratioijt >80% >60% >100% >80% >80% >60% >100% >80%
Largest Largest
Lossesa Lossesa
Log Claims Ratioijt −.20∗∗∗
(.07)
−.17∗∗∗
(.04)
−.21∗∗∗
(.08)
−.36∗∗∗
(.13)
Log Claims Levelijt .08∗∗∗
(.03)
.07∗∗∗
(.02)
.10∗∗∗
(.04)
.11∗∗
(.05)
R2 .98 .98 .99 .99 .98 .97 .98 .99
RMSE .35 .36 .31 .22 .18 .19 .16 .10
Observations 1916 2276 1635 958 1916 2276 1635 958
Data set includes annual observations covering 23 exporting and 122 importing countries, 1992 -
2006. The Share of Exports Insured is calculated as Insured Exportsijt/Exportsijt, Premium Level
as Premiumsijt/Insured Exportsijt, Claims Ratio as Claimsijt/Premiumsijt, and the Claims Level as
Claimsijt/Insured Exportsijt. All regressions include country-pair (ij), time-varying exporting country (it),
and time-varying importing country (jt) fixed effects. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in
parentheses. Significance: ***1%, **5%.
aThe largest losses are defined as the third and fourth quartile of the absolute value of claims of the subsample
of observations with a claims ratio above 80%.
I now focus on the subsample of loss observations. Again, I estimate the claims
effect on the quantity and price of insurance. I examine three different subsamples
with a "loss threshold" for the claims ratio (ijt) of respectively 80%, 60% and 100%.
The results are presented in Table 2.4. The negative claims effect on the quantity of
private export credit insurance ranges between .17 and .21, about twice as large as
the benchmark effect (Table 2.4, Columns 1 to 3). Likewise, the claims effect on the
price of insurance is double the size of the benchmark effect, ranging between .07
and .10.
These results raise the question whether the size of the loss also matters. I ex-
amine this by dropping the first and second quartile of the absolute value of claims
of the subsample of loss observations. The results in Table 2.4 show that the claims
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effect on the quantity and price of private export credit insurance increases with the
size of the loss. The negative claims effect on the quantity of insurance rises up to
.36 (Table 2.4, Column 4); more than three times the size of the benchmark effect.
Likewise, the claims effect on the price of insurance rises up to .11 (Table 2.4, Col-
umn 8). Although less pronounced, this claims effect on the premium level is also
almost triple the size of the benchmark effect.
Overall, these results suggest that the impact of claims on the quantity and
price of private export credit insurance is nonlinear. Larger losses seem to have
proportionaly bigger effects than small losses. I further examine this nonlinearity by
including quadratic terms in the benchmark specifications; i.e. I add the squared log
of the claims ratio to the quantity equation, and the squared log of the claims level
to the price equation. The results are presented in Table 2.5. The first two columns
confirm that the claims ratio has a nonlinear effect on the share of exports insured, as
captured by the quadratic term. The estimate of the squared log of the claims ratio is
statistically highly significant with a negative coefficient of .013 (Table 2.5, Column
2). Subsequently, the elasticity of the share of exports insured with respect to the
claims ratio can be calculated as 2 ∗ −.013 ∗ ln(ClaimsRatio), and thus increases
with the claims ratio. For example, the negative elasticity of the share of exports
insured with respect to the claims ratio equals .10 at the mean of the log claims ratio
(comparable to the benchmark results), but increases up to .23 at the 99th percentile
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Table 2.5: Further Evidence on Non-Linear Effects of Claims
Dependent Variable: Log Share of Exports Insuredijt Log Premium Levelijt
(1) (2) (3)
Log Claims Ratioijt .007
(.028)
Log Claims Ratioijt, Squared −.014∗∗∗
(.004)
−.013∗∗∗
(.001)
Log Claims Levelijt .039∗∗∗
(.010)
Log Claims Levelijt, Squared .000
(.002)
R2 .96 .96 .94
RMSE .39 .39 .24
Observations 4759 4759 4759
Data set includes annual observations covering 23 exporting and 122 importing countries, 1992 -
2006. The Share of Exports Insured is calculated as Insured Exportsijt/Exportsijt, Premium Level
as Premiumsijt/Insured Exportsijt, Claims Ratio as Claimsijt/Premiumsijt, and the Claims Level as
Claimsijt/Insured Exportsijt. All regressions include country-pair (ij), time-varying exporting country (it),
and time-varying importing country (jt) fixed effects. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in
parentheses. Significance: ***1%.
of the log claims ratio.43 In turn, the results in the third column of Table 2.5 do
not provide further evidence of a nonlinear effect of claims on the premium level of
export credit insurance; the estimate for the squared log of the claims level is not
statistically significant. Thus, nonlinearity of the claims effect on the premium level,
as suggested by the results in Table 2.4, may be of a more complex form.
In short, the claims effect on the quantity and price of private export credit
insurance increases when the insurer is making a loss. Moreover, the larger the loss,
the larger the decline in quantity and rise in price; the effects are up to three times
bigger than the benchmark effects. To get a sense of magnitudes, a doubling of
the claims ratio (or claims level) – in the subsample of largest losses – results in a
decline in quantity of about 36%(!) and rise in price of about 11%. Recall, however,
43 The negative elasticity of the share of export insured with respect to the claims ratio equals .13,
.16, and .18 at the 75th, 90th and 95th percentile of the log claims ratio respectively.
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that the benchmark results are not merely driven by the largest losses in the sample.
As shown in Section 2.5, claims below the median value also have a statistically
significant effect on the quantity and premium level of insured exports.
2.6.2 Extreme losses and international transmission effects
Global banks have been shown to transmit financial shocks across countries via a
reduction in their loan supply (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; De Haas and Horen,
2012). Analogous to global banks, in this section, I examine whether the global trade
credit insurer transmits loss shocks across countries via a decline in its supply of
export credit insurance. In particular, I test for international transmission effects of
the largest – extreme – losses in the sample.
The empirical strategy to identify international transmission effects hinges on
the definition of an extreme loss shock. Following the analysis above, I start with the
subsample of largest losses (see Table 2.4, Column 4 and 8). This subsample includes
all observations with a claims ratio above 80% and is further limited to the third and
fourth quartile of claims in absolute value terms. From this subsample, I select the
119 observations with the highest claims (ijt) as a percentage of total annual premium
income of country i on insured exports to all destinations j, and on insured domestic
trade (

j =iPremium Incomeijt+ Premium Incomeiit). I refer to these 119 loss shocks
as "extreme" as they represent the 97.5th percentile of the benchmark sample of 4759
observations. I also show results for a more narrow (the 99th percentile) and widened
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(the 95th percentile) definition of extreme losses. The extreme losses thus include
those losses that are large relative to the insurer’s total premium income in country i.
Importantly, I use this country i perspective to determine the countries to which the
loss shock can be transmitted to, which are defined as all destination countries with
insured exports from country i that do not experience a loss shock.
This strategy to examine international transmission effects of a loss shock is
visualised in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Identification Strategy of International Transmission of Loss Shocks
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As a hypothetical example, suppose the insurer in Germany (Country i = k
in Figure 2.2) suffers an extreme loss on insured exports from Germany to France
(Country j = h). Then there would be international transmission effects if the share
of exports insured from Germany to all destination countries – without a loss shock
– other than France (all countries j = h) declines more strongly for a given increase
in the claims ratio on insured exports to these other destination countries; i.e. the
negative elasticity between the claims ratio and the share of exports insured from
Germany to all countries (without a loss shock) other than France increases.
Subsequently, to estimate international transmission effects of extreme losses,
I add two interaction terms to the benchmark quantity equation. The first interaction
term interacts the claims ratio (ijt) with a dummy variable (SHOCKijt) which is equal
to 1 if claims on insured exports from i to j qualify as an extreme loss. The second in-
teraction term interacts the claims ratio (ijt) with a dummy variable (TRANSMITijt)
which is equal to 1 for all country-pairs with i = k, j = h if SHOCKi=k,j=h=1. I also
add the dummy variables SHOCKijt and TRANSMITijt to the equation to estimate
the interaction effects separately from any base effects.
The results are presented in the first column of Table 2.6. The interaction terms
should be interpreted as the additional claims effect on the share of exports insured,
on top of the average (benchmark) claims effect. The first interaction effect is statis-
tically significant at the 1 percent level with a negative coefficient of .19. Thus, in
case of an extreme loss the decline in the share of exports insured – from the country
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where the insurer suffers the loss shock to the destination country in which the loss
shock originates – is about three times larger (.28 = .09 + .19) than the average claims
effect associated with a given rise of the claims ratio. More important, the second in-
teraction effect is also negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The
point estimate implies that the share of exports insured – from the exporting coun-
try in which the insurer suffers a loss shock to all destination countries other than
those in which a loss shock originates – declines by a factor of two (.21 = .09 + .12)
more than on average following a given rise of the claims ratio. Thus, there seems to
be evidence that the private trade credit insurer transmits extreme loss shocks across
countries by reducing its supply of insurance.44
In Table 2.6, Column 2 to 6, I test the robustness of this international trans-
mission effect. First, I narrow down the definition of an extreme loss somewhat.
The evidence on the international transmission effect is based on 119 extreme losses
that are transmitted via 491 "transmission channels" (i.e. 491 country-pair-year com-
binations; see first column of Table 2.6). The second column of Table 2.6 shows
the results when the definition of an extreme loss is narrowed down to include only
the 99th percentile instead of the 97.5th percentile of the benchmark sample of 4759
observations. This gives 48 loss shocks and 167 possible transmission channels. Re-
assuringly, the international transmission effect is negative and of comparable size
with a coefficient of .11 (Table 2.6, Column 2). The estimate is only marginally sig-
44 I have also examined whether the private trade credit insurer transmits extreme loss shocks across
countries via an increase in the price of insurance, but did not find a statistically significant effect of
the interaction term in the price equation. For brevity, these results are not reported.
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Table 2.6: "Extreme" Losses and International Transmission Effects
Dependent Variable: Log Share of Exports Insuredijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loss Shockijt (SHOCKijt), Percentile: 97.5th 99th 95th 95th 95th 95th
Log Claims Ratioijt (LCRijt) −.09∗∗∗
(.01)
−.10∗∗∗
(.01)
−.08∗∗∗
(.01)
−.08∗∗∗
(.01)
−.08∗∗∗
(.01)
−.08∗∗∗
(.01)
LCRijt*SHOCKijt −.19∗∗∗
(.06)
−.27∗∗
(.12)
−.13∗∗
(.06)
−.13∗∗
(.06)
−.13∗∗
(.06)
−.13∗∗
(.06)
LCRijt*TRANSMITijt −.12∗∗∗
(.03)
−.11∗
(.06)
−.06∗∗∗
(.02)
LCRijt*TRANSMITijt: Border −.05∗∗
(.02)
LCRijt*TRANSMITijt: No Border −.06∗∗∗
(.02)
LCRijt*TRANSMITijt: Com. Lang. −.06∗∗∗
(.02)
LCRijt*TRANSMITijt: No Com. Lang. −.06∗∗∗
(.02)
LCRijt*TRANSMITijt: RTA −.06∗∗∗
(.02)
LCRijt*TRANSMITijt: No RTA −.05∗∗∗
(.02)
R2 .96 .96 .98 .96 .96 .96
RMSE .38 .39 .38 .39 .39 .39
Observations 4759 4759 4759 4759 4759 4759
# SHOCKijt = 1 119 48 238 238 238 238
# TRANSMITijt = 1 491 167 2048 2048 2048 2048
Border with Shock Country 327
No Border with Shock Country 1721
Com. Lang. with Shock Country 486
No Com. Lang. with Shock Country 1562
RTA with Shock Country 1340
No RTA with Shock Country 708
Data set includes annual observations covering 23 exporting and 122 importing countries, 1992 - 2006.
Com.Lang: Common Language. RTA: Regional Trade Agreement. The Share of Exports Insured is calculated
as Insured Exportsijt/Exportsijt, and the Claims Ratio as Claimsijt/Premiumsijt. All regressions include the
dummy variables SHOCKijt and TRANSMITijt, and country-pair (ij), time-varying exporting country (it),
and time-varying importing country (jt) fixed effects. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in
parentheses. Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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nificant though for this relatively small number of transmission channels. In turn, I
stretch the definition of an extreme loss somewhat, including the 95th percentile of
losses. Again there is evidence of an international transmission effect; the interaction
effect is negative and highly significant (Table 2.6, Column 3). The size of the inter-
national transmission effect is much smaller though (.06 instead of .12), as could be
expected when including smaller shocks.
Finally, I perform three more robustness checks using the widened (95th per-
centile) definition of loss shocks. These checks examine if the international trans-
mission effect is particularly due to those countries that are likely to be economi-
cally closely related to the country in which the loss shock originates. If so, the
international transmission effect could be picking up a demand effect, although the
time-varying country fixed effects already limit this possibility. Each check splits the
transmission channels into two groups of destination countries that do or do not share
a border, common language, or regional trade agreement with the country in which
the loss shock originates. The results in Columns 4 to 6 of Table 2.6 show that the
international transmission effects are not limited to those destination countries that
share a border, common language or regional trade agreement with the country in
which the loss shock originates.
Succinctly, the private trade credit insurer seems to transmit extreme loss shocks
across countries via a reduction in its supply of export credit insurance. In general,
for a given rise of the claims ratio, the share of exports insured from the country
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where the insurer suffers an extreme loss declines by about a factor of two more than
average. For example, if a claims ratio doubles, the share of exports insured declines
by about 20%, instead of 10%, as a result of the international transmission of an
extreme loss shock.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter examines the link between claims incurred by a global private trade
credit insurer and the quantity and price of its supply of export credit insurance. Us-
ing a unique data set on the insurer’s global insurance underwriting, I find that a
doubling of claims results, on average, in a decline in the share of bilateral exports
insured of about 11% and rise in the premium level of 4%. The effect of claims
on the premium level is temporary and disappears in the year following the rise in
claims, while the decline in quantity is more persistent and dies away one year later.
Moreover, these claims effects double in size when the insurer is making a loss and
further rise with the value of the loss – up to triple the size of the benchmark ef-
fects. Finally, I find that an extreme loss reduces the share of exports insured from
the country where the loss is suffered to all destination countries. This suggests that
the global trade credit insurer transmits extreme loss shocks across countries by tem-
porarily reducing its supply of export credit insurance.
The finding of relatively large quantity adjustments in case of a loss shock is
consistent with the general characteristics of the global trade credit insurance mar-
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ket. In particular, the short-term nature of trade credits covered, combined with the
unique ability of trade credit insurers to dynamically adjust their potential exposure
on existing insurance policies, allows them to quickly and significantly reduce their
insurance cover. Also, strong price competition between the Big Three global trade
credit insurers generally limits the scope for unilateral price increases to support an
insurer’s overall premium income in case of a loss shock.
Importantly, all estimated claims effects on the quantity and price of export
credit insurance are identified within a pair of countries over time, while absorb-
ing the influence of all country-specific insurance supply-and-demand shocks. That
is, the regressions include country-pair and time-varying exporting and importing
country fixed effects. Given this empirical strategy, and given that the relative de-
mand for export credit insurance tends to rise in adverse economic circumstances,
the estimated quantity declines and price increases in case of a loss shock seem to be
supply-driven. As such, the findings are consistent with the idea that the private ex-
port credit insurance market can go through a period of limited insurance availability
and higher premium rates – a hard market – following a loss shock.
The insurance underwriting literature provides two alternative explanations for
the occurrence of hard markets. Capital shock theories show how loss shocks can
deplete an insurer’s capital base, thereby temporarily constraining the capacity to
provide insurance until capital is restored via retained earnings from higher premium
rates. Alternatively, a hard market could also follow from rising expectations about
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future claims. The benchmark results on the claims effect on export credit insurance
underwriting do not differentiate between these possible drivers of hard markets, but
the evidence on the international transmission of extreme losses suggests a role for
capital constraints in case of extreme events.
Additional research is needed to further explore the potential for hard markets
in private trade credit insurance. Information on the insurance underwriting by more
than one global trade credit insurer is required to examine to what extent insurers dif-
fer in their response to loss shocks. Given the general features of the global trade
credit insurance market – in particular the dynamic exposure management by trade
credit insurers and their heavy price competition – the pattern of relatively large quan-
tity compared to price adjustments is likely to be common among insurers. The size
of adjustments, however, might differ across trade credit insurers and could for ex-
ample be related to differences in operational efficiency and capitalisation. Also, the
results in this chapter are based on the period from 1992 to 2006, and thus pre-global
financial crisis. A key question remains to what extent reductions in the supply of
private trade credit insurance affected trade in the period of the 2008-09 global trade
collapse. These research questions are particularly relevant in Europe, where private
insurers dominate the market for short-term trade credit insurance.
93
Chapter 3
The Private Export Credit Insurance Effect
on Trade
3.1 Introduction
Financial institutions play an important role in facilitating international trade. Ac-
cording to estimates by the International Monetary Fund, about 40 to 50 percent
of world trade relies on some form of bank-intermediated trade finance, public or
private export credit insurance (see Asmundson et al., 2011). The importance of
banks in supporting international trade has been well-established in recent studies.
For example, in a key contribution on bank-intermediated trade finance, Amiti and
Weinstein (2011) relate firms’ export performance to the health of the banks pro-
viding trade finance and show that financial shocks are transmitted from banks to
45 This chapter is published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. in the Journal of Risk and Insurance. The
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exporters.46 Likewise, there is also growing evidence that public export credit agen-
cies are effective in stimulating exports (Egger and Url, 2006; Moser, Nestmann and
Wedow, 2008; Felbermayr and Yalcin, 2013). However, except for a recent contri-
bution by Auboin and Engemann (2012), who find a positive effect of a combined
measure of publicly and privately insured trade credits on trade, little is known about
the role of private trade credit insurers in world trade.
This chapter contributes to fill this gap in the literature on trade finance and
examines the trade-promoting role of private trade credit insurance, a specific form
of trade finance that covered an estimated EUR 1.97 trillion of domestic and inter-
national trade in 2013 (ICISA, 2014). I exploit a unique bilateral data set on the
worldwide activities of a leading private trade credit insurer and find direct evidence
of a positive effect of private export credit insurance on exports. Moreover, the re-
sults suggest that there is a trade multiplier of private export credit insurance; every
euro of insured exports seems to generate more than one euro in total exports.
Private export credit insurance is a useful tool for an exporter selling goods
on credit to insure against the risk of nonpayment by an importer.47 It is distinct
from freight insurance that covers the risk of loss or damage to goods in transit. A
private insurance policy generally covers commercial and political risk. "Commercial
46 Relatedly, others have found that exports of firms that are more dependent on external finance are
the most affected during a financial crisis (Bricogne et al. 2012; Chor and Manova 2012; Iacovone
and Zavacka, 2009), and that the availability of short-term credit affect a country’s exports (Ronci,
2004; Berman and Martin, 2012).
47 The focus in this chapter is on private export credit insurance, but private trade credit insurance is
also used to cover domestic trade.
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risk" refers to nonpayment due to default or insolvency of the importer and "political
risk" relates to nonpayment as a result of action by the importer’s government (i.e.
intervention to prevent the transfer of payments, cancellation of a license, or acts
of war or civil war). Jones (2010, p.9) explains the need for private trade credit
insurance as follows:
"The need for trade credit insurance arises from the common practice of
selling on credit and the demand by buyers to trade on open account, where
they only pay for the goods and services after having on-sold them and are not
willing to provide any form of security, for example by way of full or partial
advance payment, bank guarantee or letter of credit."48
I use a gravity model to test whether private export credit insurance stimulates
trade and consistently find a positive and statistically significant effect. The data set
includes yearly observations on the bilateral value (aggregated at the country level)
of insured exports from 25 exporting countries to 183 destination countries covering
the period from 1992 to 2006. The bilateral dimension of the data is an advantage
compared to the destination country level data set used by Auboin and Engemann
(2012). It allows me to estimate a fixed effects gravity model consistent with a the-
oretical gravity equation as derived by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Hence, I
48 One reason why an importer could refuse to approach its bank to request a payment guarantee
or letter of credit is that it is charged against the importer’s overall credit limit set by the bank
(Jones, 2010). As a result, banking products to cover nonpayment risk reduce the importer’s
borrowing capacity. Private export credit insurance, in turn, facilitates international trade based on
supplier credit without reducing the importer’s access to bank credit. In fact, private export credit
insurance is generally purchased by the exporter even without the importer knowing it. Another
difference is that the banking products generally cover a single transaction for a single importer,
whereas private export credit insurance policies are usually "whole turnover", covering all of an
exporter’s trade receivables with the exception of intercompany sales, exports to governments or
(risky) companies the insurer is not willing to cover. Due to these differences, the banking products
are normally more expensive than private export credit insurance (Jones, 2010).
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account for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity and include time-varying multilateral
resistance terms simultaneously, avoiding the estimation biases highlighted by An-
derson and van Wincoop (2003) and Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). The benchmark
model adjusts econometrically for the endogeneity of insured exports with respect to
total exports, but I also show results using the insurer’s claims over premium income
as an instrumental variable for insured exports.
The data covers the insurance provided by one of the "Big Three" private trade
credit insurers, that together covered 87 percent of the world market in 2010: Euler
Hermes (36%), Atradius (31%) and Coface (20%). As the data does not include in-
formation on insurance supplied by other insurers, the magnitude of the estimated
trade multiplier of private export credit insurance must be interpreted with some cau-
tion. For a variety of samples, the results show an average trade multiplier of private
export credit insurance in the range of 1.3. This trade multiplier would imply that
every euro of privately insured exports generates about 1.3 euro of total exports.
The finding of a trade multiplier above one suggests that the role of private
trade credit insurers in supporting world trade is larger than the value of exports they
cover. Apparently, they do not only facilitate exports covered by export credit in-
surance (in that case, the trade multiplier would be one), but also seem to stimulate
non-insured exports. Several hypotheses from the literature could explain this out-
come. First, the trade multiplier supports the idea that the reduction in risk due to a
trade credit insurance policy increases exports to markets where a firm would not sell
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otherwise (Funatsu, 1986). Also, following the recently developed theory of trade fi-
nance by Antràs and Foley (2011), export credit insurance allows exporters to learn
about the creditworthiness of importers, reducing the need to use insurance coverage
after repeated transactions. Furthermore, export credit insurance gives importers ac-
cess to supplier credit, which reduces their transaction costs (Ferris, 1981) and could
stimulate their import demand. This channel would further support the trade mul-
tiplier if, as Becue (2008) suggests, other suppliers use private insurance cover as a
signal on the creditworthiness of an importer, improving the importer’s overall access
to supplier credit. Finally, if insuring accounts receivable gives exporters better ac-
cess to external finance (Becue, 2008; Jones, 2010), this could add to a higher export
level.
This article builds on the literature on the trade-promoting effect of public ex-
port credit guarantees. Two important contributions are Egger and Url (2006) and
Moser, Nestmann and Wedow (2008) who find that Austrian and German public
export credit guarantees stimulate trade in the long run. Private export credit insur-
ance, however, differs from the guarantees provided by public export credit agencies
(ECAs). A key difference is that private export credit insurance mostly covers short-
term credits with a tenure of 60 to 120 days, while public guarantees generally cover
projects with a duration between 2 and 5 years, where the actual shipment of the
good usually follows a few years after the public provision of insurance cover (see
i.e. Swiss Re, 2006). Within the European Union, ECAs have since 1998 even been
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restricted from providing guarantees on export credits with a maturity of less than
two years to "marketable risk countries" – the countries within the European Union
and most other OECD countries (see European Commission, 1997). As a result of
the difference in maturities, the trade multiplier of public guarantees found in previ-
ous studies needs some time to take place, whereas the results in this chapter show
that private export credit insurance stimulates trade in the short run.49 Another dif-
ference relates to country coverage. Private insurers traditionally cover risks on trade
between firms in OECD countries, whereas governments mainly cover risks on ex-
ports to high risk countries. The results in this chapter thus show that private export
credit insurance is also, and in particular, important in stimulating short-term trade
flows between firms in developed countries.
In what follows, I discuss the empirical methodology and how the benchmark
model deals with possible sources of endogeneity bias (Section 2). In Section 3,
I present the main results and go into the mechanisms that could explain the trade
multiplier. Section 4 provides sensitivity checks, and Section 5 concludes.
49 Egger and Url (2006) find an average long run trade multiplier of Austrian public guarantees of
2.8, implying that every euro spend on public guarantees creates 2.8 euro worth of exports. Moser,
Nestmann and Wedow (2008) account for possible endogeneity issues and trade dynamics, and find a
somewhat lower long run trade multiplier of public guarantees in Germany of 1.7. Moser, Nestmann
and Wedow (2008, p. 794) note that the short-run trade multipliers found are typically smaller than
1. Felbermayr and Yalcin (2013) examine whether the German export credit insurance scheme has
alleviated financial frictions during the recent international financial crisis, and find public export
credit guarantees to have increased sectoral exports. They also report an "effectiveness ratio" (euros
of exports per euros used as guarantees) of 0.47; i.e. a short-run trade multiplier below 1.
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3.2 Empirical methodology
3.2.1 Specification
To examine the private export credit insurance effect on exports, I rely on the "grav-
ity" model of bilateral trade. The gravity model explains trade between a pair of
countries with the distance and their economic "masses". I estimate an empirical
fixed effects gravity equation that is consistent with a theoretical gravity model as
derived by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and extended to allow for panel data
by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). As such, I employ the following specification:
ln(Expijt) = a0 + a1Dij + a2Dit + a3Djt + β1 ln(InsExpijt) + εijt. (3.1)
where i denotes the exporting country, j denotes the importer, t denotes time, ln(.)
denotes the natural logarithm operator. Exp denotes real FOB exports from i to j,
measured in euro. InsExp denotes insured exports from i to j, measured in euro.
ε represents the omitted other influences on bilateral exports, assumed to be well
behaved.
The parameter of interest is β1. This represents the private export credit insur-
ance effect on exports holding other export determinants constant through the fixed
effects gravity model, and is identified from within country-pair variation over time.
I estimate the equation with OLS, using a robust covariance estimator (clustered by
country-pair dyads) to handle heteroskedasticity.
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Importantly, the model includes three sets of fixed effects to account for un-
observed bilateral heterogeneity and multilateral resistance simultaneously (Baldwin
and Taglioni, 2006). The comprehensive set of country-pair fixed effects (i.e., a
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive set of {Dij} intercepts) absorb any time-
invariant characteristics that are common to a pair of countries. These fixed effects,
for example, account for the influence on exports of the distance between two coun-
tries, sharing a border, or having a common language. Further, the comprehensive
sets of time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects (i.e., sets of {Dit} and {Djt})
take account of any time-variant country-specific factors, such as GDP per capita,
population size, and factors associated with multilateral resistance to trade. Multi-
lateral resistance refers to the average barrier of two countries to trade with all their
partners (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). The time-varying importer fixed ef-
fects, among other things, also control for the general macroeconomic environment
and the country risk in the destination country in a given year. Moreover, I argue be-
low that the time-varying country fixed effects adjust for endogeneity bias particular
to estimating the private export credit insurance effect on trade. I also show that the
key results are robust to the use of other estimation strategies.
The sources of the bilateral data set are described in Appendix Table A3.1.
This data set includes annual observations between 1992 and 2006 (though with
many missing observations) for some 183 territories and localities (I refer to these
as "countries" below). The countries are listed in Table A3.2.
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3.2.2 Data on private export credit insurance
The data on privately insured exports is unique and measures the real value of ex-
ports insured (InsExpijt) by one of the "Big Three" private trade credit insurers.50
Summary statistics for exports insured by this private insurer are presented in Table
3.1. Several features regarding the data on insured exports are worth mentioning.
First, the data set on insured exports is constrained in two ways. That is, the
number of exporters is limited to 25 countries (all OECD members, except for Hong
Kong) in which the private insurer is active and data is available. Also, the number of
observations per exporter varies considerably (Table 3.1, Column 2). This reflects i)
the entrance of the private insurer into new countries over the years and ii) differences
in the number of destination countries of each exporter.
Second, a special feature of the data is the variability in the share of insured
to total exports. The mean share of exports insured (by this single insurer) is 6.6,
but this figure varies by exporting country from .1 in Poland to 19.0 in Denmark
(see final column in Table 3.1). In the regression analysis, I show results for various
subsamples of observations with insured to total exports above different thresholds.
Finally, the insurance data suffer from some measurement issues. Possible
measurement errors arise because i) clients of the insurer declare their turnover at
different frequencies; monthly, quarterly or yearly, ii) the amounts are allocated to
periods when they were invoiced by the insurer which does not always coincide with
50 Company details are confidential.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Insured Exports (ijt)*
Exporting First Year (t) # Destination Insured Exports (ijt; Millions) Mean Share
Countries (i) in Sample Obs.a Countries (j) Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Exp. Ins. (%)
All 1992 14256 183 83 342 .001 6220 6.6
United Kingdom 1992 2327 181 151 459 .001 6220 11.7
The Netherlands 1994 1455 169 138 514 .001 5760 9.0
France 1992 1230 130 24 72 .001 553 0.5
Australia 1993 1098 165 19 68 .001 793 11.5
Germany 1994 962 153 244 692 .001 6030 2.2
Belgium 1997 865 124 84 284 .001 2220 2.6
Denmark 1999 762 148 95 288 .002 2220 19.0
United States 1997 663 142 50 176 .001 1890 1.3
Sweden 1998 644 117 87 290 .001 3650 8.1
Spain 1994 553 95 15 60 .001 762 0.8
Italy 1998 564 118 25 79 .001 922 0.6
Norway 1994 638 90 46 118 .001 1150 9.6
Mexico 1993 658 64 24 147 .001 1990 3.1
Ireland 1997 370 64 15 89 .001 1410 1.2
Luxembourg 1997 393 63 16 42 .001 405 7.1
Finland 1999 329 68 27 72 .001 569 2.6
Switzerland 2003 194 73 74 238 .002 2010 4.5
New Zealand 2004 141 74 12 35 .001 270 6.0
Austria 2003 152 48 25 67 .002 473 1.2
Czech Republic 2004 56 26 50 151 .007 894 1.2
Poland 2005 47 31 2 4 .005 24 0.1
Hungary 2005 48 28 3 6 .003 24 0.3
Greece 2004 51 25 22 30 .019 108 9.4
Slovak Republic 2004 44 26 10 28 .012 135 0.6
Hong Kong 2006 12 12 12 20 .045 70 0.3
*Data on insured exports from one of the "Big Three" private trade credit insurers, 1992-2006. aNumber of
destination-year data points involving a particular exporting country in the data set.
the period when the shipments took place, and iii) data is migrated from systems used
by insurance companies that are acquired by the insurer. Part of the measurement
errors is reduced by the yearly frequency of the data. I also show below that the
results are robust to numerous sample changes, reducing the risk of obtaining biased
results, and show results based on the method of instrumental variables.
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3.2.3 Endogeneity bias
Two issues regarding the empirical set-up need to be addressed: omitted variable bias
and reverse causality. Omitted variable bias might be an issue in the benchmark spec-
ification, especially as it does not include information on other insurers. Basically,
the specification estimates what happens to a country’s exports when the value of ex-
ports insured by one large private insurer increases, while other export determinants
such as the trading countries’ GDP per capita, population size, transportation costs,
and trade costs related to various institutional settings, do not change. Also, the total
value of exports could explain the value of insured exports instead of the other way
around.
Having information on only one large private trade credit insurer could bias the
estimate for the private export credit insurance effect on trade, although the direction
of the bias is unclear. For example, an increase of coverage could simply reflect an
increase of the insurer’s share of the export credit insurance market. It is unclear
why this would stimulate trade, creating a negative bias in the estimate of the private
export credit insurance effect. Yet, a positive bias arises if the change in the insurer’s
coverage of exports is smaller than the change in coverage of the whole export credit
insurance market. Then, part of the change in trade is wrongly attributed to the
insurer.
Although a bias in the estimates in either direction may not be ruled out com-
pletely, controlling for any time-variant country-specific factors (by the comprehen-
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sive sets of {Dit} and {Djt}) in the benchmark specification is likely to adjust for
changes in the supply of other insurers. This is because supply decisions by private
trade credit insurers, while influencing the "bilateral dimension" (ijt), are taken at
the "country dimension" (it and jt). The local business unit in a destination coun-
try determines the maximum exposure – the credit limit – on a particular firm for
the whole insurance group (Becue, 2008, p. 191-194).51 As a result, the decision by
the local business unit to grant cover on a particular importing firm in country "j" is
generally independent of the home country "i" of the exporting firm. Indeed, insur-
ers have an incentive to create "Chinese walls" between the risk units that determine
credit limits and the commercial units that sell insurance, in order to assure that risks
are objectively determined.52
Reverse causality might be a second source of endogeneity bias. Instead of
some exogenous factor leading the insurer to extend more coverage (i.e. better mar-
keting of products, improvements in risk management practices, efficiency gains
etc.), growth in trade could also explain growth in insured exports. Clearly, this
would bias the estimate of the private export credit insurance effect on trade up-
wards. In order to confirm that there are no feedback effects from changes in exports
to changes in insured exports, I test for the possibility of reverse causality by address-
ing the effect of the future level of insured exports on current exports.
51 This is called the "proximity to the risk" principle.
52 Other conditions attached to cover policies are an important way by which insurers compete. For
example, customers have a self-retention, which can differ in terms of cover percentage, claim de-
ductibles, and aggregate first losses.
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3.3 Benchmark results
The results of estimating the default specification are presented in Table 3.2. The
model is estimated for the full sample and three subsamples of observations with
insured to total exports above a threshold of respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent. All
estimates for insured exports are positive and statistically distinguishable from zero.
Private export credit insurance seems to stimulate exports.
The model estimated for the full sample, Table 3.2 Column 1, shows that an
increase of insured exports by 1 per cent causes additional exports by about .01 per
cent. To get a sense of the economic magnitude of this effect, I compute the average
trade multiplier of private export credit insurance as β1 ∗ Expijt / InsExpijt. In the
full sample, the average amount of exports (Expijt) is EUR 2220 million, and insured
exports per observation average EUR 83 million (InsExpijt). Subsequently, the
result for the full sample suggests a trade "multiplier" of .01 ∗ 2220/83 ≈ .3, which
would imply that private export credit insurance induces a less than proportionate
increase in exports (see Table 3.2, final row).
A possible explanation for this finding of a trade "multiplier" below one follows
from the fact that private trade credit insurers normally provide "whole turnover"
policies that cover the insured exporter’s total trade receivables. Thus, when an ex-
porter purchases a trade credit insurance policy to cover credit risk on a new buyer,
the whole turnover policy will also cover repeated export transactions that were pre-
viously not insured. As a result, insured exports can substitute for uninsured exports,
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Table 3.2: Effect of Private Export Credit Insurance on Exports
Dependent Variable: Log Exportsijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Insured to Total Exports in Percent All > 1% > 5% > 10%
Log Insured Exportsijt .01∗∗
(.00)
.07∗∗∗
(.01)
.13∗∗∗
(.03)
.21∗∗∗
(.05)
R2 .991 .995 .997 .998
RMSE .27 .23 .18 .13
Observations 14256 8356 4724 2815
Trade Multiplier of Private Export Credit Insurance .3 1.2 1.3 1.4
Data set includes bilateral annual observations covering 25 exporting countries and 183 importing
countries, 1992 - 2006. Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors (clustered by
country-pairs) in parentheses. All regressions include country-pair (ij), time-varying exporter (it),
and time-varying importer (jt) fixed effects.
which would result in a trade multiplier below one. Overall, this possibility of substi-
tution creates a bias against finding a trade multiplier of private trade credit insurance.
Either way, the finding of a trade multiplier below one appears not to be robust.
Indeed, it turns out to be quite fragile. For example, when I exclude all observations
with insured to total exports below 1%, I find a statistically significant elasticity of
exports to insured exports of .07 (Table 3.2, Column 2), and a trade multiplier of 1.2
(≈ .07 ∗ 2250/136). Notably, the observations excluded from this estimation have a
particularly low value of insured exports, more than half of which even below EUR .5
million. A drawback of including these observations in which the insurer insures only
a tiny share of exports is that idiosyncratic shifts in the behaviour of a single exporter
or importer, or shipment, may dominate the estimated link between insured and total
exports. Moreover, one could argue that the likelihood for any potential upward or
downward bias in the estimates due to missing information on other insurers is the
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highest if the insurer captures only a small share of the overall export credit insurance
market for country i’s exports to a specific country j.
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.2, I further examine the magnitude of the private
export credit insurance effect by successively excluding observations with insured to
total exports below 5 and 10 percent. Reassuringly, the estimates in combination with
the average values of insured and total exports reveal very similar trade multipliers of
respectively 1.3 and 1.4. I also find statistically significant trade multipliers ranging
from 1.2 to 1.4 for the subsamples in between these arbitrarily chosen thresholds.53
Overall, these results suggest that an average trade multiplier of private export credit
insurance in the range of 1.3 is a reasonable estimate of the magnitude of the private
export credit insurance effect. This trade multiplier implies that, on average, every
euro of privately insured exports generates about 1.3 euro of total exports.
Private export credit insurance could increase exports through a number of
ways. These mechanisms contribute to a trade multiplier above one, however, only
if exports that are not covered by private export credit insurance are stimulated. If
insured exports only generate more insured exports, the multiplier would be sim-
ply one. For example, this would be the case if private export credit insurance only
increases trade with importers that are covered under a whole turnover insurance pol-
icy. Keeping this in mind, there are several possible explanations for the finding of a
trade multiplier of private export credit insurance.
53 The subsample of observations with insured to total exports of respectively 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9
percent reveal trade multipliers of 1.2, 1.4, 1.4, 1.3, 1.2, 1.2, and 1.3.
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The first explanation relates to the well-established fact that when firms face
substantial entry costs, previous export experience to a country increases the prob-
ability for a firm to export again (Dixit, 1989), by as much as 60 percentage points
(Roberts and Tybout, 1997). So, if the reduction in risk due to a trade credit insur-
ance policy increases exports to markets where a firm would not sell otherwise, as
Funatsu (1986) proves, this makes additional exports of the firm more likely.54
A second explanation for the trade multiplier of private export credit insurance
follows from the recently developed theoretical model of trade finance by Antràs and
Foley (2011). Although they do not explicitly consider the role of trade credit insur-
ance, their dynamic model shows that exporters can learn about the creditworthiness
of importers by repeated transactions, and over time become more willing to finance
transactions through open accounts.55 This argument can be easily extended to the
case of private export credit insurance, where an exporter may decide to export with-
out costly insurance as a relationship with an importer develops.
A third channel for the trade multiplier results from the financial advantage for
importers of having access to supplier credit, which could stimulate their demand
for imports. Supplier credit reduces an importer’s transaction costs by allowing bills
to accumulate for periodic payment, enabling the importer to better forecast cash
54 Focusing on public guarantees, Funatsu (1986) shows that by using a credit guarantee, an exporter
can reduce its profit uncertainty in the foreign market thereby increasing its optimal output level.
Abraham and Dewit (2000) further demonstrate that government guarantees can stimulate firms to
export even without subsidization by charging a fair premium.
55 See Ahn (2011) and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) for two other recently developed models of trade
finance. Both models assume that firms are risk neutral and do not demand export credit insurance.
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outflows, and to separate the payment cycle from the delivery cycle (Ferris, 1981).
Also, because of the time value of money, supplier credit allows importers to increase
other purchases (Schwartz, 1974).
Notably, an industry insider provides an interesting argument why the im-
porter’s reduction in transaction and financing costs might be an important driver
of the trade multiplier of private trade credit insurance. That is, Becue (2008) ar-
gues that the news of a change in a private insurer’s credit policy on an importer –
externalized by the "credit limits" – tends to travel fast among all suppliers of the im-
porting firm, providing valuable information on the creditworthiness of the importer.
As a result, an upgrade generally improves the importer’s overall access to supplier
credit (and vice versa), further limiting the importer’s transaction and financing costs,
and potentially stimulating other trade transactions by the importer. Due to this side
effect, Becue (2008) nicknamed private trade credit insurers the "invisible banks";
while they do not provide funding, their actions influence firms’ overall access to
supplier credit.
Finally, private export credit insurance might facilitate the exporter’s access to
bank credit and improved credit terms from lending institutions, because it avoids
exceptional losses on trade receivables and is seen as a sign of good management
(Becue, 2008; Jones, 2010). Essentially, exporters can increase their collateral value
by insuring their accounts receivable. If better access to external finance allows the
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exporter to increase its exports, this could also add to the trade multiplier of private
export credit insurance.
Overall, the finding of a trade multiplier of private export credit insurance is
important for several reasons. First, it suggests that private export credit insurance
not only facilitates insured exports (i.e. a trade multiplier of 1), but also seems to
stimulate non-insured exports. The importance of private trade credit insurers in sup-
porting international trade thus seems to be larger than the value of exports they cover.
Second, it shows that the trade multiplier of export credit insurance is not limited to
the long run effect of public guarantees found by Egger and Url (2006) and Moser,
Nestmann and Wedow (2008).56 Finally, and more generally, it provides direct evi-
dence of a link between a privately supplied form of trade finance and exports. In the
remainder of this chapter I test for the exogeneity of insured exports and extensively
check the sensitivity of the private export credit insurance effect on trade.
3.3.1 Strict exogeneity
The section on endogeneity bias suggested that growth in trade could also explain
growth in insured trade. In order to confirm that there are no feedback effects from
changes in exports to changes in insured exports in the benchmark results, I test for
"strict exogeneity" as suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p. 285).57 Subsequently, I add
56 I have also examined the long run effect of private export credit insurance on trade using the
system generalised method of moments estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) as in Moser, Nestmann
and Wedow (2008), but did not find any robust results. In particular, the estimates were (highly)
sensitive to reductions in the instrument count.
57 Likewise, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) test for "strict exogeneity" of free trade agreements.
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Table 3.3: Testing for Strict Exogeneity of Insured Exports
Dependent Variable: Log Exportsijt
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: Insured to Total Exports in Percent > 1% > 5% > 10%
Log Insured Exportsijt .07∗∗∗
(.01)
.12∗∗∗
(.03)
.22∗∗∗
(.05)
Log Insured Exportsij,t+1 .00
(.01)
−.01
(.02)
−.02
(.03)
Log Insured Exportsij,t−1 .01
(.01)
.00
(.01)
−.01
(.03)
R2 .996 .997 .999
RMSE .20 .16 .12
Observations 6485 3795 2241
Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in parenthe-
ses. All regressions include country-pair (ij), time-varying exporter (it), and time-varying importer
(jt) fixed effects.
the future level of insured exports (Log Insured Exportsij,t+1) to the benchmark
model. Moreover, as strict exogeneity implies that neither lagged nor leading values
of the potentially endogenous variable are – conditional on other control variables
and the fixed effects – significantly different from zero, I also add the first lag of the
level of insured exports (Log Insured Exportsij,t−1) to the equation. If changes in
insured exports are strictly exogenous to changes in exports in this specification, then
the future and past level of insured exports should be uncorrelated with contempo-
raneous exports. The results in Table 3.3 confirm this. The effect of Log Insured
Exportsij,t+1 as well as Log Insured Exportsij,t−1 on exports are economically
small and not significantly different from zero in any of the samples.
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3.4 Sensitivity analysis
3.4.1 Sample changes
I start the sensitivity analysis with a battery of robustness checks based on reasonable
changes to the sample. The purpose of this exercise is to show that the results are not
caused by some small subset of the sample. The results are presented in Table 3.4,
Rows 1 to 11. Each of the rows in the table corresponds to a different sensitivity
check, while the columns correspond to the specification estimated for subsamples
of observations with insured to total exports above 1, 5 and 10 percent.
I check the sensitivity of the results by selectively dropping different sets of ob-
servations. Since I am interested in exporter effects, I begin by dropping different sets
of importer observations. First, I drop all observations for importers that are indus-
trial, and then successively delete observations for developing countries from Latin
America or the Caribbean, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and for (formerly) cen-
trally managed economies.58 These robustness checks leave the basic results largely
unchanged. The same goes when dropping small importers (defined as a country with
fewer than one million people) or poor importers (those with real GDP per capita of
less than EUR 1000 per annum).
Next, I check the sensitivity of the results for two sets of exporter observations.
Both checks intend to proxy for markets that are important to this insurer. First, I
58 The various groups of countries are as classified by the IMF’s International Financial Statistics’
country codes.
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Table 3.4: Sensitivity Analysis of Private Export Credit Insurance Effect on Exports
Dependent Variable: Log Exportsijt
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: Insured to Total Exports in Percent > 1% > 5% > 10%
Est. Obs. Est. Obs. Est. Obs.
Benchmark Model .07∗∗∗
(.01)
8356 .13∗∗∗
(.03)
4724 .21∗∗∗
(.05)
2815
Sample Changes: Drop...
1. Industrial Importers .07∗∗∗
(.02)
5564 .14∗∗∗
(.03)
3211 .21∗∗∗
(.06)
1987
2. Latin America, Caribbean Importers .08∗∗∗
(.01)
6794 .15∗∗∗
(.03)
3752 .22∗∗∗
(.06)
2164
3. Middle Eastern Importers .07∗∗∗
(.01)
7694 .14∗∗∗
(.03)
4315 .22∗∗∗
(.05)
2545
4. Asian Importers .06∗∗∗
(.01)
7359 .13∗∗∗
(.03)
4132 .18∗∗∗
(.04)
2484
5. African Importers .07∗∗∗
(.01)
7194 .13∗∗∗
(.02)
4076 .20∗∗∗
(.05)
2411
6. (Formerly) Centrally Managed Importers .06∗∗∗
(.01)
7175 .12∗∗∗
(.03)
4134 .19∗∗∗
(.06)
2484
7. Small Importers (Population<1 Million) .07∗∗∗
(.01)
7135 .12∗∗∗
(.03)
3878 .15∗∗∗
(.05)
2202
8. Poor Importers (Real GDP p/c <1000) .07∗∗∗
(.01)
7910 .13∗∗∗
(.02)
4502 .20∗∗∗
(.05)
2682
9. Exporters Not in Sample Before 1995 .08∗∗∗
(.02)
5641 .13∗∗∗
(.04)
3420 .22∗∗∗
(.09)
2045
10. Small Average Market Share Exporters .07∗∗∗
(.01)
7677 .13∗∗∗
(.03)
4632 .21∗∗∗
(.05)
2781
11. Early Data (Year<1998) .06∗∗∗
(.01)
6875 .14∗∗∗
(.03)
3714 .21∗∗∗
(.05)
2080
Estimation Changes: Add...
12. Relative Financing Costs .05∗∗∗
(.01)
5839 .13∗∗∗
(.03)
3264 .19∗∗∗
(.05)
1859
13. Relative Fin. Costs & Contr. Enforcement .05∗∗∗
(.01)
5342 .13∗∗∗
(.03)
2950 .18∗∗∗
(.05)
1642
14. IMR; Based on Same Covariates .07∗∗∗
(.01)
8356 .13∗∗∗
(.03)
4724 .21∗∗∗
(.05)
2815
15. IMR; Include Legal Origin & Religion .06∗∗∗
(.01)
7231 .12∗∗∗
(.03)
4094 .16∗∗∗
(.05)
2377
Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in parentheses. IMR:
inverse Mill’s ratio. All regressions include country-pair (ij), time-varying exporter (it), and time-varying im-
porter (jt) fixed effects.
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drop exporters not in the sample before 1995, reducing the sample to markets where
the insurer is traditionally active. The results in Row 9 of Table 3.4 show that this
robustness check does not undermine the findings. Second, I drop 11 (of the 25) ex-
porting countries where the insurer insured an average share of total exports below 2
percent (see the final column in Table 3.1); thus excluding markets where the insurer
insured only a small share of total exports. Again, the results remain resilient (Table
3.4, Row 10).
Finally, I check the sensitivity of the results by dropping the observations be-
fore 1998. This sample split is motivated by the regulatory change in the European
Union that restricted public export credit agencies to covering non-marketable risks
(see also the introduction). Once more, the results are robust (Table 3.4, Row 11).
Moreover, the results in the first row of Table 3.4 show that dropping the "marketable
risk countries" does not alter the main finding either, as the group of industrial coun-
tries includes all marketable risk countries (in addition to Malta, Turkey and South
Africa).
I conclude that the finding of a positive and statistically significant effect of
private export credit insurance on trade is not due to some subset of the sample and is
robust to reasonable changes in the sample. Countries with a higher level of exports
covered by private export credit insurance seem to have higher trade than others.
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3.4.2 Estimation changes
Following the sample changes, I now examine the sensitivity to model changes. Suc-
cessively, I test whether the main result holds when accounting for relative financ-
ing costs and contract enforcement, zero (insured) trade, and show results using the
method of instrumental variables; an alternative strategy to deal with endogeneity
issues.59
Relative financing costs and contract enforcement
Recent theories of trade finance identify the endogenous emergence of the op-
timal payment contract between trading partners (Antràs and Foley, 2011; Schmidt-
Eisenlohr, 2013). In particalur, these studies show that the type of arrangement cho-
sen depends on the financing costs and (contract) enforcement in both the exporting
and importing country. For example, a cash-in-advance instead of an open account
transaction – under which the seller might purchase export credit insurance to cover
the risk of default – is expected if the financing costs and enforcement in the export-
ing country are high compared to the importing country.
Given the empirical strategy and the rich set of dummy variables controlling for
time-varying exporter and importer as well as time-invariant country-pair character-
istics, any potential omitted variable bias would stem from time-varying country-pair
59 I have also examined whether the main result holds when accounting for currency unions (Glick
and Rose, 2002), regional trade agreements (Rose, 2004), disaggregated regional trade agreements
(see i.e. Eicher and Henn, 2011), and trade dynamics (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1998). The finding of
a positive and statistically significant private export credit insurance effect is robust to any of these
alternative specifications. For brevity, these results are not reported here but in the Appendix Table
A3.3.
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characteristics. I control for two such candidates suggested by recent trade finance
theory, by adding two dummy variables to the benchmark model. The first variable
measures the relative financing costs within a country-pair and is equal to one if fi-
nancing costs in the exporting country are higher than in the importing country. I
follow Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013) and use the net interest margin from Beck et al.
(2009) – the ratio between the accounting value of the net interest revenues of banks
and their total earning assets – as a measure of relative financing costs. The second
variable measures the relative enforcement within a country-pair and is equal to one
if enforcement in the exporting country is higher than in the importing country. I
proxy for enforcement by using the "Law and Order" country rates of the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide. Due to missing observations the sample size is reduced
by about a third. I do not find a statistically significant effect of relative financing
costs or relative enforcement. Importantly, the results in Table 3.4 show that in-
troducing relative financing costs (Row 12) or relative enforcement simultaneously
(Row 13) does not change the main findings. The private export credit insurance
effect on exports is again positive and statistically significant in all three subsamples.
Zero (insured) trade
All the results above are generated from a linear-in-logs specification that con-
verts observations with zero (insured) exports to missing and these observations drop
out of the sample, potentially introducing selection bias. The data set has 64752 ob-
servations including 50496 observations with zero insured exports of which 5082
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also correspond to zero exports.60 As zero exports imply zero insured exports I ex-
amine the sensitivity of the results when correcting for sample selection due to zero
insured exports. I follow Wooldridge (1995) and apply a sample selection model
that is suitable for panel data with fixed effects.61 Accordingly, for each year, I esti-
mate a probit model where the dependent variable equals one if insured exports are
positive. I derive the linear prediction of this model for each year and calculate the
inverse Mills ratio, which I include as a regressor in the benchmark model. Table 3.4
Row 14 shows there is no impact on the main result. Again, the private export credit
insurance effect is positive and statistically significant for all samples.62
A drawback of this approach is that it relies on differences in functional form
between the first and second stage when both equations include the same covariates.
Therefore, I reestimate the system adding to the annual probit models a dummy vari-
able equal to 1 for country-pairs that share the same legal origin, and a variable with
an index for common religion (see also Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008).63
60 Notice that a fully balanced data set would include 68250 observations (15 years x 25 export-
ing countries x 182 importing countries). However, I lose 2578 observations because Belgium and
Luxembourg are not included before 1997 (trade statistics do not report these countries separately be-
fore 1997), and the (formerly) centrally managed economies are missing in 1992. I lose another 920
observations by excluding observations with insured exports below EUR 1000.
61 See also Egger and Nelson (2011). Cross-section procedures as in Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein
(2008) are not applicable in this case, as pointed out by Wooldridge (1995). Also, the poisson quasi-
maximum likelihood model suggested by Santos and Tenreyro (2006) is not suitable to handle sample
selection due to the observations with zero insured exports. In a Poisson model, the right-hand-side
of the specification is logarithmically transformed but not the dependent variable. Hence, the zero
insured trade flows (including the 5082 observations that also correspond to zero exports) are still
dropped by log-transforming the model.
62 Although not reported, the estimates for the inverse Mills ratio indicate little significant selection
into the sample.
63 Variables are calculated as in Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008, p. 480). Data from CIA’s
World Factbook and "The Global Social Change Research Project", see http://gsociology.icaap.org.
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Once more, the key finding of a positive private export credit insurance effect on
exports persists (Table 3.4, Row 15).
Instrumental variables
The benchmark model accounts for the endogeneity of insured exports econo-
metrically. An alternative approach would be to use an instrument for insured ex-
ports and apply the method of instrumental variables. In this section, I use the private
insurer’s claims ratio – defined as claims (ijt) over premium income (ijt) – as an in-
strument for insured exports and examine the sensitivity of the previous estimates. In
passing, I note that Hausman tests cannot reject the null that insured exports may be
treated as exogenous (see Table 3.5).
The claims (or loss) ratio is a key performance indicator for insurers, and an
important determinant of an insurer’s decision to adjust its supply of insurance. For
example, Winter (1994) formalizes the idea that an increase in claims – a loss shock
– negatively affects an insurer’s capital, and temporarily constrains the capacity to
write coverage until higher premium rates allow capital to be built up again from
retained earnings.64 Alternatively, Lai et al. (2000) emphasize the supply reducing
effect of increasing expectations about future losses that result from an increase in
actual claims.
64 In Winter’s capacity constraint model, insurers must hold equity to guarantee that they will be able
to pay all claims, and external capital is assumed to be more costly than internal capital.
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Table 3.5: Instrumental Variable Estimates of Private Export Credit Insurance Effect
on Exports
Dependent Variable: Log Ins. Exportsijt
(First Stage)
Log Exportsijt
(Second Stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Instrument(s): Log Claims Ratioijt t,t−1,t−2 t t−1 t−2
Log Claims Ratioij,t −.11∗∗∗
(.02)
Log Claims Ratioij,t−1 −.06∗∗∗
(.01)
Log Claims Ratioij,t−2 −.04∗∗∗
(.01)
Log Insured Exportsijt, Instrumented .06∗∗
(.02)
.02∗∗
(.01)
.03
(.02)
.09∗∗∗
(.03)
F-statistic for excluded instruments 24.00 24.00 234.03 101.63 51.07
RMSE .64 .18 .21 .21 .20
Observations 2973 2973 5207 4498 3848
Hausman endogeneity test .022 .022 .053 .107 1.563
Chi-sq(1) P-val .883 .883 .818 .744 .211
Underidentification test
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 40.45 40.45 124.27 67.37 39.50
Chi-sq(3;1) P-val .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Weak identification test
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 24.00 24.00 234.03 101.63 51.07
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:
5% maximal IV relative bias 13.91 13.91
10% maximal IV relative bias 9.08 9.08
20% maximal IV relative bias 6.46 6.46
30% maximal IV relative bias 5.39 5.39
10% maximal IV size 22.30 22.30 16.38 16.38 16.38
15% maximal IV size 12.83 12.83 8.96 8.96 8.96
20% maximal IV size 9.54 9.54 6.66 6.66 6.66
25% maximal IV size 7.80 7.80 5.53 5.53 5.53
Overidentification test
Hansen J statistic .32 .32
Chi-sq(2) P-val .854 .854
Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in parentheses. All
regressions include country-pair (ij) and year (t) fixed effects. Regressors included but not recorded: Log
Exporter Population; Log Importer Population; Log Exporter Real GDP p/c; Log Importer Real GDP p/c;
Currency Union Dummy; Regional Trade Agreement Dummy.
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Intuitively, the instrumental variable estimation uses only part of the variability
in insured exports – the part that is correlated with the claims ratio – to estimate the
relationship between insured exports and total exports. So, in case of a shock, i.e. a
credit crisis or sovereign default, claims increase. The claims ratio also increases, as
the private insurer can (in the short run) only raise the premia of new contracts, which
are generally fixed for one year.65 However, in order to limit the rise in claims, the
private trade credit insurer reduces its exposure by using its right to cancel a credit
limit on any buyer at any given time (Swiss Re, 2006; Jones, 2010).66
A drawback of this approach is that the claims ratio might not be truly exoge-
nous to trade, since both claims and trade are simultaneously influenced by the risk
environment. Still, I find no evidence indicating that this source of omitted variable
bias is a serious issue in this model and underlying data. For example, I estimate
the benchmark model including the claims ratio but find no statistically significant
correlation between the claims ratio and trade. Also, I find that none of the models
is under-, weakly, or overidentified (see Table 3.5). Moreover, I show results with
various lags of the claims ratio as instrument and find longer lags to increase the es-
timated private export credit insurance effect (see Table 3.5, Columns 3 to 5). And
65 For example, the ICC Global Survey report (2010) reports that "Total claims paid to insured cus-
tomers by all Berne Union members more than doubled from 2008 to 2009 and reached USD2.4
billion. As the total premium stayed roughly the same at an estimated USD2.8 billion, the loss ratio
jumped from 40 to 87 percent. The Berne Union is the leading international organisation of public
and private sector providers of export credit and investment insurance.
66 For instance, even if a supplier has an insurance contract covering its accounts receivable, the
insurer can effectively reduce this cover to zero over night. This ability to set and manage exposures
distinguishes trade credit insurance from other kinds of insurance and many other credit instruments
(Swiss Re, 2006).
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finally, I show below that the results are robust to the inclusion of various possibly
omitted variables to the model.
The results for the First Stage regression on insured exports are presented in the
first column of Table 3.5. I find a negative and statistically significant effect of the
claims ratio on insured exports up to two years ahead. The point estimates indicate
that a 1 percent increase in the claims ratio reduces insured exports by .11 percent in
the same year, exports are .06 percent lower in the following year, and .04 percent
lower the year thereafter. So, past claims ratios also influence the current value of
insured exports. The results for the Second Stage regression on exports are presented
in Columns 2 to 5 of Table 3.5. I estimate the system with various lags of the claims
ratio as instrument. The point estimate for the instrumented insured exports ranges
between .02 and .09.
Again, I examine whether the private export credit insurance effect on trade is
robust when successively dropping observations with insured to total exports below
a threshold of 1, 5 and 10 percent, and test the sensitivity of the benchmark instru-
mental variable model (see Table 3.6).67
First, I add a measure of importer country risk – the inverse of the composite
risk indicator from the International Country Risk Guide (Table 3.6, Row 1). Sub-
sequently, I include a lag of the dependent variable to capture trade dynamics (Table
67 Note that I estimate the system using the contemporaneous claims ratio as instrument for insured
exports. This way, I maximize the number of observations and the F-statistic for the excluded in-
struments, while being conservative on the size of the estimated private export credit insurance effect
(compare Columns 2 to 5 of Table 3.5).
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Table 3.6: Sensitivity of Instrumental Variable Estimates of Private Export Credit
Insurance Effect on Exports
Dependent Variable: Log Exportsijt
Second Stage Instrument: Log Claims Ratio at t
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: Insured to Total Exports in Percent > 1% > 5% > 10%
Est. Obs. Est. Obs. Est. Obs.
Benchmark Instrumental Variable Model .16∗∗∗
(.05)
3924 .25∗∗
(.10)
2485 .35∗∗∗
(.13)
1459
1. Add Importer Country Risk .13∗∗
(.05)
3729 .27∗∗
(.12)
2331 .43∗∗∗
(.16)
1334
2. Add Lagged Dependent Variable .18∗∗∗
(.04)
3797 .32∗∗∗
(.09)
2400 .42∗∗∗
(.12)
1389
3. Add Domestic Credit by Banking Sector .12∗∗∗
(.05)
3781 .23∗∗
(.10)
2395 .35∗∗
(.14)
1410
4. Add Domestic Credit to Private Sector .14∗∗∗
(.05)
3787 .25∗∗
(.10)
2401 .36∗∗∗
(.14)
1415
5. Add Controls 1 to 4 .12∗∗∗
(.04)
3507 .33∗∗∗
(.10)
2196 .49∗∗∗
(.16)
1246
Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in parentheses. All
regressions include country-pair (ij) and year (t) fixed effects. Regressors included but not recorded: Log
Exporter Population; Log Importer Population; Log Exporter Real GDP p/c; Log Importer Real GDP p/c;
Currency Union Dummy; Regional Trade Agreement Dummy.
3.6, Row 2). I continue with the inclusion of a variable measuring domestic credit
by the banking sector and a measure for domestic credit to the private sector, both at
home and abroad (Table 3.6, Row 3 and 4). These variables from the World Bank
might serve as proxies to capture the structure of the banking sector. And finally, I
estimate the system including all these controls to account for the combined influ-
ence of these possibly omitted variables (Table 3.6, Row 5). None of the sensitivity
checks, however, significantly alter the results.
Overall, the instrumental variable estimates support the finding of a positive
effect of private export credit insurance on trade. The coefficients for insured exports
are consistently positive and statistically significant. Indeed, the point estimates are,
if anything, larger than those associated with the benchmark model.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter examines whether private export credit insurance stimulates trade using
a unique data set on the insurance provided by one of the world’s largest private trade
credit insurers. Accounting for endogeneity issues, I consistently find a positive ef-
fect of private export credit insurance on exports. Moreover, the results suggest that
there is a trade multiplier of private export credit insurance; every euro of insured
exports seems to generate more than one euro in total exports. The estimated magni-
tude of this trade multiplier should be interpreted with some caution, however, as the
data covers information from one private trade credit insurer only. For a variety of
samples, the results show a trade multiplier of private export credit insurance in the
range of 1.3. This trade multiplier would imply that every euro of privately insured
exports generates about 1.3 euro of total exports.
The finding of a trade multiplier above one suggests that the impact of pri-
vate export credit insurance on international trade is larger than the value of exports
insured. A number of hypotheses from the existing literature could explain this out-
come. First, the trade multiplier supports the idea that the reduction in risk due to a
trade credit insurance policy increases exports to markets where a firm would not sell
otherwise. Second, export credit insurance allows exporters to learn about the cred-
itworthiness of importers, reducing the need to use insurance coverage after repeated
transactions. Third, export credit insurance gives importers access to supplier credit,
which reduces their transaction and financing costs and could stimulate their import
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demand. This channel would further support the trade multiplier if other suppliers
use private insurance cover as a signal on the creditworthiness of an importer, im-
proving the importer’s overall access to supplier credit. Finally, if insuring accounts
receivable gives exporters better access to external finance, this could increase their
export level and generate additional exports on top of insured exports.
A natural next step would be to examine to what extent these alternative chan-
nels contribute to the trade multiplier of private export credit insurance. Data con-
taining information on insured and non-insured trade at the firm-level could be used
to examine the trade multiplier in more detail. I leave this for future research.
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Chapter 4
The Level Effect of Bank Lending
Standards on Business Lending
4.1 Introduction
The Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey is an important source of information for
monetary policymakers in the euro area to understand changes in credit conditions
and gain better insight into future economic developments. It is a quarterly survey
among a representative sample of around 90 banks from all euro area countries, and
the European equivalent of the quarterly Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey that the
Federal Reserve conducts in the United States. The survey asks senior loan officers
about bank-specific developments in lending standards and credit demand.
A key observation from the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey is the prolonged
period of tightening of lending standards on business lending by banks across Eu-
rope during the 2007-09 financial crisis (Figure 4.1). In that period, every quarter, a
considerable share of European banks tightened their lending standards. Since then,
on balance, banks have not eased lending standards. From this observation it seems
68 This chapter is published as DNB Working Paper (van der Veer, K.J.M. and M.M. Hoeberichts,
2013). We thank Peter van Els, Jakob de Haan, Eelke de Jong, Andrew Rose, Job Swank, and seminar
participants at De Nederlandsche Bank for comments. The views expressed in this chapter are those
of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Dutch central bank.
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natural to conclude that bank lending standards in Europe are still tight, limiting busi-
ness lending for a given level of loan demand.
Figure 4.1: Changes in Bank Lending Standards on Business Lending in the Euro
Area*
Weighted percentage of banks 
Source: European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse.
*This figure shows the answers given by banks in the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey to the 
question: "Over the past three months, how have your bank’s credit standards as applied to the 
approval of loans or credit lines to enterprises changed?" Grey bars show the percentage of banks 
in the euro area that tightened lending standards in a particular quarter. White bars show the 
(negative) percentage of banks that eased lending standards in a particular quarter. Country weights 
are used to aggregate the national results at the euro area level (see Berg et al. 2005 for details).   
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In academic and policy circles, however, it is often questioned whether the sur-
vey questions and reported quarterly changes in bank lending standards should be
taken literally. For example, Del Giovane et al. (2011) argue that banks provide
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answers that are inconsistent with the formulation of the question they are asked; in-
stead of reporting a change in lending standards over the past three months, banks
report the "degree of tightness" compared to some benchmark. The European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) seems to interpret the survey responses in a similar way, concluding
from the 2013Q1 survey results (see final point in Figure 4.1) that bank lending stan-
dards in Europe are, in fact, not particularly tight:
"The level of net tightening of credit standards for loans to enterprises in the
first quarter of 2013 currently stands below its historical average calculated
over the period since the start of the survey in 2003"(ECB, 2013).
Thus, depending on the interpretation of the survey results, a different, even
opposite, conclusion on the strictness of bank lending standards in Europe can be
reached.
This chapter advocates a literal reading of bank lending surveys such as those
conducted in the euro area, United States and Japan. In particular, we propose an
intuitive approach of constructing a bank-specific measure for the (cumulated) level
of bank lending standards from the survey answers, and examine whether this level
measure affects business lending. The basic assumption underlying our measure for
the level of a bank’s lending standards is that a reported tightening is (only) offset
by a reported easing of standards, and vice versa. Using micro-data on the sample of
banks that participate in the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in The Netherlands,
the results show that a one point increase in the level of a bank’s lending standards –
i.e. a bank reports a tightening – reduces the bank’s quarterly growth rate of business
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lending in the range of .5 percentage points; equivalent to about 2 percentage points
in annualized terms. Importantly, this result should be interpreted as a permanent
effect – until bank lending standards are eased – and comes on top of the one-off
effect of a tightening of standards found by Del Giovane et al. (2011).
The finding of a level effect of bank lending standards helps to explain high
bank lending growth in a period of prolonged easing and low bank lending growth
after a period of prolonged tightening of standards. To illustrate this, we perform
counterfactual analyses for business lending in The Netherlands – holding the level of
bank lending standards constant – in the period before and since the 2007-09 financial
crisis. The results suggest that due to looser bank lending standards, business lending
growth was about 4 percentage points higher in the years prior to the crisis. In turn,
due to tighter bank lending standards since 2009, the current annual growth rate of
business lending in The Netherlands is subdued by about 3 percentage points.
The counterfactual scenarios illustrate that our survey-based estimate for the
level effect of bank lending standards is relevant at the macro-level. As such, they
provide analysis for another potential indicator for macroprudential policy. Several
authors (i.e. Borio and Lowe, 2002; Borio and Drehmann, 2009) have identified
strong credit growth, and in particular a large credit-to-GDP gap, as an early warning
indicator of financial crises.69 Also, Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) show evidence
indicating that countries with softer bank lending standards due to low monetary
69 The credit-to-GDP gap is the deviation of the ratio of credit to GDP from its trend.
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policy rates prior to the 2007-09 financial crisis, experienced a worse economic per-
formance afterwards. Moreover, the IMF (2013) identifies "erosion of lending stan-
dards" as one of the factors that can contribute to credit booms and too much risk
taking by financial institutions, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the system.
Our survey-based measure of the level of bank lending standards can be of use to
track these developments, although it is subject to the Lucas critique; the relationship
between bank lending and lending standards might change once policymakers base
their actions on it.
We estimate a standard panel data model with bank-specific and time fixed ef-
fects to identify the level effect of bank lending standards. Our approach builds on
the model by Del Giovane et al. (2011) which uses micro-level survey results on
changes in bank lending standards and credit demand to disentangle supply and de-
mand effects on credit developments. Importantly, we extend their model in two
ways. First, we add two novel bank-specific level variables; one measuring the level
of bank lending standards, and one for the level of credit demand. Second, we in-
clude bank-specific interest rate spreads on new loans. As such, our finding of a
"level effect" relates to the influence of non-price bank lending standards (i.e. col-
lateral requirements, non-interest rate charges, covenants etc.) on business lending,
and confirms the idea that banks rely more heavily on non-price rationing of loans
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
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Our micro-data covers the survey responses, loan quantities and prices, for the
eight banks that participated in the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in The Nether-
lands in the period from 2003Q1 to 2013Q2. Although we use information on a
relatively small and unbalanced sample, the level effect is robust within a large vari-
ety of even smaller subsamples, an alternative weighing scheme for "somewhat" and
"considerable" changes when constructing the level variables, and other specification
changes. Also, we find no evidence that the level effect is statistically different dur-
ing the 2007-09 crisis, pre- or post-crisis period, or asymmetric between tightenings
and easings of standards.
So far, there has been little attempt in the literature to identify the level effect
of bank lending standards on bank lending. Del Giovane et al. (2011), using micro-
data on the sample of banks participating in the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in
Italy, examine a specification with a measure for the cumulated level of bank lending
standards that differs from ours but find no statistically significant effect on busi-
ness lending when including bank-specific and time fixed effects. Lown and Morgan
(2006) and Basset et al. (2012) show that a shock in standards in the United States is
followed by a decline in the aggregate volume of loans until banks start to ease stan-
dards again. Our finding of a level effect of bank lending standards is related, but is
identified at themicro-level and shows that a bank’s level of standards has a persistent
impact on its growth rate of lending. Finally, a number of authors study the link be-
tween the level of bank lending standards and consumption (Muellbauer, 2007; Aron
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et al., 2012; Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy, 2012; Duca and Muellbauer, 2013).
These studies construct a level index of unsecured consumer credit conditions from
the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey aggregate diffusion index
and find a strong relationship between credit conditions and consumption.
More generally, our study contributes to the literature that examines the infor-
mation content of bank lending surveys. Responses of bank lending surveys have
been shown to be good predictors of aggregate bank lending and real GDP growth
in the United States (Lown and Morgan, 2006; Ciccarelli et al., 2010; Bassett et al.,
2012) and the euro area (De Bondt et al., 2010; Cappiello et al. 2010; Ciccarelli et
al., 2010). Moreover, there is evidence that reported changes in bank-specific lending
standards are associated with one-off effects on bank lending in Italy (Del Giovane et
al., 2011), Germany (Blaes, 2011) and Denmark (Kuchler, 2012). Our results show
that, in addition to forecasting credit growth and monitoring real-time changes in
credit supply, the (historical) content of bank lending surveys can be used to infer the
persistent impact of the level of bank lending standards on bank lending.
In what follows, we discuss the empirical methodology, data, and our measure
of the level of bank lending standards (Section 2). In Section 3, we present the bench-
mark results, followed by a discussion and robustness analysis in Section 4. Section
5 provides two counterfactual analyses for business lending in The Netherlands and
discusses implications of the prolonged period of easing of bank lending standards
before, and tightening since, the 2007-09 financial crisis. Section 6 concludes.
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4.2 Empirical methodology and data
4.2.1 Model specification
We examine if the level of bank lending standards has an effect on the growth rate of
the stock of loans to businesses. This "level effect" is a separate factor that influences
credit growth aside from changes in bank lending standards. The intuition behind
this link between the level of a bank’s lending standards and the growth in the bank’s
loan portfolio runs as follows.
Let the stock of outstanding loans by bank i at time t be given by Sit. Newly
extended loans to businesses by bank i in period t are given by Lit. The cohort-
structure of the loans implies that a fraction ρi < 1 of Sit survives until next period.
The survival rate ρi is determined by redemptions and defaults on outstanding loans.
The dynamics of the stock of outstanding loans S is given by:
Sit = ρiSi,t−1 + Lit (4.1)
From equation (4.1), it follows that the growth rate of outstanding loans is equal
to:
ΔSit
Si,t−1
= ρi − 1 +
Lit
Si,t−1
(4.2)
According to equation (4.2), the growth rate of outstanding loans of an indi-
vidual bank depends on the bank-specific survival rate ρi of the loans in the portfolio
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and on the amount of newly extended loans as a fraction of the total loan portfolio
in the previous period. We argue that the fraction of newly extended loans depends
on the change in and "level" of bank lending standards. For example, higher (more
strict) bank lending standards result in a higher rejection rate of loan applications for
a given level of loan demand. So, not only the most recent adjustment of bank lend-
ing standards determine the growth rate of the loan portfolio, but also all previous
changes that make up the current level of standards. This is formalized in equation
(4.3):
Lit
Si,t−1
= f(BLS_Si,t−1, BLS_S_leveli,t−2) (4.3)
whereBLS_S represents changes in bank lending standards, andBLS_S_level
is the level of bank lending standards. Since we are interested in the level effect of
bank lending standards for a given level of credit demand, we include in our econo-
metric specification two level indicators: one for bank lending standards and one for
credit demand. Aside from these novel level variables, we follow the approach taken
by Del Giovane et al. (2011) and add a set of dummy variables measuring specific
changes in bank lending standards and credit demand. We include the level variables
with a two-quarter lag in order to prevent double counting of the effect of a change
in bank lending standards or credit demand; once by the one-quarter lagged dummy
variable for the respective change and once by the level variable. In addition, we in-
clude bank-specific interest rate spreads on new loans such that the "level effect" of
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bank lending standards relates to the influence on business lending of non-price con-
ditions. Combining equations (4.2) and (4.3) then implies that the growth rate lit of
loans by bank i in quarter t can be written as:
lit = Di+Dt+α1Xit−1+α2IRit+β1BLS_S_leveli,t−2+β2BLS_D_leveli,t−2+it
(4.4)
where Di captures bank fixed effects and Dt are time fixed effects. ‘X’ is a
vector of variables that includes dummy variables for specific changes in a bank’s
lending standards (i.e. "eased considerably", "eased somewhat", "tightened some-
what", and "tightened considerably") and changes in bank-specific credit demand
(i.e. "decreased considerably", "decreased somewhat", "increased somewhat", and
"increased considerably"). IR is the bank-specific interest rate spread on new loans,
calculated as the difference between the interest rate on new loans and the eonia rate.
β2 captures the level effect of credit demand.
The parameter of interest is β1. This represents the level effect of bank lending
standards on the quarterly growth rate of bank lending. It is identified within bank
variation over time and should be interpreted as a permanent effect. We include
bank-specific fixed effects to account for bank-specific factors that may affect the
growth rate of bank loans, such as the maturity structure and the credit quality of the
loan portfolio. Moreover, our benchmark specification includes time-specific fixed
effects to capture the macroeconomic situation and other effects that change over
time and affect all banks equally. Demand for credit, to the extent that it is driven by
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macroeconomic factors, is included in the time-specific effect. The time fixed effects
also absorb the influence of supply factors that affect bank loans equally across banks,
e.g. if a macroeconomic downturn increases economy-wide credit risk and banks are
more reluctant to lend, this effect will be captured by the time dummy.
4.2.2 Bank-specific data on business lending and bank lending
standards
We examine the level effect of bank lending standards on the quarterly growth rate
of lending to non-financial firms in The Netherlands. The individual bank data are
confidential, but were kindly provided by the Statistics and Information Division of
the Dutch central bank for the purpose of this research project. The sample consists
of an unbalanced panel of 8 banks that participated in the Eurosystem Bank Lending
Survey in The Netherlands in the period from 2003Q1 to 2013Q2.
The outstanding volume of business loans by the panel of banks represented
about 65% of the total volume of business lending in The Netherlands in 2012.70 The
growth rates of lending to firms by the banks in the sample and by the whole Dutch
banking sector follow a similar pattern and are highly correlated; the correlation
coefficient equals .97.
The data on bank lending standards are taken from the Eurosystem Bank Lend-
ing Survey, which was introduced in 2003.71 Every quarter, banks in the euro area
70 The data on loans are not adjusted for securitizations, as adjusted data at the bank level are not
available in The Netherlands. Over the sample period, an average of 4 percent of the total outstanding
volume of business loans was securitized.
71 See Berg et al. 2005 for a detailed description of the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey.
136 Chapter 4. The Level Effect of Bank Lending Standards on Business Lending
are asked about changes in their lending standards and credit demand. Our bench-
mark model includes the information from the two general questions in the survey on
developments in lending standards and credit demand for loans to enterprises, which
allow us to examine whether there is a level effect of bank lending standards.72 These
"standards" refer to both price and non-price lending terms, such as collateral re-
quirements, non-interest rate charges, loan limits, covenants and maturity. Since we
include bank-specific interest rate spreads in the benchmark model, the "level effect"
relates to non-price bank lending terms.
Banks answer the question on the change in lending standards by choosing
from a scale of five answers: "tightened considerably", "tightened somewhat", "basi-
cally unchanged", "eased somewhat" or "eased considerably". Likewise, the question
on the change in credit demand involves five answering categories: "decreased con-
siderably", "decreased somewhat", "basically unchanged", "increased somewhat" or
"increased considerably". Figure 4.2 reports the frequency of the various answers
given by the panel of banks in The Netherlands, differentiating between the pre-
crisis (2002Q4-2007Q2), crisis (2007Q3-2009Q4) and post-crisis period (2009Q4-
2013Q1).
Figure 4.3 shows the aggregate bank-weighted changes in bank lending stan-
dards on business lending in The Netherlands over time. A few remarks can be made.
First, in the majority of responses (about 60-70%), banks report basically unchanged
72 The survey contains similar questions related to loans to households.
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Figure 4.2: Bank responses to the survey questions on changes in lending standards
and credit demand for loans to enterprises in The Netherlands
Percentage of total number of responses
Note: due to missing observations, the total number of responses to the question on changes in bank lending 
standards is lower than for the question on changes in credit demand. 
Source: based on the confidential bank-level data from the sample of banks participating in the Eurosystem Bank 
Lending Survey in The Netherlands. Aggregate data on the non-weighted net percentage of changes in bank 
lending standards in The Netherlands are publicly available at the ECB's Statistical Data Warehouse and on the 
website of the Dutch Central Bank, see Table T5.5 at 
http://www.statistics.dnb.nl/index.cgi?lang=nl&todo=Bankbedr.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Whole period Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
2002Q4-2013Q1 2002Q4-2007Q2 (2007Q3-2009Q4) (2010Q1-2013Q1)
(228 responses) (89 responses) (49 responses) (90 responses)
Bank lending standards
Tightened considerably
Tightened somewhat
Basically unchanged
Eased somewhat
Eased considerably
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Whole period Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
2002Q4-2012Q4 2002Q4-2007Q2 (2007Q3-2009Q4) (2010Q1-2013Q1)
(230 responses) (92 responses) (48 responses) (90 responses)
Credit demand
Decreased considerably
Decreased somewhat
Basically unchanged
Increased somewhat
Increased considerably
138 Chapter 4. The Level Effect of Bank Lending Standards on Business Lending
lending standards and credit demand. Second, lending standards are more often re-
ported to have been tightened than eased, which is largely due to the crisis period.
Similarly, since the crisis the balance has shifted towards more reporting of credit de-
mand decreases than increases. Finally, banks seldom report a considerable change in
either lending standards or credit demand; they never reported a considerable easing
of lending standards.
Figure 4.3: Changes in Bank Lending Standards on Business Lending in The Nether-
lands*
Weighted percentage of banks 
Source: authors calculations based on confidential bank-level data from the sample of banks 
participating in the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in The Netherlands. Aggregate data on the 
non-weighted net percentage of changes in bank lending standards in The Netherlands are 
publicly available in the ECB's Statistical Data Warehouse and on the website of the Dutch Central 
Bank, see Table T5.5 at http://www.statistics.dnb.nl/index.cgi?lang=nl&todo=Bankbedr.
*This figure shows the answers given by the sample of banks participating in the Eurosystem Bank 
Lending Survey in the Netherlands to the question: "Over the past three months, how have your 
bank’s credit standards as applied to the approval of loans or credit lines to enterprises changed?" 
Grey bars show the weighted percentage of banks in The Netherlands that tightened lending 
standards in a particular quarter. White bars show the (negative) weighted percentage of banks 
that eased lending standards in a particular quarter. Every bank is weighted according to its share 
in the aggregate volume of business lending of the sample of banks participating in the 
Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in The Netherlands.   
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4.2.3 A survey-based measure of the level of bank lending
standards
The novel part of the data set is our measure of a bank’s level of lending standards
and credit demand. We use the individual responses of the banks participating in the
Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in The Netherlands to construct these level vari-
ables. The idea is straightforward: since banks are asked to report changes in lending
standards over the past three months, the quarterly reported changes cumulate over
time. For example, if a bank reports a tightening at t+ 1 and again at t+ 2, the level
of the bank’s lending standards at t+ 2 > t+ 1 > t.
We construct the variable for the level of a bank’s lending standards by coding
the qualitative answers given in the Bank Lending Survey as follows:
BLS_S_levelit= 0 if t = 2002Q3
BLS_S_leveli,t−1 +1 if t > 2002Q3 & standards at t "tightened"
BLS_S_leveli,t−1 +0 if t > 2002Q3 & standards at t "unchanged"
BLS_S_leveli,t−1 −1 if t > 2002Q3 & standards at t "eased"
Thus we start with a zero level of bank lending standards at the beginning of
our sample, and add a value of "+1" when lending standards are tightened, "-1" if
lending standards are eased, and "0" if a bank reports no change. Notice that since
the level effect is identified within bank variation over time, it is not influenced by
the starting point (absolute value) chosen to construct the level of a bank’s lending
standards. The variable measuring a bank’s level of credit demand is constructed
similarly; it starts with a value of zero in 2002Q3 after which increases are coded as
"+1", decreases as "-1", and a "0" is given when credit demand did not change.
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Our benchmark measure for a bank’s level of lending standards (or credit de-
mand) makes no distinction in the degree of tightening or easing; the categories "con-
siderably" and "somewhat" are treated equally. Admittedly, this approach is arbitrary,
but it is in line with the main measure used by the ECB to describe developments of
survey replies over time, i.e. the "net percentage" of changes in aggregate bank lend-
ing standards (see for more details Berg et al. 2005). The ECB also reports a "dif-
fusion index" where the response option "considerably" is given a weight twice as
high as the response option "somewhat" (see i.e. ECB, 2013). We show below that
our main finding of a level effect of bank lending standards is robust to such an alter-
native weighing scheme. We also examine whether the level effect differs between
tightenings and easings of bank lending standards.
4.3 Benchmark results
The results of estimating the baseline specification are presented in the first column
of Table 4.1. We also show an alternative specification with constraints on the one-
off effects of different changes in standards and credit demand. Both specifications
are first estimated with bank and time fixed effects, and then with macroeconomic
controls instead of time fixed effects.
Before we discuss the level effect of bank lending standards, we briefly go into
the impact on business lending of the conditioning variables. The results indicate
that when banks tighten their lending standards "considerably", the quarterly growth
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Table 4.1: Permanent Effect of Level of Bank Lending Standards on Business Lend-
ing
Dependent variable: quarterly growth rate of business lending by bank i in quarter t
(1) (2) (3)
Level of bank lending standards (t-2) −.51∗∗∗
(.08)
−.42∗∗
(.13)
−.47∗∗∗
(.12)
Level of credit demand (t-2) −.01
(.11)
.07
(.07)
−.07
(.10)
Changes in bank lending standards
Tightened considerably (t-1) −3.89∗∗∗
(1.00)
−3.25∗∗∗
(.30)
Tightened somewhat (t-1) −1.02
(.82)
−.53
(.62)
Eased somewhat (t-1) −.46
(1.30)
−.95
(1.79)
Bank lending standards indicator (t-1) −.86∗∗
(.33)
Changes in credit demand
Decreased considerably (t-1) .48
(1.38)
−.25
(.86)
Decreased somewhat (t-1) −1.61∗
(.75)
−1.36∗∗∗
(.34)
Increased somewhat (t-1) 1.10∗
(.58)
.25
(.65)
Increased considerably (t-1) −1.14
(1.60)
−.07
(.38)
Credit demand indicator (t-1) .55∗
(.25)
Interest rate spread (t) .06
(.35)
−.92
(.83)
.15
(.43)
Fixed capital formation (t-3) 1.67
(4.66)
National share index (t-2) −3.15
(1.85)
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes
Time fixed effects yes no yes
Seasonal fixed effects yes yes yes
Time trend yes yes yes
Observations 200 200 200
R-squared .41 .30 .38
Data set includes quarterly observations covering eight banks, 2002Q4-2013Q1. Robust standard errors (clus-
tered by bank) in parentheses. Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Specification (1) is our benchmark. In
specification (2) the time fixed effects are dropped, and macroeconomic controls included. Finally, in specifica-
tion (3) we use an alternative approach to account for the one-off effects of changes in bank lending standards,
and changes in credit demand. Instead of using dummy variables for the various answering categories, specifi-
cation (3) applies an ordinal scale to the various possible answers to each question. The "bank lending standards
indicator" ranges from 1 (eased considerably) to 5 (tightened considerably), and the "credit demand indicator"
ranges from 1 (decreased considerably) to 5 (increased considerably).
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rate of business lending decreases by as much as 3.9 percentage points (relative to
"basically unchanged"); about 1.5 percentage points more than found by Del Giovane
et al. (2011) in their sample of Italian banks. The coefficients for the tightened and
eased somewhat dummies are not statistically significant. Considering the effects of
specific changes in credit demand, we find a marginally significant negative (positive)
effect of a somewhat decrease (increase) in demand of 1.6 (1.1) percentage points;
the size of the coefficient for the somewhat increase in demand is equal to the effect
found by Del Giovane et al. (2011). We do not find a statistically significant effect
of "considerable" changes in credit demand, neither of the level of credit demand or
the interest rate spread on new loans.
The minor role of demand factors and interest rates in explaining bank lending
to firms in the benchmark specification is somewhat surprising, and seems at odds
with standard models in which bank lending is typically demand determined. In this
regard, two remarks can be made. First, it is important to notice that the supply and
demand effects estimated by the survey indicators and the interest rate spread cap-
ture effects over and above those captured by the time fixed effects. Credit demand,
in particular, can be expected to relate closely to macroeconomic developments, the
influence of which are picked up by the time fixed effects. Second, the interest rate
spread and the level of bank lending standards are strongly correlated (the correlation
coefficient equals .67). Thus, when banks increase (decrease) the interest rate spread
on new loans, non-price bank lending standards are generally tightened (eased) as
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well. Notably, in a specification without the variable for the level of bank lending
standards and time fixed effects, the interest rate spread is economically and statis-
tically significant (at the 5 percent level) and negative with a size of 1.47, and the
level effect of credit demand is also statistically significant (at the 5 percent level)
and positive with a size of .18 (see Appendix Table A4.1).
Turning to our main variable of interest: the level of banking lending standards
appears to influence the growth rate of business lending. The estimate for the level
effect of bank lending standards is negative and different from zero at any reasonable
significance level. Further, the size of the "level effect" is economically relevant. It
shows that a one point increase in the level of a bank’s lending standards – i.e. a bank
reports to have tightened its lending standards "somewhat" or "considerably" – per-
manently reduces its quarterly growth rate of business lending by about .5 percentage
points (equivalent to about 2 percentage points in annualized terms).
As a first robustness check, we exclude the time fixed effects and only include
seasonal fixed effects and a time trend, and add macroeconomic controls that are
usually included in estimated credit demand equations. That is, we add the growth
rate of gross fixed capital formation and a variable measuring the change in the Dutch
overall share index. The latter is a proxy for the circumstances for issuing stocks,
which can serve as an alternative to bank financing. We choose the number of lags
for each variable on the basis of the fit of the regression and the Schwarz information
criterion. The results in the second column of Table 4.1 show that investment growth
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lags the growth rate of bank lending to firms by three quarters, but the effect is not
statistically significant. Notably, this lagging pattern is consistent with other studies
(see e.g. ECB, 2013a), and can be explained by firms first financing their investments
with internal funds before they turn to external financing. Also, we find that the stock
market is negatively related (although not statistically significant) to the growth rate
of bank lending to firms, consistent with stock issuance being an alternative source
of financing. More important, however, the level effect of bank lending standards is
fairly robust to this alternative specification. The estimate is statistically significant
at the 5 percent level and negative with a size of .42.
The specification in the third column of Table 4.1 provides another sensitivity
check by using an alternative approach to account for the one-off effects of changes in
bank lending standards and credit demand. Instead of using dummy variables for the
various answering categories, we construct one bank lending standards indicator and
one credit demand indicator, following the approach by Del Giovane et al. (2011).
The bank lending standards indicator has a value of 1 to 5, corresponding to answers
ranging from eased "considerably" (1) to tightened "considerably" (5). Likewise, the
credit demand indicator ranges from decreased "considerably" (1) to increased "con-
siderably" (5). This approach thus implicitly assumes that a linear relationship holds
between the various possible answers to each question. The results show a statisti-
cally significant and negative one-off effect of tighter bank lending standards of .9
(Table 4.1, Column 3); somewhat smaller than the 1.4 found by Del Giovane et al.
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(2011).73 Also, we find a positive but marginally significant effect of an increase in
credit demand of .6, similar to the effect of .7 in Del Giovane et al. (2011). Im-
portantly, the level effect of bank lending standards remains highly significant and
negative with a size of .5.
Succinctly, banks with a higher level of bank lending standards seem to have
lending growth that is both economically and statistically significant lower, holding
other things constant. The level effect of (a one point) tighter standards reduces the
quarterly growth rate of business lending by about half a percentage point, persists
until standards are eased again, and comes on top of any one-off effect of a change
in standards. Notably, this level effect relates to the influence on business lending
of non-price bank lending standards, such as collateral requirements, non-interest
rate charges, covenants etc. In the remainder of this chapter, we extensively check
the sensitivity of this result and assess the implications for business lending at the
macro-level before and after the 2007-09 financial crisis.
73 See Table 6, Column (c) in their article.
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4.4 Discussion and robustness analysis
4.4.1 Response bias
One question comes up immediately when using survey results to construct a measure
of the level of bank lending standards and credit demand. If banks are biased towards
reporting tightening (or easing) of standards, how would this influence the level effect
of bank lending standards? We attempt to address this point below by testing the
robustness of the level effect to a large number of sample and specification changes.
Still, we now make several points.
First, any common bias in the answers given in our sample of banks is picked
up by the time fixed effects which are included in all specifications throughout the
regression analysis.
Second, the distribution of reported tightenings and easings in our sample of
survey results seems to be plausible. While lending standards are more often reported
to have tightened than eased, there are also periods during which the number of banks
tightening outweigh the number of banks easing in our sample (i.e. 2003Q3, 2004Q2-
2005Q2, 2006Q1-Q2, 2010Q4-2011Q2; see Figure 4.3). Moreover, since the sample
includes the period of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, it is not surprising that
banks have reported a tightening of lending standards more frequently.
Third, the direction of a bias in the survey responses, if any, is not clear upfront.
Whereas Schreft and Owens (1991) suggested a bias towards tightenings in fear of
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closer scrutiny from supervisors, Del Giovane et al. (2011) argue that banks might
also have an incentive against reporting tighthenings in fear of public scrutiny. The
aggregate results of the bank lending survey in The Netherlands are often discussed
in Dutch media, especially since the 2007-09 crisis. Thus, an incentive to report
tightenings for supervisory reasons might well balance out against the incentive to
limit public discontent.
Fourth, our empirical strategy to identify a level effect of bank lending stan-
dards relies on changes over time in the bank-specific level variable. So, any bias
against reporting a change in lending standards (whether this bias is against tight-
ening or easing) works against finding a level effect of bank lending standards on
business lending.
4.4.2 Robustness of level effect
Is the finding of a level effect of bank lending standards on business lending fragile?
Do small changes to the sample or specification strongly influence the level effect?
We provide a battery of robustness checks in Table 4.2 to show that our main finding
is basically insensitive to reasonable changes to the sample and adjustments to the
specification. Each of the rows in Table 4.2 corresponds to a different sensitivity
check. We only report the estimate for the level effect; all specifications include the
controls, bank and time fixed effects, as in our benchmark model.
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The Dutch banking system is highly concentrated. As a result, the number of
banks participating in the Bank Lending Survey in The Netherlands (8 during the
sample period) is relatively small. At the same time, there are large differences in
balance sheet size and market shares in overall business lending. To show that our
main result is not caused by a particular bank, we successively exclude every bank
from the sample. The results in rows 1 to 8 of Table 4.2 show that the finding of a
level effect of bank lending standards is not due to a particular bank. The size of the
level effect slightly varies over these subsamples, ranging between .4 and .6.
We continue with the sample sensitivity analysis by dropping groups of banks
with a common characteristic. We consider three tests. First, since the 2007-09
financial crisis there is growing evidence that foreign banks reduced lending more
compared to domestic banks (see i.e. Claessens and Van Horen, 2013). To examine
whether our finding of a level effect of bank lending standards is due to foreign banks,
we drop the two foreign banks from our sample. The results show that the level effect
remains resilient (Table 4.2, Row 9). Second, we examine if our finding is caused by
banks with a relatively small share in aggregate business lending in The Netherlands.
If so, the level effect would lose economic relevance. The results in row 10 of Table
4.2 show that dropping banks with a share of business lending below 10% does not
undermine the main result. Third, we create a more balanced sample by excluding
banks that did not participate in the survey from the start to end of our sample period.
Once more, the level effect is robust (Table 4.2, Row 11).
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Table 4.2: Sensitivity Analysis of Permanent Level Effect of Bank Lending Standards
on Business Lending
Dependent variable: quarterly growth rate of business lending by bank i in quarter t
Level effect Obs.
Benchmark model −.51∗∗∗
(.08)
200
Sample changes
1. Drop bank 1 −.50∗∗∗
(.09)
193
2. Drop bank 2 −.51∗∗∗
(.10)
190
3. Drop bank 3 −.54∗∗∗
(.07)
189
4. Drop bank 4 −.49∗∗∗
(.12)
176
5. Drop bank 5 −.53∗∗∗
(.08)
165
6. Drop bank 6 −.63∗∗∗
(.10)
163
7. Drop bank 7 −.56∗∗∗
(.11)
163
8. Drop bank 8 −.38∗
(.18)
161
9. Drop foreign banks −.53∗∗∗
(.08)
182
10. Drop small banks (share in aggregate business lending < 10%) −.69∗∗∗
(.09)
110
11. Drop banks not in sample from start to end of the survey −.51∗∗
(.14)
148
Specification changes
12. Level variables constructed with alternative weighing scheme −.47∗∗∗
(.08)
200
13. Weighted regression (bank weight = share in aggregate business lending) −.61∗∗∗
(.08)
200
14. Level variables with one-quarter instead of two-quarter lags −.50∗∗∗
(.09)
202
15. Add bank-specific deposit rates −.50∗∗∗
(.07)
196
16. Add lagged dependent variable −.58∗∗∗
(.08)
196
Data set includes quarterly observations covering eight banks, 2002Q4-2013Q1. All regressions include the
control variables as in the benchmark model (see Table 4.1, Column 1), bank and time fixed effects. Robust
standard errors (clustered by bank) in parentheses. Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
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Next, we examine the sensitivity to specification changes. First, we test the
sensitivity of the level effect to an alternative weighing scheme for reported changes
in bank lending standards. Instead of treating the response categories "considerably"
and "somewhat" equally, we now give "considerable" changes (tightenings and eas-
ings) twice as high a weight as "somewhat" changes. The level variable for credit
demand is adjusted in the same way. Table 4.2 row 12 shows that the level effect of
bank lending standards is resilient to this alternative weighing scheme for the level
variables.
Further, we examine whether our finding holds when we apply a weighted
panel regression, where every bank is weighted according to its share in the aggregate
volume of business lending. The results in row 13 of Table 4.2 again confirm the level
effect of bank lending standards. The size of the effect is somewhat larger than our
benchmark estimate, but not statistically different.
Continuing, our benchmark model includes the level variables with a two-
quarter lag. This approach was taken to prevent counting the effect of a change
in bank lending standards or credit demand twice; once by the one-quarter lagged
dummy variable for the respective change, and once by the level variable. Table 4.2
row 14 shows the result when the level variables are included with a one-quarter lag;
the level effect of bank lending standards is basically unchanged.
Following, we investigate whether our result holds when including bank-specific
deposit rates in our estimation. Deposit rates on new deposits can be seen as a mea-
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sure for a bank’s funding costs and higher funding costs could reduce the growth rate
of loan supply. We do not find a statistically significant effect of the deposit rate on
new deposits. Our main result on the level effect of bank lending standards remains
unaffected (Table 4.2, Row 15).
Finally, we check the sensitivity of the level effect when including the lagged
dependent variable. This way, the specification accounts for possible lending dynam-
ics in quarterly business lending. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is
small (.02) and not statistically significant. Importantly, once more the level effect of
bank lending standards is robust; the size being slightly larger than our benchmark
estimate (see final row of Table 4.2).
To sum up, we conclude from the various sensitivity checks that the level effect
of bank lending standards is relatively robust to reasonable changes in the sample and
specification. Banks with a higher level of bank lending standards seem to have per-
manently lower growth of business lending. The size of the level effect is somewhat
sensitive to the sample or specification chosen, ranging between .4 and .7; overall
close to and not statistically different from our benchmark estimate of .5.
4.4.3 Asymmetry
Did the level effect change since the 2007-09 financial crisis? Is the level effect of
tightenings versus easings of bank lending standards different? We now examine
both these types of possible asymmetry in the level effect of bank lending standards.
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First, we test whether the level effect is different during the crisis, pre- or post-
crisis period. We define the crisis as the period from 2007Q3 to 2009Q4.74 Subse-
quently, we create a dummy variable for the crisis, pre- and post-crisis period, and
interact each dummy variable with the level variables for bank lending standards and
credit demand. The results are presented in Table 4.3 column 1. We find a statisti-
cally significant level effect of bank lending standards in all three periods. Moreover,
test results reveal that the size of the level effect is not statistically different between
periods.
Second, we examine whether the level effect is the same for tightening versus
easing of bank lending standards. We add two interaction terms to our benchmark
model; one between the level variable of bank lending standards and a dummy for
tightenings, and one interacted with a dummy for easings. Likewise, we include
two interaction terms between the level of credit demand and a dummy variable for
increases and one for decreases in demand. The results in Table 4.3 column 2 show
that neither of the two interaction terms of bank lending standards is statistically
different from zero; the level effect appears to be symmetric between tightenings and
easings of standards.
Overall, we find no evidence indicative of asymmetry in the level effect of
bank lending standards. The level effect is not statistically different before, during
and after the financial crisis period, or between tightenings and easings of standards.
74 The results are qualitatively unchanged when we define the crisis as the period from 2008Q3-
2009Q4.
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Table 4.3: Asymmetric Level Effect of Bank Lending Standards?
Dependent variable: quarterly growth rate of business lending by bank i in quarter t
(1) (2)
Level of bank lending standards (t-2) * Pre-crisis period (2002Q4-2007Q2) −.48∗∗∗
(.09)
Level of bank lending standards (t-2) * Crisis period (2007Q3-2009Q4) −.42∗∗
(.12)
Level of bank lending standards (t-2) * Post-crisis period (2010Q1-2013Q1) −.58∗∗∗
(.05)
Level of bank lending standards (t-2) −.52∗∗∗
(.08)
Level of bank lending standards (t-2) * Tightened −.01
(.19)
Level of bank lending standards (t-2) * Eased −.28
(.43)
Observations 200 200
R-squared .42 .42
Data set includes quarterly observations covering eight banks, 2002Q4-2013Q1. All regressions include the
control variables as in the benchmark model (see Table 4.1, Column 1), bank and time fixed effects. Addition-
ally, the specification in Column 1 includes interaction terms for the level of credit demand with the pre-crisis,
crisis, and post-crisis period. Specification 2 includes interaction terms for the level of credit demand with a
dummy variable for decreases, and increases. Robust standard errors (clustered by bank) in parentheses. Sig-
nificance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
4.5 Counterfactual analyses
The finding of a level effect of bank lending standards implies that after a prolonged
period of tightening, such as during the 2007-09 financial crisis, bank lending growth
is subdued. Likewise, the level effect could help to explain high bank lending growth
in a period of prolonged easing of standards, such as prior to the crisis. This raises
the question of whether our micro-level estimate for the level effect of bank lending
standards is economically relevant at the macro-level.
In this section, we attempt to quantify the level effect of bank lending stan-
dards on business lending in The Netherlands both before and since the 2007-09
financial crisis. We do so by performing two counterfactual analyses. The first sce-
nario demonstrates the impact of the level of bank lending standards on business
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lending in the period of easing of standards before the crisis. The second scenario
focuses on the period of subdued credit growth since the crisis.
In order to generate a prediction in the counterfactual scenarios for business
lending at the macro-level, we use the estimated coefficients from the weighted panel
regression (see Table 4.2, Row 13). In this weighted panel regression each bank is
weighted according to its share in the total outstanding volume of loans issued by
all banks in the sample. The presented annual (rolling four-quarter) growth rate at
the macro-level, then, equals the weighted sum of the predicted bank-specific growth
rates.
4.5.1 The level effect of looser bank lending standards before the
crisis
In the first counterfactual scenario we aim to isolate the level effect of bank lending
standards on business lending in The Netherlands in the pre-crisis period. We do so
by comparing the actual growth rate of business lending with a prediction based on a
counterfactual scenario in which the level of bank lending standards did not change
after a certain date. We choose 2004Q1 as the quarter after which we hold the level
of bank lending standards constant for each bank. Banks in The Netherlands started
easing standards in 2004 and maintained relatively loose standards until the second
half of 2007 (see Figure 4.3).
The results of the counterfactual analysis are presented in the left panel of Fig-
ure 4.4. The black line shows the actual annual growth rate of business lending in
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The Netherlands. The grey line shows what annual business lending growth would
have been if the level of bank lending standards would not have eased after 2004Q1.
In that scenario, annual business lending growth would have been about 4 percentage
points lower at around 6% in 2006 and 2007. The peak of annual business lend-
ing growth in 2008Q2 seems to have been largely attributed to demand factors and
is only 2 to 3 percentage points lower in the counterfactual scenario at the still high
level of around 13%. Overall, these results suggest that supply factors, as measured
by the level of banks’ lending standards, were important drivers behind strong busi-
ness lending growth in The Netherlands before the 2007-09 financial crisis.
4.5.2 The level effect of stricter bank lending standards since the
crisis
In this second counterfactual analysis, our aim is to isolate the level effect of bank
lending standards in the period since the crisis. Again, we compare the actual growth
rate of business lending with a prediction based on a counterfactual scenario in which
the level of bank lending standards did not change after a certain date. We choose
2008Q4 as the quarter after which we hold the level of bank lending standards con-
stant for each bank. By that time, most banks had tightened their standards about
five times from the low levels reached in 2006, and the aggregate annual growth rate
of business lending was close to its long-term average of 7% (see the dotted line in
Figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.4: Counterfactual Prediction of Pre- and Post-Crisis Business Lending in
The Netherlands
Annual growth rate of business lending
          Pre-Crisis Counterfactual Scenarioa                              Post-Crisis Counterfactual Scenariob
aThe pre-crisis counterfactual scenario starts in 2004Q2; the first quarter in which the level of bank lending 
standards is kept constant. Due to the lag structure in the model (the level variables are included with a two-
quarter lag), the counterfactual prediction of business lending starts in 2004Q4.
bThe post-crisis counterfactual scenario starts in 2009Q1; the first quarter in which the level of bank lending 
standards is kept constant. Due to the lag structure in the model (the level variables are included with a two-
quarter lag), the counterfactual prediction of business lending starts in 2009Q3.                                 
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A particular issue that comes up in the post-crisis counterfactual scenario is the
take over and split-up of one major bank in 2010. As a result, this bank was replaced
in the bank lending survey by one large and two smaller banks. In the counterfactual
scenario we let the three new banks inherit the major bank’s level of bank lending
standards and of credit demand as of 2010Q1.
The results of the post-crisis counterfactual analysis are presented in the right
panel of Figure 4.4. The grey line presents the counterfactual prediction in case
the level of bank lending standards would not have changed after the final quarter
of 2008. In that scenario, current annual business lending growth would have been
close to 4%; about 3 percentage points higher than the actual growth rate.
Overall, these results suggest that the persistently low growth rate of business
lending in The Netherlands since the 2007-09 financial crisis can for a significant
part be attributed to stricter bank lending standards. Due to the prolonged period
of tightening, and limited easing so far, bank lending standards in The Netherlands
are still relatively tight, restricting business lending growth for a given level of loan
demand. This is not to say that depressed demand is not a limiting factor either.
Indeed, the long-run average growth rate of business lending is about 7% annually,
still well above the prediction in our post-crisis counterfactual scenario.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we examine the link between the level of bank lending standards and
business lending using micro-data from the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in The
Netherlands. In this survey, as in similar surveys conducted in countries around the
world, banks are asked to report quarterly changes in standards (i.e. pricing, col-
lateral requirements, non-interest rate charges, covenants etc.) on the approval of
business loans. Taken literally, reported tightenings or easings of standards cumu-
late over time, thus representing changes in the level of a bank’s lending standards.
Economists, however, are often skeptical of such a cumulative interpretation of these
survey results, casting doubt on whether banks interpret the survey questions cor-
rectly. This chapter follows a literal reading of bank lending survey results. In doing
so, we identify a level effect of bank lending standards on business lending using a
simple and intuitive survey-based measure of a bank’s level of lending standards.
The empirical results show that the "level effect" is robust; a one point increase
in the level of a bank’s lending standards – i.e. a bank reports a tightening – reduces
the bank’s quarterly growth rate of business lending in the range of .5 percentage
points; or about 2 percentage points in annualized terms. This level effect persists
until bank lending standards are eased, comes on top of any one-off effect of a change
in standards, and results from the influence on business lending of non-price bank
lending standards. Also, we find no evidence of asymmetry in the level effect before,
during or after the 2007-09 financial crisis, nor between tightenings and easings.
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Our finding of a level effect of bank lending standards helps to explain high
bank lending growth when bank lending standards are loose and low bank lending
growth when standards are tight. We illustrate the economic relevance of the level
effect at the macro-level by performing two counterfactual analyses for business lend-
ing in The Netherlands. The first scenario suggests that due to loose bank lending
standards, business lending growth was about 4 percentage points higher in the years
prior to the 2007-09 financial crisis. As such, our survey-based measure of the level
of bank lending standards provides another potential indicator for macroprudential
policy, although it is subject to the Lucas critique. The second scenario, in turn, in-
dicates that the current annual growth rate of business lending in The Netherlands
is about 3 percentage points lower due to tighter bank lending standards since the
crisis.
We close with some general remarks on our survey-based measure for a bank’s
level of lending standards. First, the level measure does not say anything about the
absolute level of bank lending standards at a certain point in time. Quantitative in-
formation on specific standards, for example on bank loan covenants (Demiroglu and
James, 2010), would be needed to do so. Second, although we find this unlikely, the
finding of a level effect based on survey data might be peculiar to our sample, which
covers the banks that participate in the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey in The
Netherlands. Finally, our goal here is to show that the level effect of bank lending
standards on bank lending can be identified using this survey-based measure of over-
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all lending terms. We did not delve into the survey questions on the factors driving
changes in standards or the conditions and terms involving a change. Examining the
level effect of bank lending standards along these lines could be a promising direction
for future research.
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Conclusions, Discussion and Policy
Implications
This thesis presents a collection of four empirical chapters, related to three di-
verse policy issues. Policy decisions within these three areas all benefit from a better
understanding of factors influencing flows of finance in times of crisis. Understanding
the conditions under which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stimulates private
capital flows to countries that participate in an IMF program (Chapter 1), helps in
shaping the role of the IMF in strengthening the international financial system. Under-
standing how shocks to private trade credit insurance impact on trade (Chapters 2 and
3), contributes to a more timely identification of trade finance constraints and proper
policy response in future crises. Understanding how bank lending standards affect the
supply of bank lending to firms (Chapter 4), provides information needed to decide on
policy interventions, both in periods of high and low bank lending growth. For each of
these three policy issues, this concluding chapter will briefly recapitulate and discuss
the main findings in this thesis, followed by some policy implications and suggestions
for future research.
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Do IMF programs stimulate private capital flows to crisis-hit
countries?
Chapter 1 estimates the effect of a country’s participation in an IMF program on the
country’s private capital inflows. The results shed new light on the empirical rejec-
tion of IMF catalysis of private capital flows in previous studies. Applying an instru-
mental variable model to account for the endogeneity of IMF programs – the stan-
dard approach within the literature that evaluates IMF program effects – it is shown
that IMF programs stimulate private capital flows to countries that do not restructure
their commercial or official debt. The results further suggest that IMF programs help
non-defaulting countries to signal their willingness to reform and repay debts, thereby
catalysing private capital. This signalling role appears to be more important for IMF
catalysis, than the size of IMF lending.
The divide between IMF programs in defaulting and non-defaulting countries
generates new insights on the catalytic effect of IMF programs within the standard em-
pirical approach, but this instrumental variable approach has an important limitation.
The instrumental variables – based on measures of a country’s political and economic
proximity to the United States – generate predictions for a country to participate in an
IMF program that remain imprecise. On average, the estimated probability of program
participation is significantly larger for countries that actually participate in an IMF pro-
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gram, but countries are also incorrectly classified as having a high or low probability.
Essentially, countries that participate in an IMF program differ systematically from
other countries, creating endogeneity issues that are difficult to solve. Another, but
less fundamental, limitation of the empirical strategy is that the effect on private capi-
tal flows is measured only in the year after the IMF program is signed. This way, the
issue of program implementation could be ignored. The findings, however, do not say
anything about the influence of IMF programs on private capital inflows in the longer
run.
Given the methodological limitations that plague the literature on the effects of
IMF programs, one should caution using the empirical findings as a definitive guide to
policy. Keeping this in mind, two general policy implications follow from the consis-
tent finding of a positive effect of IMF program participation on private capital inflows
to non-defaulting countries. First, this finding suggests that early intervention by the
IMF is important. When a default has become inevitable, it is unlikely that an IMF
program can turn the tide by attracting private capital inflows. To support early inter-
vention, policies should aim at limiting the barriers for countries to participate in an
IMF program as much as possible. By itself, the finding in this thesis helps to over-
come one particular barrier; the barrier to participate in an IMF program in fear of a
negative signal triggering capital outflows. Second, the results in this thesis suggest
that the policy conditionality attached, and less so the IMF loan, is what drives the cat-
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alytic effect of IMF programs. Given the first policy implication, this implies a difficult
balancing act in which the IMF should limit the conditions for countries to participate
in an IMF program, while at the same time hold on to those policy conditions needed
to restore the confidence of private investors.
Future research could support the IMF’s ongoing balancing act in finding the
sufficient policy conditions in IMF programs to restore confidence and attract capi-
tal from private investors. One way of doing so, is to exploit the detailed information
on the number, type, and scope of policy conditions attached to IMF programs, made
available relatively recently in the IMF’s Monitoring of Fund Arrangements database
(see i.e. Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2013). For example, one could evaluate dif-
ferences in private capital inflows between countries that participate in IMF programs
with diverse policy conditions.
Do shocks to private export credit insurance impact on
trade?
Chapters 2 and 3 subsequently estimate the effect of claims incurred by a global trade
credit insurer on its quantity and price of export credit insurance, and the effect of
changes in bilateral exports covered with export credit insurance on a country’s total
bilateral exports. So far, the recently emerging literature on the link between trade
finance and trade has studied bank-intermediated trade finance exclusively. The focus
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in this thesis on the role of private trade credit insurance in international trade is novel.
The results in Chapter 2 show that loss shocks temporarily reduce the availability and
increase the premium level of private export credit insurance. These claims effects rise
with the size of the shock; the largest losses are associated with a decline in the share
of bilateral exports insured by the insurer of up to 36% and rise in premium level of
11%. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the private trade credit insurer transmits
extreme loss shocks across countries by reducing its supply of export credit insurance.
In turn, the results in Chapter 3 show that exports covered with private export credit
insurance have a positive effect on a country’s total bilateral exports, and suggest there
is a trade multiplier of private export credit insurance. Overall, claims shocks appear
to have a sizeable effect on the availability of private export credit insurance which
reduces trade more than proportionally.
The unique data set on worldwide insurance underwriting by a global trade credit
insurer allowed to generate these first empirical insights on the characteristics of the
market for private trade credit insurance and its importance to world trade. A limita-
tion of the findings, however, is that they are based on data covering one global trade
credit insurer only. As a result, the estimates for the effect of claims on the quan-
tity and price of private export credit insurance are not necessarily representative for
the market as a whole, as other insurers might react differently to shocks. Also, the
estimated magnitude of the trade multiplier of private export credit insurance should
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be interpreted with some caution. Although the econometric approach and extensive
sensitivity checks limit the potential for bias in the estimates, it may not be ruled out
completely. Finally, a limitation of the data is that they do not cover the period of the
2008-09 global trade collapse. While this event was the primary motivation for this
research, one should be careful in extrapolating the results to this unique period.
Despite these limitations, some general policy implications might be drawn on
the potential impact of trade finance constraints in times of crisis, and how to respond
to them. First, the findings on private trade credit insurance suggest that trade finance
constraints might not only affect trade through limitations in working capital loans
(lending channel) but also via limitations in the supply of trade finance instruments
that reduce the risk of non-payment (risk channel). Thus, in order to limit the impact
on trade, policy interventions should address constraints in both the lending and risk
channel of trade finance. Second, given the importance of private trade credit insur-
ance in domestic and international trade – especially within Europe – an adverse shock
could justify policy interventions targeted at trade credit insurance. If decided upon,
the short-term nature of private trade credit insurance (and trade finance more gener-
ally) implies such support should be mobilized quickly. Indeed, since private trade
credit insurers have the right to reduce or cancel insurance cover overnight, policy
interventions are most likely to be effective when they are developed in advance.
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Aside from the contributions in this thesis, private trade credit insurance is an
unexploited research area. As a result, many research questions are still open and even
the questions asked in this thesis are in need of further examination. For example,
information on insurance underwriting of other trade credit insurers is needed to ex-
amine if they react differently to loss shocks, and to verify the estimated size of the
trade multiplier of private export credit insurance. Also, a key question remains to
what extent reductions in the supply of private trade credit insurance contributed to the
2008-09 global trade collapse. Since trade credit insurers are still reluctant to disclose
detailed information on their activities, however, exploiting other sources of informa-
tion might be a more promising route to further examine the use and impact of private
trade credit insurance. For example, an interesting but yet unused source of data are the
yearly surveys held by Fenedex – an association of Dutch exporters – which includes
information on the various ways exporters cover payment risk.
Do bank lending standards influence the supply of bank
lending to firms?
Chapter 4 estimates the effect of the level of bank lending standards on the growth
rate of bank lending to firms in The Netherlands. There is a growing literature that
studies the influence of changes in bank lending standards on bank lending, but little
attempt is made to identify a level effect of bank lending standards. In this thesis, an
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intuitive bank-specific measure of the level of bank lending standards is introduced,
using confidential information on reported changes in bank lending standards from the
Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey. The results show a statistically robust and econom-
ically relevant influence of the level of bank lending standards on the quarterly growth
rate of business lending in The Netherlands. This level effect persists until bank lend-
ing standards are eased, comes on top of a one-off effect of a change in standards,
and results from the influence on business lending of non-price bank lending standards
such as collateral requirements, non-interest rate charges, and covenants. Counterfac-
tual analyses illustrate how loose bank lending standards contributed significantly to
the lending boom in the years prior to the 2007-09 financial crisis, while tighter bank
lending standards since the crisis limit the current growth rate of business lending in
The Netherlands.
The novel survey-based approach provides a practical way to identify the level
effect of bank lending standards on bank lending in a country, but has its limitations.
For instance, the level measure does not say anything about the absolute level of bank
lending standards at a certain point in time. To infer on the influence of the level of
bank lending standards in a particular period – for example, by counterfactual analyses
– further assumptions are needed. Also, the level measure is based on changes in a
bank’s assessment of its overall lending standards; the conditions and terms involving a
change are disregarded. Finally, the survey-based model can be used to assess changes
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in the supply of bank business lending, but leaves unexplained whether these changes
are driven by shocks to bank balance sheets and/or changes in risk perception.
Taking these limitations into account, a few policy implications follow from the
finding of a level effect of bank lending standards on business lending in The Nether-
lands. First, when assessing current credit conditions, past changes in reported bank
lending standards should also be considered. Further, the evidence in favor of supply
factors contributing to the current low growth rate of business lending in The Nether-
lands, implies there is a risk of credit rationing by banks. To limit this risk, policies
should focus on strengthening bank balance sheets. In turn, policies could also sup-
port the development of alternative means of finance in order to mitigate the economic
impact of bank credit constraints. Finally, the evidence on the contribution of loose
bank lending standards to the lending boom before the 2007-09 financial crisis, sug-
gests there is an important role for macroprudential policy to prevent excessive credit
growth in the future. Notably, the survey-based measure of the level of bank lending
standards could be used as a complementary macroprudential indicator.
This thesis provides the first evidence on a level effect of bank lending standards
on bank lending using information from the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey, leaving
ample room for further research. For instance, policy decisions would benefit from an
examination of the absolute level of bank lending standards, for example by using
loan-level data including information on specific standards. Also, one could delve
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into the survey’s subquestions about the factors driving changes in standards or the
conditions and terms involving a change. This could be a promising direction of future
research, although the quality of the survey-data is likely to become a more pressing
issue. Finally, a straightforward follow-up on this research is to redo the analysis for
other countries within the euro area, preferably within one comprehensive research
project. This way, it can be assessed if the survey-based measure of the level of bank
lending standards contributes to explaining developments in bank lending within the
euro area. Pooling euro area wide bank-specific information from the Eurosystem
Bank Lending Survey, however, requires overcoming some confidentiality issues first.
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Appendices
Chapter 1. IMF-Supported Programs: Stimulating Capital to
Non-Defaulting Countries
Table A1.1: Country List
Albania Dominica Mexico
Algeria Dominican Republic Moldova
Angola Egypt Nicaragua
Argentina El Salvador Panama
Armenia Georgia Papua New Guinea
Azerbaijan Grenada Paraguay
Belize Guatemala Seychelles
Bolivia Guyana South Africa
Botswana Honduras St. Kitts and Nevis
Brazil Indonesia St. Lucia
Cameroon Jamaica St. Vincent and Grenadines
Cape Verde Kazachstan Swaziland
Chile Lesotho Thailand
China Macedonia Tonga
Colombia Malaysia Turkey
Costa Rica Mauritius Uruguay
Croatia
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Table A1.2: Sources of Data
Variable Source
Total private capital flows/GDP Global Development Finance, WB
Real GDP growth World Economic Outlook, IMF
Trade/GDP World Development Indicators, WB
Total debt service/Exports Global Development Finance, WB
Total external debt (US billions) Global Development Finance, WB
Reserves/Imports (Months) International Financial Statistics, IMF
Short-term debt/Reserves Calculated using data from IFS and GDF
Domestic credit/GDP Calculated using data from IFS
Exchange rate volatility Calculated using data from IFS
Exchange rate regime From Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
IMF program IMF Policy Development and Review Department
Precautionary program IMF Policy Development and Review Department
IMF loan (percent of quota) IMF Policy Development and Review Department
US aid/Total aid OECD DAC database
UN voting Provided by Axel Dreher
US bank exposure (US millions) Bank for International Settlements
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Chapter 2. Loss Shocks and the Quantity and Price of Private Export
Credit Insurance: Evidence From a Global Insurer
Table A2.1: Data Sources
Insured Exports, Claims, Premium The trade credit insurance data come from one of the "Big Three" global
private trade credit insurers; company details are confidential.
Exports IFS Direction of Trade Statistics: FOB exports in US dollars. The fig-
ures are converted to euros at the average annual exchange rate. Pre-
1999 exchange rates were calculated as the weighted bilateral dollar
exchange rate of the 11 countries participating at the start of the euro in
1999 (Source: FT/Reuters). All figures are deflated by the Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), overall index, taken from Eurostat,
2000=1.
Table A2.2: Correlation Matrix
Share of Exports Insured Claims Ratio Premium Level Claims Level
Share of Exports Insured 1.00
Claims Ratio −.44 1.00
Premium Level .09 −.14 1.00
Claims Level −.38 .90 .31 1.00
Data set includes 4759 annual observations covering 23 exporting and 122 importing countries from 1992 -
2006. The Share of Exports Insured is calculated as Insured Exportsijt/Total Exportsijt, the Premium Level
as Premiumsijt/Insured Exportsijt, the Claims Ratio as Claimsijt/Premiumijt, and the Claims Level as
Claimsijt/Insured Exportsijt. All variables are in logs.
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Table A2.3: Country List
Algeria Djibouti Korea, Rep Russian Federation
Antigua & Barbuda Dominica Kuwait Samoa
Argentina Dominican Republic Latvia Saudi Arabia
Australia Ecuador Lebanon Senegal
Austria Egypt Lithuania Seychelles
Bahamas El Salvador Luxembourg Singapore
Bahrain Estonia Malawi Slovak Republic
Bangladesh Fiji Malaysia Slovenia
Barbados Finland Maldives Solomon Islands
Belgium France Malta South Africa
Belize Gabon Mauritania Spain
Benin Germany Mauritius Sri Lanka
Bolivia Ghana Mexico St. Kitts & Nevis
Botswana Greece Morocco St. Lucia
Brazil Grenada Netherlands St. Vincent & Grens
Brunei Guatemala Netherlands Antilles Sweden
Bulgaria Honduras New Zealand Switzerland
Burkina Faso Hong Kong Nicaragua Thailand
Cameroon Hungary Norway Togo
Canada Iceland Oman Trinidad & Tobago
Cape Verde India Pakistan Tunisia
Central African Republic Indonesia Panama Turkey
Chile Iran Papua New Guinea Uganda
China, P.R.: Mainland Ireland Paraguay Ukraine
Colombia Israel Peru United Arab Emirates
Costa Rica Italy Philippines United Kingdom
Cote D’Ivoire Jamaica Poland United States of America
Croatia Japan Portugal Uruguay
Cyprus Jordan Qatar Venezuela
Czech Republic Kenya Romania Zimbabwe
Denmark Kiribati
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Chapter 3. The Private Export Credit Insurance Effect on Trade
Table A3.1: Data Sources
1 The private export credit insurance data comes from one of the "Big Three" internationally active private
trade credit insurers; company details are confidential.
2 FOB exports in US dollars are taken from IFS Direction of Trade Statistics. The figures are converted
to euros at the average annual exchange rate. Pre-1999 exchange rates were calculated as the weighted
bilateral dollar exchange rate of the 11 countries participating at the start of the euro in 1999 (Source:
FT/Reuters). All figures are deflated by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), overall
index, taken from Eurostat, 2000=1.
3 Population and real GDP per capita (rgdpl) taken from PWT Mark 6.2. If PWT data are unavailable, I
use World Development Indicators. The figures are converted to euros at the average annual exchange
rate.
4 Currency-union data taken from Glick and Rose (2002).
5 Regional trade agreements taken from WTO website
http//www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/eif_e.xls.
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Table A3.2: Country List
Afghanistan Comoros Hungary Mongolia Solomon Islands
Albania Congo, Dem. Rep. Iceland Morocco Somalia
Algeria Congo, Republic of India Mozambique South Africa
Angola Costa Rica Indonesia Myanmar Spain
Antigua & Barbuda Cote D’Ivoire Iran Namibia Sri Lanka
Argentina Croatia Iraq Nepal St. Kitts & Nevis
Armenia Cuba Ireland Netherlands St. Lucia
Australia Cyprus Israel Netherlands Antilles St. Vincent & Grens
Austria Czech Republic Italy New Zealand Sudan
Azerbaijan Denmark Jamaica Nicaragua Suriname
Bahamas Djibouti Japan Niger Swaziland
Bahrain Dominica Jordan Nigeria Sweden
Bangladesh Dominican Republic Kazakhstan Norway Switzerland
Barbados Ecuador Kenya Oman Syria
Belarus Egypt Kiribati Pakistan Tajikistan
Belgium El Salvador Korea, Rep Palau Tanzania
Belize Equatorial Guinea Kuwait Panama Thailand
Benin Eritrea Kyrgyzstan Papua New Guinea TogoBahamas
Bhutan Estonia Laos Paraguay Tonga
Bolivia Ethiopia Latvia Peru Trinidad & Tobago
Bosnia & Herz. Fiji Lebanon Philippines Tunisia
Botswana Finland Lesotho Poland Turkey
Brazil France Liberia Portugal Turkmenistan
Brunei Gabon Libya Qatar Uganda
Bulgaria Gambia Lithuania Romania Ukraine
Burkina Faso Georgia Luxembourg Russian Federation United Arab Emirates
Burundi Germany Macedonia Rwanda United Kingdom
Cambodia Ghana Madagascar Samoa USA
Cameroon Greece Malawi Sao Tome & Principe Uruguay
Canada Grenada Malaysia Saudi Arabia Uzbekistan
Cape Verde Guatemala Maldives Senegal Vanuatu
Central African Rep. Guinea Mali Seychelles Venezuela
Chad Guinea-Bissau Malta Sierra Leone Vietnam
Chile Guyana Mauritania Singapore Yugoslavia
China, P.R.: Mainland Haiti Mauritius Slovakia Zambia
China, P.R.: Macao Honduras Mexico Slovenia Zimbabwe
Colombia Hong Kong Moldova
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Table A3.3: Further Sensitivity Analysis of Private Export Credit Insurance Effect on Exports
Dependent Variable: Log Exportsijt
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: Insured to Total Exports in Percent > 1% > 5% > 10%
Est. Obs. Est. Obs. Est. Obs.
Benchmark Model .07∗∗∗
(.01)
8356 .13∗∗∗
(.03)
4724 .21∗∗∗
(.05)
2815
1. Add currency unions .07∗∗∗
(.01)
8356 .13∗∗∗
(.03)
4724 .21∗∗∗
(.05)
2815
2. Add regional trade agreements (RTAs) .07∗∗∗
(.01)
8356 .13∗∗∗
(.03)
4724 .21∗∗∗
(.05)
2815
3. Add disaggregated RTAs .07∗∗∗
(.01)
8356 .13∗∗∗
(.03)
4724 .21∗∗∗
(.05)
2815
4. Add lagged dependent variable .06∗∗∗
(.01)
8058 .12∗∗∗
(.02)
4551 .18∗∗∗
(.04)
2687
5. Add controls 1-4 .06∗∗∗
(.01)
8058 .13∗∗∗
(.02)
4551 .18∗∗∗
(.04)
2687
Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) in parentheses. RTAs:
regional trade agreements. All regressions include country-pair (ij), time-varying exporter (it), and time-varying
importer (jt) fixed effects.
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Chapter 4. The Level Effect of Bank Lending Standards on Business
Lending
Table A4.1: Model Without Level of Bank Lending Standards and Time Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: quarterly growth rate of business lending by bank i in quarter t
Benchmark model
(1) (2)
Level of bank lending standards (t-2) −.51∗∗∗
(.08)
Level of credit demand (t-2) −.01
(.11)
.18∗∗
(.07)
Changes in bank lending standards
Tightened considerably (t-1) −3.89∗∗∗
(1.00)
−3.17∗∗∗
(.42)
Tightened somewhat (t-1) −1.02
(.82)
−.09
(.49)
Eased somewhat (t-1) −.46
(1.30)
−1.44
(1.85)
Changes in credit demand
Decreased considerably (t-1) .48
(1.38)
−1.32
(1.02)
Decreased somewhat (t-1) −1.61∗
(.75)
−1.68∗∗
(.61)
Increased somewhat (t-1) 1.10∗
(.58)
.30
(.76)
Increased considerably (t-1) −1.14
(1.60)
−.07
(.37)
Interest rate spread (t) .06
(.35)
−1.47∗∗
(.49)
Bank fixed effects yes yes
Time fixed effects yes no
Seasonal fixed effects yes yes
Time trend yes yes
Observations 200 200
R-squared .41 .26
Data set includes quarterly observations covering eight banks, 2002Q4-2013Q1. Robust standard errors (clus-
tered by bank) in parentheses. Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Specification (1) is our benchmark. In
specification (2) we exclude the variable for the level of bank lending standards and the time fixed effects.
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Samenvatting
Het doel van dit proefschrift was om een diepgravend onderzoek te doen naar
een duidelijk afgebakend onderwerp. Volgens mijn onderzoeksvoorstel – geschreven
in de lente van 2008 – zou het gaan over "De Club van Parijs: de veronachtzaamde
centrale speler in het herstructureringsproces van schulden van landen." Maar niets is
minder waar. Een paar maanden nadat ik mijn gedetailleerde onderzoeksvoorstel had
afgerond, brak de grootste mondiale financiële crisis sinds de Grote Depressie in de
jaren ‘30 uit. Werkzaam als beleidseconoom in de monetaire en later de reëel-
economische beleidsafdeling van De Nederlandsche Bank, kon ik de verleiding niet
weerstaan om mijn onderzoekstijd aan meer actuele beleidsvragen te wijden. Het
resultaat is dat dit proefschrift uit vier empirische studies bestaat, die betrekking
hebben op drie uiteenlopende beleidsthema’s. Terugkijkend, vragen deze
beleidsthema’s alle drie om beter inzicht in veranderingen in financiële stromen in
tijden van crisis.
Het eerste beleidsthema betreft de rol van het Internationale Monetaire Fonds
(IMF) in het versterken van het internationale financiële systeem. Door de mondiale
financiële crisis is de discussie over de vraag waar het IMF zich vooral op moet
richten – crisispreventie of crisisresolutie – opnieuw opgelaaid. Een aspect van deze
brede beleidsdiscussie is de effectiviteit van IMF interventies in landen die in een
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financiële crisis verkeren. De vraag is of IMF-programma’s deze landen helpen om
private kapitaalstromen aan te trekken of dat IMF-programma’s juist signaleren dat
het deelnemende land financieel in de problemen zit? Hoofdstuk 1 in dit proefschrift
geeft een nieuw inzicht in deze meer traditionele onderzoeksvraag.
Het tweede beleidsthema speelde tijdens het hoogtepunt van de mondiale
financiële crisis en de daarmee gepaard gaande ineenstorting van de wereldhandel. In
de periode van oktober 2008 tot en met januari 2009 kromp het wereldhandelsvolume
met 17% – de diepste val van de wereldhandel in de geschiedenis. Wereldwijd
vroegen beleidsmakers zich af of het opdrogen van handelsfinanciering bijdroeg aan
de afname van handelsstromen, en of overheden en centrale banken moesten ingrijpen
door handelsfinanciering te ondersteunen. Het onderzoek in Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 is
gemotiveerd door deze beleidsdiscussie en gaat over private handelskrediet-
verzekeringen, een verzekeringsproduct waarmee bedrijven het risico dat een afnemer
niet betaalt kunnen afdekken. Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt de gevolgen van een negatieve
schok op het aanbod en de prijs van exportkredietverzekeringen van een mondiale
(handels)kredietverzekeraar. Vervolgens schat Hoofdstuk 3 het effect van export-
kredietverzekeringen op de internationale handel.
Het derde en laatste beleidsthema gaat over de bancaire kredietverlening aan
bedrijven; een thema dat nog steeds hoog op de beleidsagenda staat, zowel in Europa
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als in Nederland. Sinds 2009 is de kredietverlening aan bedrijven sterk afgenomen.
De kernvraag is in hoeverre aanbod- en vraagfactoren bijdragen aan de beperkte
kredietverlening. In de context van deze beleidsdiscussie bestudeert Hoofdstuk 4 de
invloed van veranderingen in het kredietbeleid van banken op de groei van de
kredietverlening aan bedrijven in Nederland.
Stimuleert deelname van een land aan een IMF-programma de
instroom van privaat kapitaal?
Landen die financieel in de problemen komen, kunnen bij het IMF aankloppen voor
een hulpprogramma. Een IMF-programma bestaat veelal uit een lening in combinatie
met strenge beleidsvoorwaarden, bedoeld om de financiën en economie weer gezond
te krijgen. De leningen van het IMF zijn echter niet afdoende om het financieringsgat
van een land te overbruggen. Daarvoor is, naast beleidsaanpassingen in het land, ook
kapitaal van private investeerders nodig. De gedachte is dat deelname aan een
IMF-programma de instroom van privaat kapitaal stimuleert, doordat een land
daarmee de bereidheid toont om structurele hervormingen en budgettaire
aanpassingen door te voeren die nodig zijn om (toekomstige) schuldverplichtingen na
te komen.
Tot dusverre hebben studies niet of nauwelijks bewijs gevonden voor een
positief effect van IMF-programma’s op de instroom van privaat kapitaal. Een
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beperking van deze studies is dat geen onderscheid is gemaakt tussen
IMF-programma’s in landen die hun schuldverplichtingen nakomen en landen die
tegelijkertijd met het IMF-programma tekenen voor een schuldherstructurering. Uit
eerder onderzoek is echter bekend dat landen die hun schulden herstructureren in de
jaren daarna een uitstroom van kapitaal ervaren.
Hoofdstuk 1 in dit proefschrift laat zien dat IMF-programma’s wel degelijk
private kapitaalstromen stimuleren naar landen die hun schulden niet herstructureren.
Het blijven nakomen van schuldverplichtingen blijkt een absolute, maar ook
afdoende, voorwaarde voor een positief effect van een IMF-programma op private
kapitaalinstroom. Daarbij suggereren de resultaten dat de positieve invloed op private
kapitaalstromen voornamelijk het gevolg is van de beleidsvoorwaarden die het IMF in
de programma’s stelt. De omvang van de IMF-lening lijkt van ondergeschikt belang.
Deze bevindingen wijzen op twee algemene beleidsimplicaties. Ten eerste,
onderstrepen de resultaten het belang van een vroegtijdige interventie van het IMF.
Wanneer de economische situatie van een land dusdanig is verslechterd dat een
schuldherstructurering onvermijdelijk is, is het onwaarschijnlijk dat een
IMF-programma het tij nog kan keren door private kapitaalstromen aan te trekken.
Om vroegtijdige betrokkenheid van het IMF te stimuleren, moet beleid zich richten op
het zo veel als mogelijk verlagen van de drempel voor landen om deel te nemen aan
een IMF-programma. Op zichzelf kan dit onderzoek hieraan bijdragen doordat het
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laat zien dat de vrees voor deelname aan een IMF-programma, vanwege een mogelijk
negatief signaal aan de financiële markten, onterecht is. Ten tweede, wijst het
onderzoek op het belang van de beleidsvoorwaarden voor de stimulerende werking
van IMF-programma’s op kapitaalinstroom. Samen met de eerste beleidsimplicatie,
toont dit echter de lastige balanceeract waar het IMF zich in bevindt. Zo moet het
IMF de beleidsvoorwaarden in de programma’s beperken om de kans op vroegtijdige
deelname van landen te vergroten, maar tegelijkertijd vasthouden aan die beleids-
voorwaarden die nodig zijn om het vertrouwen van private investeerders te herstellen.
Wat is de invloed van private exportkredietverzekeringen op de
internationale handel?
Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 gaan over het economische belang van private handelskrediet-
verzekeringen. Dit zijn verzekeringen waarmee bedrijven het risico op wanbetaling
door afnemers in binnen- en buitenland kunnen afdekken. In 2012 verzekerden
private (handels)kredietverzekeraars – "niche" spelers in de bredere markt voor
handelsfinanciering – wereldwijd voor EUR1.9 biljoen aan binnenlandse en
internationale handelstransacties. Door een gebrek aan gegevens is er echter weinig
tot niets bekend over de invloed van economische schokken op het aanbod van private
handelskredietverzekeringen en de gevolgen voor de wereldhandel. Dit proefschrift
bevat de eerste twee studies op dit gebied. Beide studies maken gebruik van dezelfde
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unieke gegevens over de wereldwijd verzekerde handel, premie inkomsten en
betaalde claims, door een van de "Grote Drie" mondiale kredietverzekeraars (Euler
Hermes, Atradius en Coface) in de periode van 1992 tot 2006. Tezamen hebben deze
kredietverzekeraars 86% van de wereldwijde markt voor handelskrediet-
verzekeringen in handen.
De resultaten in Hoofdstuk 2 laten zien dat de kredietverzekeraar zijn aanbod
van kredietverzekeringen tijdelijk beperkt en de premie verhoogt, als reactie op een
toename van de claims. De omvang van deze effecten is in potentie groot en neemt
toe met de omvang van het verlies voor de verzekeraar. Zo zijn de grootste verliezen
(20 procent van de steekproef) in het verleden gepaard gegaan met een gemiddelde
afname van ruim een derde van het aandeel van de kredietverzekeraar in de totale
export tussen twee landen. De premie ging in deze gevallen met gemiddeld ruim 10
procent omhoog. Daarnaast suggereren de bevindingen dat de kredietverzekeraar als
reactie op extreme verliezen (1 procent van de steekproef), het aanbod van
exportkredietverzekeringen wereldwijd beperkt. Dit "internationale transmissie-
effect" komt overeen met bevindingen uit de literatuur die het gedrag van mondiale
banken bestudeert.
De verzekeringsliteratuur heeft twee verklaringen voor het verband tussen
claims en het aanbod en de premie van verzekeringen. Enerzijds kunnen verliezen de
kapitaalsbasis van de verzekeraar verkleinen, waardoor de capaciteit om
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verzekeringen aan te bieden tijdelijk wordt beperkt. Door hogere premies in rekening
te brengen kan de verzekeraar de winstgevendheid herstellen, en via winstinhouding
zijn kapitaalsbasis weer aanvullen. Een alternatieve verklaring is dat als gevolg van
de verliezen de verwachtingen ten aanzien van toekomstige verliezen toenemen,
waardoor de verzekeraar minder verzekeringen aanbiedt. De bevinding van een
internationaal transmissie-effect in geval van extreme verliezen suggereert dat in die
omstandigheden kapitaalbeperkingen voor de kredietverzekeraar een rol spelen in de
vermindering van het aanbod van exportkredietverzekeringen.
Hoofdstuk 3 schat vervolgens het effect van private exportkredietverzekeringen
op de internationale handel. Verschillende varianten van het standaardmodel om
handelsstromen tussen landen te verklaren – het zogeheten zwaartekrachtmodel –
laten consistent een positief effect van private exportkredietverzekeringen op de
bilaterale exporten zien. Bovendien suggereren de resultaten dat er sprake is van een
"handelsmultiplier": iedere euro aan verzekerde exporten genereert meer dan één
euro – gemiddeld zo’n dertig cent meer – aan totale exporten. Hiervoor zijn
verschillende verklaringen mogelijk. Zo stimuleren exportkredietverzekeringen de
export naar buitenlandse markten die anders als te risicovol zouden worden
beschouwd. Daarnaast vergroten exportkredietverzekeringen de beschikbaarheid van
handelskrediet voor importeurs, wat hun transactie- en financieringskosten
vermindert en zo hun importvraag kan stimuleren. Tenslotte, kan een exporteur door
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het verzekeren van zijn debiteurenrisico mogelijk betere toegang krijgen tot externe
financiering, wat zijn productiecapaciteit en exporten kan stimuleren.
Samengevat, laten de resultaten in Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 zien dat negatieve schokken
tot een grote afname van het aanbod van exportkredietverzekeringen kunnen leiden,
met een meer dan evenredige afname van de internationale handel tot gevolg. Hieruit
volgen tenminste twee algemene beleidsimplicaties met betrekking tot de impact van
belemmeringen in handelsfinanciering in tijden van crisis, en hoe daar in beleid mee
om te gaan. Ten eerste, wijzen de bevindingen over private exportkrediet-
verzekeringen uit dat beperkingen in handelsfinanciering de wereldhandel niet alleen
kunnen raken via een verminderde beschikbaarheid van werkkapitaalfinanciering,
maar ook via een beperkter aanbod van verzekeringsproducten. Om de gevolgen van
handelsfinancieringsbelemmeringen voor de wereldhandel tijdens een crisis zoveel
mogelijk te beperken, zouden beleidsinterventies belemmeringen in zowel het
werkkapitaal- als het verzekeringskanaal moeten adresseren. Ten tweede, gegeven het
belang van private handelskredietverzekeringen voor de binnenlandse en
internationale handel (vooral in Europa), zou een crisis beleidsinterventies gericht op
handelskredietverzekeringen kunnen rechtvaardigen. Het korte termijn karakter van
private handelskredietverzekeringen (en handelsfinanciering in het algemeen) vereist
echter dat overheidssteun snel moet kunnen worden gemobiliseerd. Dit geldt eens
temeer omdat private kredietverzekeraars hun dekking op afnemers per direct kunnen
Samenvatting 199
intrekken. Kortom, beleidsinterventies zullen het meest effectief zijn wanneer deze
vooraf zijn ontwikkeld en direct uitvoerbaar zijn.
Wat is de invloed van het bancaire kredietbeleid op de
kredietverlening aan bedrijven in Nederland?
Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert de invloed van veranderingen in de kredietvoorwaarden van
banken op de zakelijke kredietverlening in Nederland. In het bijzonder is onderzocht
of aanscherpingen of versoepelingen van het kredietbeleid ook een blijvend effect
hebben op de kredietverlening. Dit effect ligt voor de hand – een strenger
kredietbeleid leidt logischerwijs tot minder kredietverlening – maar is moeilijk aan te
tonen omdat de kredietvoorwaarden uit verschillende onderdelen bestaan waarover
geen gedetailleerde gegevens beschikbaar zijn. Zo bestaan kredietvoorwaarden naast
de rente op een lening bijvoorbeeld uit onderpandseisen, niet-rentekosten, en allerlei
convenanten. Bovendien is een belangrijke vraag of aanpassingen in het kredietbeleid
van banken in een bepaalde periode de kredietverlening stimuleren of beperken
bovenop de invloed van veranderingen in de kredietvraag.
Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift maakt gebruik van vertrouwelijke
enquêtegegevens waarin banken sinds 2003 ieder kwartaal aangeven of de
kredietvoorwaarden zijn gewijzigd ten opzichte van het voorgaande kwartaal. Op
basis van deze gegevens is een nieuwe intuïtieve maatstaf voor het niveau van de
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kredietvoorwaarden van een bank geconstrueerd. De gedachte voor deze maatstaf is
eenvoudig: als kredietvoorwaarden nu strenger worden, blijven ze streng tot het
moment dat ze weer worden versoepeld. Deze maatstaf voor het niveau van de
kredietvoorwaarden van een bank is vervolgens toegevoegd aan een standaardmodel
om de bancaire kredietgroei te verklaren. Dit model schat de invloed van het bancaire
kredietbeleid op de kredietverlening aan bedrijven, rekening houdend met macro-
economische en bankspecifieke veranderingen in de kredietvraag van bedrijven.
De resultaten wijzen op een statistisch robuust en economisch relevant effect van
veranderingen in het niveau van de kredietvoorwaarden van banken op de zakelijke
kredietverlening in Nederland. Deze bevinding is vervolgens gebruikt om de invloed
van het bancaire kredietbeleid op de ontwikkeling van de kredietverlening aan
bedrijven in Nederland vóór en na de financiële crisis van 2007-2009 te analyseren.
Hieruit blijkt dat het soepele kredietbeleid van banken in sterke mate heeft
bijgedragen aan de hoge kredietgroei in de jaren voor de crisis. Daarentegen draagt
het aangescherpte kredietbeleid sinds de crisis juist bij aan de huidige beperkte
kredietverlening aan bedrijven.
Hieruit volgen enkele beleidsaanbevelingen. De rol van het aangescherpte
bancaire kredietbeleid in de huidige beperkte kredietverlening aan bedrijven betekent
dat er een risico is op kredietrantsoenering. In dat geval zouden ook gezonde
bedrijven een beperktere toegang tot bancair krediet hebben, wat schadelijk is voor de
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economie. Om dit risico te verminderen moet beleid zich richten op het versterken
van de bankbalansen. Daarnaast kan beleid de ontwikkeling van alternatieve vormen
van financiering ondersteunen. Voorts wijst de bijdrage van het (te) soepele
kredietbeleid van banken aan de uitbundige kredietgroei vóór de crisis op een
belangrijke rol voor macroprudentieel beleid. Met de wijsheid van nu wordt de sterke
kredietgroei van destijds gezien als een van de oorzaken van de financiële crisis.
Macroprudentieel beleid is gericht op het bevorderen van de financiële stabiliteit,
onder andere door buitensporige kredietgroei in de toekomst tegen te gaan. De
maatstaf voor het niveau van de bancaire kredietvoorwaarden, zoals geïntroduceerd in
dit proefschrift, kan worden gebruikt als complementaire macroprudentiële indicator
om te beoordelen wanneer sprake is van buitensporige kredietgroei.
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this theme in common, and relate to three policy issues.
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servicing their debt. 
The second policy issue came up during the 2008-09 global trade collapse, 
when policymakers around the world raised the question whether a drying 
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its supply of export credit insurance and reduce a country’s trade more 
than proportionally. 
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contributed to the lending boom in the years prior to the 2007-09 crisis, 
while tighter bank lending standards applied since the crisis limit current 
business lending in the Netherlands.
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